

EDITOR'S PREFACE

This handbook is presented as a supplement to several management training and education programs offered by the Management Science and Personnel Assessment Unit of the FBI Academy. The handbook contains carefully selected articles concerning police supervision and management topics. It is intended for the use of students who participate in the various courses and programs presented not only at Quantico, Virginia, but also in the various programs throughout the nation.

For organization purposes the selections are arranged in two groups: police supervision and police management. Although not specifically identified the articles in the entire collection examine the general functions of police planning, organizing, directing, and controlling of human and other police resources. Those in the Police Supervision section contain information of use to first-line supervisors; those in the Police Management section, information of use to mid-level and senior police staff. By no means is the collection exhaustive. For this reason a selected bibliography of management titles is offered in section three for the student who wants to pursue topics in greater depth.

The editor gratefully acknowledges permission to reprint the selections from the publishers holding copyrights: The Office of Public and Congressional Affairs of the Federal Bureau of Investigation for the articles which originally appeared in the FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin; the International Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP) for the articles which originally appeared in The Police Chief and the Journal of Police Science and Administration; and the National Sheriffs Institute (NSI) for the material first published in the National Sheriff.

Hillary M. Robinette
Management Science and
Personnel Assessment Unit
FBI Academy, Quantico, Virginia

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I. POLICE SUPERVISION

Management Control Through Motivation

By DONALD C. WITHAM

*Special Agent
Management Science Unit
FBI Academy
Quantico, Va.*

The task of management is frequently subdivided into the following component parts: Planning, organizing, directing, staffing, and controlling. The management function of control, perhaps befitting its position as the last function listed above, is generally less understood and honored than the other managerial processes. There are many different interpretations of and misgivings about the concept of control. Yet, despite the many misconceptions about the nature of control, there is general agreement about its definition. Henri Fayol's definition in 1916 is still commonly accepted today.

"In an undertaking control consists in verifying whether everything occurs in conformity with the plan adopted, the instructions issued and principles established. It has for object to point out weaknesses and errors in order to rectify them and prevent recurrence. It operates on everything, things, people, actions."¹

The American cultural value of individual freedom is supposedly threatened by any form of control. Highly simplified, the argument goes that freedom is good and control is bad. Although most people are reluctant to admit it, they probably prefer some degree of control in their lives to give them some stability and continuity and to contribute to their general well-being

and safety. Yet, the negative connotation of control still exists; it is amplified by the methods in which controls have been traditionally devised, implemented, and used in both private sector and governmental organizations. Here, we discuss the traditional management control strategies, with particular emphasis on the behavioral implications of these strategies. Motivation theory will also be addressed. Familiarity with such theories may assist law enforcement executives in unleashing the potential of their subordinates, while establishing an organizational climate of self-control and optimum productivity.

A Traditional View of Control

Many managers view control as the managerial means to insure that objectives are implemented. This process is normally accomplished by establishing policies and procedures and measuring and providing feedback on performance.² The process of establishing policies and procedures is related to the concept of control as direction. The father of scientific management, Frederick Taylor, believed that it was a primary responsibility of management to learn the best method and procedures for accomplishing work, prepare written instructions detailing these procedures, and carefully train selected workers in these procedures. Thus, it was the responsibility of managers, and not employees, to provide clear and understandable policies and procedures that would insure the accomplishment of objectives.

The distinctions between policy, procedure, or rule are not always clear and are not really central to our discussion. Broadly stated, policies, procedures, and rules set forth guidelines for making decisions, specify ways for carrying out tasks, and provide regulations that require or prohibit certain behavior. What is important is that managers devise policies and procedures that help employees accomplish objectives. In their early years and while they are relatively small, most police departments, or for that matter virtually all organizations, require very few policies and procedures. Gradually, as the department grows and becomes more complex, the need for policies and procedures becomes more pronounced. It is just not efficient or economically feasible to continue handling every problem as unique. The organizations decide to develop some policies that trade upon experience and give guidance to people facing similar problems for the first time. Today, many departments not only rely on their own experience but hire management consultants and staff specialists to analyze the experiences and innovations of other departments to see if they are applicable to their own department.

Even though the development of policies and procedures is inevitable, and in spite of the advantages just discussed, it is equally inevitable that problems will evolve as a result of these policies and procedures. Unless management is careful to avoid providing too much direction, these problems or disadvantages can easily outweigh the advantages. In this era of rapid change and advanced technology, the idea of planning for and controlling every contingency is not feasible. Above all else, police departments must be flexible and adaptive to the environment. Police managers and patrolmen must use discretion in handling unique or unforeseen incidents. Too much direction leads to an inversion of means and ends. Some people regard plans and procedures as an end in themselves, without regard to their contribution to organizational objectives. Many people feel that this "by the book" mentality is essentially synonymous with bureaucracy.

A final difficulty with control through policies and procedures is the continuing necessity to insure that they are up-to-date. Outdated and improper policies can be a strong demotivator. Some management consultants recommend periodically burning all policies and procedures, and after a few weeks, carefully assessing the situation to determine which policies are really needed and which should be eliminated.

The second control process, measuring performance and providing feedback, has its roots in the concept of control not as direction but as verification—checking to see if activities conform to predetermined direction. This approach involves developing and administering measures of key activities that will discover and determine if objectives are being fulfilled. Elaborate budgetary techniques, management audits, time scheduling techniques such as PERT (Program Evaluation and Review Technique), computer technology, and management information systems have the capacity to provide police managers with voluminous amounts of accurate, complex information in a timely fashion. Crucial to the effectiveness of such approaches, however, is choosing what to measure. How well the measurements are designed makes a difference in how much they can help the organization reach its objectives. Probably one of the most damning, but accurate, complaints about management by objectives, at least with respect to the way it is frequently implemented, is the seductive urge to concentrate on that which is quantifiable at the expense of that which is important. If control systems are to avoid being counterproductive, both from an organizational effectiveness standpoint and from a motivational perspective, they must highlight links between effort and performance.

Research on the effects of control systems upon motivation and behavior leads to the conclusion that completeness, objectivity, and responsiveness to employee effort and performance are desirable and necessary qualities of the performance measures.³ Employees perceive that measurements define important aspects of the job. They assume that what is counted is what matters. As Harold Hook, the president of American General Insurance Company, states, "A company gets what it inspects, not what it expects."⁴ In a 1963 report, P. M. Blau comments that law enforcement officials who are assigned an established caseload and a quota for clearing cases pick easy or fast cases toward the end of each month if they anticipate falling short of their quota.⁵ Several studies document how employees will make sure, by fair means or foul, that measurements will register at satisfactory levels. The performance measures selected for the control system can, in fact, change the behavior of employees, and if the measures are not a valid indicator of performance, this change in behavior may well be dysfunctional.

Feedback is an integral part of control through the use of performance measurement. Feedback makes it possible to compare actual and intended performance and to make the necessary adjustments. The popular belief that accurate feedback results in improved performance has not always been supported by research studies.⁶ Additionally, the effectiveness of feedback can vary depending on who or what provides it. Most individuals seem to find the task and themselves the preferred source.⁷ Supervisors often make a poor source of feedback. "Critical feedback from supervisors in a performance appraisal system tends, indeed, to provide more stimulus to defensiveness than to improve performance."⁸ In short, feedback can be both valuable and risky.

Control Through Motivation

Now that the possibilities of controlling the behavior of people in organizations through policies and procedures and through performance measurement and feedback have been discussed, it is necessary to consider the motivational processes of individuals and see how police managers can apply this knowledge to control the behavior of their personnel. According to motivation theory, people have certain needs and beliefs or expectancies

"Feedback is an integral part of control through the use of performance measurement."

about whether or not various ways of behaving will lead to satisfaction of these needs. Within us all, mental and emotional processes are at work to determine how we will behave. This article will briefly review some of the major theories of motivation in order to assist in understanding this psychological process.

Maslow's Hierarchy of Needs

In a classic work in the 1940's, Abraham Maslow outlined an overall theory of motivation using a hierarchy of needs concept which can be most helpful in explaining the vagaries of human behavior.⁹ (See fig. 1.) A basic assumption of the theory is that all behavior is goal-directed. The desired goals represent satisfaction of basic human needs. These needs are arranged in a hierarchical relationship with the lowest needs being prepotent. According to the theory, people are always in a state of want, but what they want is a function of the pattern of need satisfactions within the hierarchy. Lowest-level needs are predominant until they are at least partially satisfied, at which time higher-level needs emerge and become the energizers for future behavior. Maslow states that a satisfied need is not a motivator of behavior.

Just as satisfied needs move people up the hierarchy, unsatisfied needs move people back down the hierarchy to their basic physiological and safety needs. Thus, a young police lieutenant with a graduate degree and virtually unlimited career advancement potential is probably operating normally at a level of ego/esteem need satisfaction or self-actualization. However, if he were captured by a group of terrorists and involved in a lengthy hostage situation, within a relatively short time his behavior would be directed toward the satisfaction of basic physiological needs, as well as the maintenance of his safety and that of the other hostages.

Although Maslow did not intend that his theory be directly applied to work motivation, the need hierarchy can be roughly converted. (See fig. 2.)

The research conducted to validate Maslow's model has had mixed results, and most likely, the model is not the final answer in work motivation. However, the model does serve one very significant purpose—to make managers more aware of the diverse needs of people at work.

Herzberg's Two-factor Theory of Motivation

Frederick Herzberg extended the work of Maslow and developed a specific theory of work motivation. Using what is known as the critical incident method, Herzberg has posed the following to the many different types of workers—professional and manual.

"Think of a time when you felt exceptionally bad about your job, either your present job or any other job you have had. Tell me what happened. Conversely, think of a time when you felt exceptionally good about your job . . . and tell me what happened."¹⁰

The responses obtained were fairly consistent. When people were describing good feelings, they were generally associated with job experiences and job content, and bad experiences were generally associated with the environment in which the work was accomplished. Herzberg states that what makes people feel good and bad about their work are two separate and distinct factors. The good factors are called motivators; the bad factors, hygiene. (See fig. 3.)

Herzberg's theory is closely related to that of Maslow. The hygiene factors are preventative and environmental in nature and are roughly equivalent to Maslow's lower-level needs. These factors are important because they prevent dissatisfaction and almost certain poor performance, but they do not lead to feelings of satisfaction and consequent high performance. Herzberg believes that a person must be given a task to perform which is challenging and meaningful to him in order to be motivated.

Herzberg's theory has also been heavily criticized by academicians and practicing managers. The most serious criticism would appear to be with the methodology employed. When researchers depart from the critical incident method (describing one instance when they felt either particularly good or bad about their job) used by Herzberg, they generally obtain results which are quite different from those the two-factor theory would predict.¹¹ An additional point of controversy over Herzberg's theory is the listing of salary or pay as a hygiene factor. Herzberg states that pay is the most important hygiene factor, but many people feel that even this preeminence among hygiene factors may be an overcorrection for many workers. In other words, pay can be and is a motivator for many people. A study by Lawler in the early 1970's has shown that money can be a powerful motivator for some people.¹² Still, Herzberg's work is extremely valuable to practicing managers because it provides an understanding of job-content factors and worker satisfaction.

Figure 1.





Figure 2.



Expectancy Theory of Motivation

In an attempt to address some of the limitations of Maslow's and Herzberg's motivation theories, Victor J. Vroom proposed the expectancy theory of work motivation in 1964.¹³ Essentially, there are many models of motivation built around the concept of expectancy theory. Most academicians have embraced the expectancy theory because they feel it adequately describes the motivational process of individuals than the simplistic models of Maslow and Herzberg. It should be recalled that Maslow and Herzberg believed that all behavior was goal-directed and that goals represented satisfaction of human needs. By way of contrast, the expectancy theory states that human being is both emotional—feeling satisfaction of needs—and rational—thinking through what alternative actions will satisfy needs—at the same time. In effect, we try to predict the consequences of our behavior with respect to the payoffs we receive, i.e., there is a cognitive aspect of behavior. Basic to the cognitive view of motivation is the notion that individuals have cognitive (subjective) expectancies concerning the outcomes of their behavior and have preferences among these outcomes. Thus, people have an idea about possible consequences of their acts and make conscious choices among consequences according to their probability of occurrence and their value to them. "Thus for the cognitive theorists the anticipation of reward that organizes behavior and the perceived value of various outcomes that gives behavior its direction."¹⁴

For example, consider the situation of a young patrolman studying for a sergeant's exam. The night before the exam the patrolman is trying to decide how to spend the evening. He has a number of choices. He could stay home and study, go to the local gym and work out, go to the neighborhood bar, or take his girl to the movies. Each choice will produce its own payoffs for the patrolman. The one he chooses will be the one which will provide the greatest payoffs with respect to his needs and values. The

"If control systems are to avoid being counterproductive, . . . they must highlight links between effort and performance."

patrolman is likely to have a sense of achievement as a result of studying for the exam, and if he believes (his subjective probability) that studying for the exam will lead to a high grade and he values a high grade and the expected resulting promotion, it is very likely that he will spend the evening in study. It may be that in addition to a need for achievement, the patrolman also has a strong need for affiliation. In this event he could satisfy both needs by studying with other officers preparing for the exam. However, if the officer does not believe (subjective probability) studying will have any effect upon his grade or if he places little or no value on achieving a high grade and possible promotion, there is very little likelihood that he will study.

The expectancy models can become quite complex and frequently involve mathematical equations and formulas to predict behavior. This complexity and quantifiability are obviously attractive to academicians and simultaneously tend to scare off practicing law enforcement executives. This is most unfortunate. Obviously, people do not become mathematicians to figure out their every act, but this does not mean that expectancy theory is of no value.

In real life, people trade upon their experience and knowledge to make quick, subjective estimates of the payoffs resulting from various behaviors. The true value of expectancy theory lies in highlighting the reasoning side of people—the cognitive side of behavior. Generally, if managers can cement the link between task performance and need satisfaction, they raise the probability that employee efforts will be committed to organizational goals and objectives. Managers are employed to assist in realizing organizational objectives, and their effectiveness depends upon the cooperation of their subordinates. They must clarify for subordinates the paths of behavior that will fill the subordinates' need satisfaction and insure these paths are parallel or complementary to attainment of organizational goals.

The central notion of expectancy theory is that people will act in a particular way as a function of how certain they are that the act will be followed by a reward and what value that reward holds for them. The reward must be contingent upon performing specific acts which are organizationally desirable. Management, thus, is able to control organizational behavior by the design and administration of reward practices. By insuring that rewards are linked to organizationally desired behaviors and that the paths to these rewards are clarified for subordinates, management can establish real control of their organization.

Conclusion

We have reviewed the control process from the perspectives of establishing policies and procedures and also from measuring and providing feedback on performance. Additionally, we have discussed the complex psychological process of motivation in order to gain some insight into why people behave in certain ways. The first two approaches can be of invaluable assistance to law enforcement executives in controlling the behavior of their organizational members, but simultaneously, the limitations and po-

tential disadvantages of these approaches must be considered. The desire for control and uniformity based on policies and procedures must be balanced with the necessity of allowing decisionmakers some flexibility when confronted with new and unanticipated situations. The accelerating nature of societal changes serves to guarantee an increasing number of such situations in the future. Policies and procedures essential to the efficient operation of the department must be regularly reviewed—at least annually—to guard against dysfunctional behavior and negative impact on members' motivation. Similarly, when measuring the performance of police officers, executives must insure that the elements measured correlate strongly with effort expended and performance achieved. Departments must measure the important elements of performance and not just those elements which lend themselves to measure.

Police executives can enhance their ability to achieve organizational objectives and control individual performance by understanding motivational processes and applying this knowledge to work situations. By designing and administering the reward practices (pay, promotions, assignments, etc.) of the organization so that they are obvious rewards of superior performance, managers can increase the probability of receiving satisfactory performance. Officers will discipline their own behavior with self-control to

Figure 3.

Herzberg's Two-factor Theory of Motivation

HYGIENE FACTORS	MOTIVATORS
Company policy & administration	Job itself (meaningful and challenging)
Interpersonal relations	Recognition
Working conditions	Achievement
Supervisory practices	Responsibility
Salary	Advancement

increase their opportunities to receive organizational rewards. As Drucker states, "People act as they are being rewarded or punished."¹⁵ Management control of the behavior of organizational members can be greatly enhanced by an understanding of the motivational processes and by applying this knowledge on the job. **FBI**

Footnotes

¹ Henri Fayol, *General and Industrial Management*, trans. Constance Stors (London: Sir Isaac Pitman and Sons, 1949), p. 107.

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³ E. E. Lawler, and J.G. Rhode, *Information and Control in Organizations* (Santa Monica, Calif.: Goodyear, 1976), p. 42.

⁴ Harold Hook, "Catchwords Become a New Management Technique," *Business Week*, December 15, 1975, p. 77.

⁵ P. M. Blau, *The Dynamics of Bureaucracy*, rev. ed., (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1963), p. 45.

⁶ Lyman W. Porter, Edward E. Lawler III, and J. Richard Hackman, *Behavior in Organizations* (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1975) p. 303.

⁷ M. M. Greller and D. M. Herold, "Sources of Feedback—A Preliminary Investigation," *Organizational Behavior and Human Performance*, April 1975, pp. 244-256.

⁸ H. H. Meyer, E. Kay, and J. R. P. French, Jr., "Split Roles in Performance Appraisals," *Harvard Business Review*, January-February 1965, pp. 123-129.

⁹ Abraham Maslow, *Motivation and Personality*, (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1954). The hierarchy of needs concept is discussed in detail in Chapter 17.

¹⁰ Frederick Herzberg, Bernard Mausner, and Barbara Bloch Snyderman, *The Motivation to Work*, 2d ed. (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1959), p. 141.

¹¹ Marvin D. Dunnette, John P. Campbell, and Milton D. Hakel, "Factors Contributing to Job Satisfaction and Job Dissatisfaction in Six Occupational Groups," *Organizational Behavior and Human Performance*, May 1977, pp. 143-144; C. A. Lindsay, E. Marks, and L. Goslow, "The Herzberg Theory: A Critique and Reformulation," *Journal of Applied Psychology*, August 1967, pp. 330-339.

¹² Edward E. Lawler, *Pay and Organizational Effectiveness—A Psychological View* (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1971), pp. 91-92.

¹³ Victor H. Vroom, *Work and Motivation* (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1964).

¹⁴ J. P. Campbell, M. D. Dunnette, E. E. Lawler III, and K. E. Weick, Jr., *Managerial Behavior, Performance and Effectiveness* (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1970), p. 343.

¹⁵ P. Drucker, *Management: Tasks, Responsibilities, Practices* (New York: Harper and Row, 1974), p. 504.

MANAGEMENT

Labor's Most Effective Organizer

By WALT H. SIRENE

*Special Agent
Management Science Unit
FBI Academy
Quantico, Va.*

Employee organizations are made, not born. Rarely does the seed of organized labor sprout in a well-managed organization which has as one of its major objectives the welfare of its employees. Whether intentional or not, the best organizers of labor are managers who, through poor management, lack of concern for legitimate grievances, or plain ignorance, antagonize the workers to the point where their only alternative is to form collectively so as to bargain. It's fair to say that throughout the history of the police labor movement, few police officers promoted unionism as the ultimate solution. Most likely, they were forced to reluctantly change their fraternal organization into a collective bargaining unit.

Police today have even taken a further step. As they become more and more frustrated at the bargaining table, they are turning toward affiliation with the Teamsters and the AFL-CIO to gain power through intimidation, experience in bargaining, and broader financial resources by which to gain their demands. The Teamsters and the AFL-CIO are both making a concerted effort to organize a national police union. This is evidenced by the fact that the AFL-CIO has recently granted a charter to its first police union affiliate—the International Union of Police Associations (IUPA)—to compete with the Teamsters' bid to organize law enforcement. The IUPA already claims a membership of more than 40,000 police officers throughout the country. As for the Teamsters, at least 10,000 police officers are presently members of

their locals. Teamsters' officials estimate that they bargain on behalf of 15,000 police officers in approximately 225 municipalities.¹

In the 1980's, the question is posed, "How can this occur?" Can we learn from the history of law enforcement labor relations or must we repeat the mistakes which have been made from city to city, from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, since the Boston police walkout in 1919. How many times must city officials and police managers be reminded that bad faith bargaining with local, independent police associations will lead to the introduction of organized labor unions in the labor/management equation? On the other hand, how many times must inexperienced members of employee organizations representing their membership in collective bargaining allow emotion to overrule judgment, promoting irresponsible job actions? The prime responsibility for good management of an organization lies with managers, not employees. Therefore, when local employee organizations are formed and subsequently affiliate with organized labor, one usually finds the prime cause to be the outgrowth of a management problem. This article identifies for managers the warning signals which lead police employees to unionize and seek organized labor's influence to force city officials to improve police pay and benefits. The following case study is typical of many cities and depicts why more and more police are joining the Nation's largest labor unions.

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Case Study

Dellwood, a community with a population of 55,000, has 50 police officers. It is located in the heartland of the United States and has had collective bargaining legislation in force since early 1973. Its law provides a system whereby a State agency certifies a democratically selected "union" or "association" as the employee's sole representative in collective bargaining. In 1973, very few of Dellwood's police officers foresaw the day when they would begin bargaining collectively for wages, hours, and working conditions, let alone be represented by organized labor. After all, they were one of the highest paid departments in the area. Their chief of 12 years was considered to be somewhat autocratic and tough, but he was fair and consistent. Furthermore, he was a pillar of integrity and had established respect and support throughout the community for both the department and himself. This apparently was the lull before the storm.

The chief died unexpectedly, and his successor was a lieutenant with 20 years' experience on the Dellwood police force. The new chief was respected by the department's employees and was dedicated to law enforcement. The employees hoped that an already good situation would improve. This was not realized, however, as communications and morale began to deteriorate shortly after he took office. It became popular in the early tenure of the new chief to refer to the barriers of communication as the "brass walls." Officers began complaining openly that the

brass was unwilling to listen to their concerns or grievances.

Another source of dissatisfaction voiced by the officers pertained to the lack of planning and training. They cited the example of the purchase of a new radio system through Law Enforcement Assistance Administration (LEAA) funds. By the time the system was installed and activated, no one had received any instruction on its use, adding to the frustration level.

As unrest increased in the department, neighboring police agencies were unionizing and engaging in collective bargaining. Dellwood's officers repeated, with envy, the rumors about the contract provisions that provided formalized grievance procedures and new financial benefits being obtained by other agencies through negotiations. Needless to say, the stage was set, and Dellwood's officers began talking about forming a union to bargain with the city.

PBA vs. Teamsters

As the concept of unionizing gained momentum, factions developed within the department over who would represent them. Should the Teamsters or the Police Benevolent Association (PBA), which had existed as a social organization in the department for 20 years, be elected as the exclusive bargaining agent? A group of young officers sought Teamster representation, while PBA support came from "the old guard."

A heated campaign preceded the election, resulting in further polariza-

tion of the department. Each side developed their arguments:

In Favor of the PBA

- 1) Better results with local people dealing with local problems;
- 2) Lower dues;
- 3) More control over expenditures;
- 4) More personal relationship between union and management;
- 5) No conflict of interest when enforcing laws involving organized labor; and
- 6) More positive image for professionalism.

In Favor of the Teamsters

- 1) More experience in bargaining;
- 2) More influence;
- 3) Management respect for union power;
- 4) More money, experts, and legal support;
- 5) Political impact through lobbying and candidate support; and
- 6) More benefits, such as union insurance programs.

Issues concerning the effect of the Teamsters image on public opinion and the officers' own self-images continued to be mentioned in locker room debates. Officers frequently questioned the Teamster's negative image and asked, "What about *our* image?" The responses heard included, "More police officers are indicted every year than Teamster officials," and "If you want results, choose a union with power. The only union more powerful than the Teamsters is the Soviet Union."

Management's Mistake

The election was held in January 1974, and the PBA won with a 2-1 margin. Out of 40 persons eligible to vote, only 3 voted "no union." In city hall, the chief of police, the city manager, and mayor were quietly rejoicing because the Teamsters lost. They anticipated a local PBA, unskilled in the bargaining process, would be easier to negotiate with and would lack the financial resources to employ a labor consultant, whom they refer to as a "hired gun." The city administration viewed collective bargaining as undesirable, but they were confident they could "win" by outwitting the PBA.

By summer 1974, the first labor contract was negotiated. Personalities aside, the bargaining was primarily a battle rather than a negotiation. Both parties came to the bargaining table ready to reject the others demands and proposals as being unreasonable. By expecting these things and preparing for them, each set a tone which brought about the expected conduct. Neither party wanted to lose, and as a result, a bitter fight or a stalemate usually occurred. Numerous grievances were filed in the next 3 years concerning overtime, court-time pay, and past practice issues which were the product of poorly written contracts. The officers during this period were frequently talking about the city's bad faith in both bargaining and contract administration. The city, according to Dellwood's officers, continually had indicated "there was no more money in the budget," when in fact there was. As a result, Dellwood's police officers were now one of the lowest paid in the area.

By 1977, after three contracts, "teamsters" were saying, "I told you so," and officers who had previously promoted the PBA were now silent.

"The prime responsibility for good management of an organization lies with managers, not employees."

The Weight of Self-Image

When the contract was about to expire, officers supporting the Teamsters obtained over 30 percent of their fellow officers' signatures on a petition to compel an election to determine who would be the bargaining agent for the next contract. Both the PBA and the Teamsters once again qualified for the ballot.

On this occasion, the Teamsters won the election hands down. During this period, there was little discussion regarding the Teamsters' impact on the police public image. As one officer put it, "We just balanced the sensitivity of our image and appearance of professionalism against the desire to make management sit up and listen." In 4 short years, Dellwood's police department had unionized and become affiliated with the Nation's largest labor union. City administrators were at a loss to understand why its police officers had unionized or sought affiliation in organized labor. One thing was certain, they all agreed it wasn't going to be easy to outwit the Teamsters.

Analysis

An analysis of the case study reveals the most common reasons why police unionize and why they eventually become affiliated with organized labor. If management is to be successful in deterring unionization or keeping labor/management conflict at a minimum, they will have to address these issues.

Low Salary

Salary is not generally recognized as a major cause for forming employee organizations. However, salary becomes an employee dissatisfier, if

wages and benefits received are not comparable to those of other organizations in the surrounding areas and significantly less than neighboring police agencies. From this dissatisfaction, other employee grievances form, much as electrons around a nucleus. Managers must realize that the true cost of dealing with the union is not higher wages but having to share management practices with the union. Once an employee association is formed, management loses its right to act unilaterally; valuable time must now be spent in negotiations. The real cost then lies in negotiations concerning disciplinary actions, personality clashes, or patrol assignments. When added up, one could argue it would be less expensive to pay the prevailing wage than to bear the expense of shared management. The other benefits of competitive wages are the attraction of better qualified personnel to the organization, a more content work force, the removal of wages as a rallying point, and the belief that management is concerned with the welfare of the worker's families. Adequate compensation for employees should not, however, be construed by management to be merely a cynical process used to buy off employees. It must be accompanied by a genuine concern for the employees' welfare. The concern can be illustrated by periodic wage reviews in order to keep wages in line with the cost of living. Management should also insure that each employee understands what they may be able to anticipate in terms of wage increases so that sound economic planning by the employee can occur. In general, salary can be identified as one triggering cause of employee dissatisfaction; rarely though, does money promote job satisfaction. Adequate compensation is a reflection of management concern for employee welfare. The more management understands the role of money as a motivator, the less salary will be a causative factor in the formation of employee associations. Consider this statement by Gus Tyler in the March/April 1972, issue of *Public Administration Review*:

"Among the first to unionize are the better paid, better situated employees, while the very last to organize are the most deprived and aggrieved. The cycles of unionism seem to come not when a new outrage is perpetrated against employees, but when the class or subclass is ready and times are propitious."²

Personnel Problems

Personnel problems are often cited as the "trigger mechanism" in police job actions. Pent-up employee frustrations concerning policies which they consider unfair, poorly administered by a rotating cadre of managers or administered solely to still dissent, often combine around a single instance. The emotions generated inevitably lead to more serious dissatisfaction, or in the extreme case, a strike. "Each organization should have one person who has direct, personal responsibility for employee relations."³ If the organization is widespread geographically or relatively large in size, it should have one representative for each precinct or department, as Joseph Latham in *Employee Law Relations Journal* correctly points out:

"The appointment of one person will facilitate development of a rapport with all the employees. He or she should take the time to get to know the employees and to listen to their questions and problems, providing relief for complaints when possible and, when relief is not possible, explaining why.

"In addition, the person responsible for employee relations should: Train and evaluate supervisory personnel to handle employee relations;

"Once an employee association is formed, management loses its right to act unilaterally. . . ."

Keep informed about local wage and benefit surveys; and
Ascertain that the employer is getting a good compensation package for its money."⁴

A labor relations individual can assist not only the aggrieved employee in reaching a just solution to his problem but also the organization in learning firsthand the type and scope of employee problems. It would seem far better to trade this management prerogative to the employee rather than surrender it later to the labor organizer.

Lack of a Grievance Procedure

Separate from the appointment of one or more individuals to handle employee relations, each organization should have a separate path for employees to air grievances. This more formal path allows employees to present their grievance in the manner of their choice. History is replete with examples of organizations which deemed grievance procedures a sign of weakness. Adoption of such procedures was considered an insult to enlightened management and a right to be denied a mere employee. Such arrogance has led to the formation of employee associations or unions in a number of organizations in both private and public sectors. Rather than indulge in the belief that grievance procedures are a sign of inherent weakness, management should recognize the necessity of establishing a procedure by which complaints can be heard by managers sympathetic to employee concerns. If organizations do not have such procedures in place, it is logical to anticipate some degree of employee dissatisfaction.

Poor Working Conditions

Poor working conditions are not a concern of a satisfied employee. However, once employees become dissatisfied with other circumstances, poor working conditions intensify discontent. Working hours, poor equipment, fringe benefits, discipline procedures, and the condition of the work environment all influence morale. While it is probably true that poor working conditions will not cause employees to organize, they do become a sustaining factor for employee complaints until a more substantive issue comes along. Of all the expenses incurred by a police organization, the maintenance of good working conditions is minimal. There is little doubt that a poor working environment is a direct reflection of poor management.

Lack of Identity and Recognition

"The desire for self-expression is a fundamental human drive for most people. They wish to communicate their aims, feelings, complaints, and ideas to others. Most employees wish to be more than cogs in a large machine. They want management to listen to them. The union provides a mechanism through which these feelings and thoughts can be transmitted to management."⁵

The police believe they are playing an important role in society, and in return, they are not receiving the compensation or recognition they believe they deserve and the responsibility they want. This belief of nonappreciation can have a far-reaching impact on police work itself. As the police begin to feel less and less important they begin to accept the idea that their's is just another profession, and at that point, the romance, glory, and commitment go out of the job.

Lack of Administrative Leadership

At the 1967 Conference of Mayors, Jerry Wurf, President of American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees (AFSCME) stated:

"You (the mayors) represent our best organizers, our most persuasive reason for existence, our defense against membership, apathy and indifference, our perpetual prod of militancy, and our assurance of continued growth . . . Unions would be unable to sign up a single employee if he were satisfied, if his dignity were not offended, if he were treated with justice . . ." ⁶

Mr. Wurf could also have leveled his charge against some police managers. If organizations lack individuals who exhibit the quality of leadership, again the potential for employee dissatisfaction is increased. Of all organizational problems, this is probably the most vexing. Simply put, the foundation of all leadership is knowledge. Some leadership qualities can be imparted through the process of training, while other more subtle qualities are seemingly genetic in origin and can only be obtained by a careful selection procedure for individuals as managers.

Lack of Internal Communications

No better statement on this problem exists than one made by Commissioner Don Pomerleau of Baltimore:

"Employee organizations develop many times because we have not established all inclusive and progressive communications. We and our subordinates have not listened, nor have we provided our personnel with a means to seek redress for their real or imagined problems. The old autocratic and dictatorial approach to problem solving has come under severe criticism, and rightly so.

"Opening lines of communication is an effective means of creating a stable labor environment. Communication between the police administrator and his officers give each an understanding of the other's problems. Two-way communication is best facilitated by periodic, informal discussions. An informal discussion offers three decided advantages: officers are able to express their needs and dissatisfactions; more time-consuming and costly methods of achieving changes in employment conditions, such as lobbying and collective bargaining, are avoided; police officers develop a better understanding of management problems." ⁷

Suffice it to say, if managers are dedicated to improving channels of communications, the labor relations battle is more than half over.

Organized Labor

Public officials, having ignored the causes of unionization, now maintain that if the police must join a union, they would prefer it to be a local, independent association. The majority of city and police administrators are, therefore, opposed to organized labor's efforts to step-up their drive to unionize the police. Yet, by adopting a win/lose bargaining philosophy that eventually evolves into a losing situation of frustration and job dissatisfaction, management once again falls prey to helping the union in its organizing efforts.

When management fails to negotiate in good faith with a local, independent police association, they invite and are, in fact, the catalyst for its subsequent affiliation with organized labor. The scenario presented in the previous case study is typical of many cities in the country today. Many city officials have been approaching collective bargaining in a negative manner, and a self-fulfilling prophecy results. Good faith bargaining doesn't mean giving in to the union's demands—it does mean attempting to develop an atmosphere of trust and cooperation, opening lines of communication, and working toward

common goals where the needs of both parties can be realized. Cities that fail to recognize this basic principle of good faith bargaining push the local, independent police association to their tolerance point. Frustrated with their inability to have the city fathers listen to what they perceive to be legitimate demands, the police look for other alternatives to gain the city's attention. One alternative in such an emotionally tense situation is for the police to participate in some type of job action—a slowdown, speedup, or blue flu. Another alternative, less radical than a job action, is to affiliate with organized labor. The police realize that the power of organized labor is its ability to intimidate the city administration. It is no wonder, therefore, that more and more police are joining the Teamsters and the AFL-CIO in order to "force" cities to listen to their demands and bargain openly. If cities prefer not to deal with organized labor, then they must recognize that the answer to this dilemma is to learn to deal with the local, independent police association in an atmosphere of trust and cooperation, promoting the true tenants of good faith bargaining. It is unfortunate that it often takes an act of intimidation to cause a shift from a competitive or combative approach to collective bargaining to one of collaboration. Needless to say, if management were truly wise, it would direct its efforts toward identifying the cause of unionization and eliminating the need for a union in the first place.

FBI

Footnotes

¹ Alan Dodds Frank, "When All Else Fails, Call the Teamsters," *Police Magazine*, September 1978, vol. 1, No. 4, pp. 21-34.

² Gus Tyler, "Why They Organize," *Public Administration Review*, March/April 1972, p. 98.

³ Joseph Al Latham, Jr., "Susceptibility to a Successful Union Organizing Campaign—The Seven Warning Signals," *Employee Relations Law Journal*, Autumn 1980, vol. 6, No. 2, p. 231.

⁴ *Ibid.*

⁵ Dale S. Beach, *Personnel—The Management of People at Work*, 2d ed., (New York: The MacMillan Co., 1970), p. 83.

⁶ John H. Burpo, *The Police Labor Movement* (Springfield, Ill.: Charles C. Thomas, 1971), p. 11.

⁷ *Ibid.*

Leadership: A Police Perspective

By WILLIAM F. WALSH

A basic concept of sound management is that the effectiveness of any enterprise is directly related to the quality of its leadership. This is true for law enforcement as well as private industry. It follows that in order to be a successful police manager, one must be an effective leader. But what is leadership? Also, what should a newly promoted individual do to develop leadership ability? These are important questions when we consider that most organizational failures are attributed to ineffective leadership and often result in negative consequences for the individual in command.

Leadership Defined

Leadership is a frequently used term in the lexicon of management. Some experts in the field define it "as the skill of gaining influence with others,"¹ while others identify it as "the process of influencing the activities of an individual or group in efforts toward goal achievement."² In his analysis of the police manager's role, Lynch states that leadership is "the role of the manager in influencing subordinates to work willingly to achieve the stated objectives of the organization."³

These definitions share three basic elements: influence, willing workers, and task achievement. Thus, leadership may be identified as a relationship between the police manager and those he commands, a vital part of which involves his ability to influence them to perform their tasks willingly. Leadership is a function of a manager's total approach to his management role, constrained by his personality, the attitudes and personal characteristics of his subordinates, and the organizational environment in which they work.

Influence v. Direction

A key variable in this concept of leadership is the ability of a manager to influence the actions of his subordinates. Influencing others is of particular importance in policing because of the

special position of the police supervisor. Unlike many other managers, he is accountable for subordinates who by the very nature of their organizational role operate without direct supervision during the majority of their work period.

While law, policy, and procedures attempt to regulate the discretionary power of police officers, autonomy is an integral part of their operational milieu. In fact, it is not unusual for the average operational supervisor to have visual contact with a patrol officer only three or four times a shift, lasting from five to 10 minutes per contact. In those agencies that are responsible for miles of public highway and vast rural areas, the autonomy of officers is even greater.

Unfortunately, a major problem for some police managers is their inability to conceive of themselves in the role of an influencer and motivator of people. Instead, they equate their positions with that of the military leader who directs and commands his subordinates. This view is reinforced by the traditional paramilitary management philosophy of many police departments. Yet, nothing could be further from the truth. The autonomy aspect of the police operational role places the manager in a very different position from his military counterpart. Bittner expressed this concept most clearly when he stated:

Contrary to the army officer who is expected to lead his men into battle even though he may never have a chance to do it, the analogously ranked police official is someone who can only do a great deal to his subordinates and very little for them.⁴

The police manager may be classified as an after-the-fact supervisor. He usually participates in an event after an officer has taken some type of action or has been requested to solve a problem. On the other hand, the military supervisor functions directly with his subordinates. A good military unit operates and thinks as one under his direction. This is a vastly different situation from the autonomously operating police officer responding to various complex societal problems.

The law enforcement manager who fails to understand this and attempts to lead from a position of total authority and direction will often earn the contempt and disrespect of his officers. A police manager should recognize that the willing performance of his officers is dependent on his ability to influence them in a positive manner at all times—even when he is not present.

Development of Leadership Ability

Leadership is an art that each individual in a managerial position must develop; it is not something that he or she is born with or can copy. When an agency promotes an individual to a management position, it gives him power over the actions of others. But the true source of leadership is the unit he commands and is exemplified by how well its members perform their duties without his direct supervision. The ideal leader is recognized as such by both the organization and those in his work unit.

It was once believed that if individuals developed certain

WILLIAM F. WALSH is an assistant professor in the Administration of Justice Program, The Pennsylvania State University, College of Human Development, University Park, Pennsylvania 16802. He formerly was a lieutenant with the New York City Police Department, having completed 21 years' service. Walsh holds B.A. and M.A. degrees from John Jay College of Criminal Justice and is a doctoral candidate at Fordham University. He is also a graduate of the FBI

National Academy. As a part of Penn State University's service to law enforcement through its continuing education programs, Walsh has instructed police officers in the municipal and state levels on the practice and concept of management.

qualities, others would follow them. To date, research on leadership has failed to identify a particular set of qualities that guarantees success as a leader. Individuals will follow the direction of another for one or a combination of the following reasons:

- They fear his authority and the manner in which he controls, directs, and plans.
- They like him as a person.
- They respect him because he has proven by his actions that he has a set of values consistent with theirs, and he is consistent in the manner in which he deals with the subordinates.
- They trust him and he has exhibited confidence in his role as a police manager, clearly indicating his ability to make decisions and manage conflict and change.⁵

The police manager may be classified as an after-the-fact supervisor, usually participating in an event after an officer has taken some type of action. The manager who fails to understand this and attempts to lead from a position of total authority and direction will often earn the contempt and disrespect of his officers. The willing performance of these officers is dependent on his ability to influence them in a positive manner at all times—even when he is not present.

Leadership based upon trust is both lasting and effective. It can be developed through personal contacts between the manager and the members of his unit, who depend upon their commander's knowledge of law and procedures. They will evaluate his judgment and decision-making ability on a daily basis. Accordingly, they will react to him in the manner in which he personally treats them.

For many officers, their best and worst experience in police work can be attributed to the actions of a supervising officer rather than job circumstances and duties. The effect of managerial action on employees is directly correlated to the manager's leadership ability. Trust and confidence can be developed over them, depending to a great extent on how well an individual employs various leadership patterns.

Leadership Styles

There have been many attempts to identify and define successful styles of leadership. In the first part of this century, we had "scientific management" that emphasized concern for tasks only. Later, the "human relations movement" stressed concern for work group norms and values. Recently, the "participative management" approach has attempted to synthesize these earlier concerns into one style.

Law enforcement managers, by the nature of their role and occupational experience, are to a great extent task-oriented. Police emphasis on quick response to calls for service and the authority expected of them by the public tend to reinforce their concern for tasks. Public as well as private sector managers are rewarded or penalized according to how well they accomplish organizational activities.

Yet, it should always be remembered that organizational goals and objectives ultimately depend on the willingness of the personnel required to carry them out. Unit personnel are determinants of leadership style. Task-orientation must be balanced with knowledge of values, norms, needs, and the proficiency of the officers required to carry out the task.

Police officers expect to be managed in certain ways. They look to their leaders to respond to their needs and assist them in task accomplishment.

Generally, if managers can cement the link between the task performance and need satisfaction, they raise the probability that employee efforts will be committed to organizational goals and objectives.⁶

Many police officers relate to and identify with their agency. They derive self-satisfaction from membership in their department, which represents their need to belong. The accomplishment of objectives and pride in their role appeals to their personal self-worth.⁷ Managers must take these variables into consideration in selecting a proper leadership pattern.

The particular style chosen by the leader will also be affected by the assumptions he has concerning his subordinates and the particular situation confronting him. In reality, he will probably select different leadership styles depending upon his assessment of the above factors. Robert Tannenbaum and Warren H. Schmidt, in an attempt to analyze the everyday world of the manager, developed a continuum of leadership, suggesting that the average manager uses seven different leadership styles, ranging from the full use of authority to allowing complete freedom for his subordinates.⁸ The selection of the appropriate style is a factor of three groups of variables: the forces within the manager, within the group, and within the situation⁹ (See Figure 1).

The style that incorporates the full use of managerial authority is selected when the manager directs his employees to carry out his orders without question. It is the appropriate pattern in police emergency situations and on those occasions where any delay would likely result in negative consequences for the agency.

An example of this type of pattern might be found in a lost child situation. The officer in charge would be directing the operation and ordering his officers where to search. His instructions would be based on incoming information and his overall plan of action. In order to do a proper job, it is important that he maintain operational control.

Another style on the continuum, one that is very common for operational managers in law enforcement, is the "selling" leadership pattern. Lower-ranking supervisors are often placed in the position of carrying out policy and procedure decisions made by upper management.

Selling is simply recognizing that most people are in a better position to, and are more likely to, support the boss if they understand why.¹⁰


The effective manager who finds himself in this position should first analyze the policy to gain proper insight and understanding. Then he should identify the positive elements in it that affect his personnel. When informing his work group of the policy, he would first attempt to sell them on the positive aspects. People are more inclined to support something they view as positive.

The middle grouping of patterns identified by Tannenbaum and Schmidt may be viewed as encompassing a participative or consultative approach to leadership. The manager using this style will make his final decision to act only after he has obtained suggestions and advice from the members of his unit. While the final decision is still his, it is made with the consultation of his staff.

In order for this style not to be viewed by the subordinates as manipulative, the manager must give them feedback: did he use their input or not? Also, he must inform them of the reasons for his decision. It is through this interactive process that trust is built between leader and follower. If he fails to do this, they will not participate in the future.

The participative style of leadership may be used when the manager requires the services of a qualified subordinate who possesses knowledge or skills he does not have. For example, before instituting a particular operational plan in a service area, the police supervisor may seek the advice of the officers assigned to patrol that area. This is a positive approach because people close to a situation frequently have a solution to the

Figure 1



FROM: "How to Choose a Leadership Pattern," Tannenbaum and Schmidt, *Harvard Business Review*, March-April, 1958.

The police manager's position involves vicarious liability for the actions of his subordinates. Whether or not a supervisor wishes to allow his officers total freedom, he can never escape the accountability commensurate with his function. He is *always* responsible, and not making a decision does not reduce his liability. Failure to act will be viewed by his subordinates as approval of their behavior.

problem but are not asked. Including personnel in the decision-making process is also a good means of gaining their support for a plan. Police officers usually will support policy that they have helped to develop.

There are many important aspects of this style, including sharing of responsibility, mutual trust, personal commitment, and development of subordinates to their full potential. But it requires mature subordinates and a manager who is willing to be open and candid with them.

At the opposite end of the continuum from the full use of authority is a pattern that grants total freedom for making decisions to the work unit. The individual who employs this style has been labeled an "abdicrat." The problem with this type of leadership is that some individuals carry it too far and no decisions are reached. When this happens, no one will gain satisfaction from his work.

It should be remembered that the police manager's position involves vicarious liability for the action of his subordinates. Whether or not a supervisor wishes to allow his officers total freedom, he can never escape the accountability commensurate with his function. He is always responsible and not making a decision does not reduce his liability. No decision is a decision in itself and will be viewed by his subordinates as approval of their actions.

Summary

Leadership is an art that each police manager must develop. How effective he is as a leader will depend on his ability to influence his subordinates. The traditional para-military management philosophy of some police agencies negates this view of police leadership. Our position is that the autonomy factor of the police officer's role works against this traditional view and will prevent the law enforcement manager from fully realizing his potential.

True leadership is built on mutual trust and respect that is a result of the interactive patterns selected by the supervisor in dealing with his officers. When a manager gains the respect and confidence of those he commands, he will have become a true leader, one appointed by his agency and recognized as such by his subordinates. He will be getting the job done willingly through others, and his management task will be an easier one. ★

¹Donald F. Farreau and Joseph E. Gillisple, *Modern Police Administration* (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice Hall, Inc., 1978), p. 62.

²Paul Hersey and Kenneth Blanchard, *Management of Organizational Behavior Utilizing Human Resources*, 3rd ed. (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice Hall, Inc., 1977), p. 84.

³Ronald G. Lynch, *The Police Manager* (Boston, Holbrook Press, Inc., 1975), pp. 71-72.

⁴Egon Bettner, *The Functions of Police in Modern Society* (Chevy Chase, Md.: National Clearinghouse for Mental Health, 1970), p. 59.

⁵Lynch, *The Police Manager*, pp. 69-70.

⁶Donald C. Witham, "Management Control Through Motivation," *FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin*, Vol. 49, No. 2 (February 1980), p. 10.

⁷Robert Tannenbaum and Warren H. Schmidt, "How to Choose a Leadership Pattern," in *Management: A Book of Readings*, ed. Koontz and O'Donnell, p. 505.

⁸Robert Tannenbaum and Warren H. Schmidt, "How to Choose a Leadership Pattern," *Harvard Business Review*, 36 (March-April 1958), pp. 95-101.

⁹*Ibid.*

¹⁰R. Fred Ferguson and Paul M. Whisenand, *The Managing of Police Organizations* (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1973), p. 222.

We are currently living at a time when the stable state of social systems has been lost. Views and ideologies of occupations, organizations, and traditional institutions are experiencing perpetual transformation. Law enforcement institutions are no exception in terms of change and should not be exempt from scrutiny if they are to fulfill the needs of a complex society. We should not, however, be discouraged by the complexity of social changes, for as Donald A. Schon says, "No established institution in society now perceives itself as adequate to the challenges that face it."¹ We should, instead, acknowledge and accept the need for change, develop systems that deal effectively with the rapidity of change, and provide for leaders who are willing to meet the challenges of complexity.

This article explores the changes and transformations occurring in law enforcement agencies as a result of the loss of the stable state, examines what causes these changes, and dis-

Beyond the Stable State

Schon's idea of dynamic conservatism indicates that organizations strive to maintain a stable state as long as possible by minimally accommodating new ideas.² As an organization moves beyond the stable state and begins to accept change, the driving force behind the change begins to lose its momentum. Momentum is gradually dissipated as an idea reaches a satisfactory level of acceptance and the system assimilates the change. The new idea becomes, then, a part of the stable state and replaces the old idea.

Schon further states that ideas that produce change travel in clusters.³ While only a portion of these ideas are successfully used, they can still bring about substantial organizational change and produce a significant rippling effect and concomitant anxiety throughout the system. The greatest anxiety develops in those employees who are close to the change process but have no input into the process. The anxiety level drops in proportion to the

By

ARNOLD R. GERARDO*

Special Agent

*Federal Bureau of Investigation
Washington, D.C.*

**Special Agent Gerardo was formerly assigned to the Management Science Unit, FBI Academy, Quantico, Va.*

Leadership and Transformation

cusses the managerial traits necessary for future law enforcement leaders to deal with change. Finally, this article examines one specific managerial tool, situational leadership, developed by Paul Hersey and Kenneth Blanchard, which provides a situation-specific method for managing while working within a complex, changing environment.

individual's distance from the center of change.

Responses in law enforcement organizations to the loss of the stable state have been mixed. One negative response is sometimes voiced as a desire by leadership to return to "the way it used to be."⁴ Another is what Schon calls "mindlessness,"⁵ which is the avoidance of the dreaded reality of the present. These negative responses only undermine the purpose and the functioning of the agency. Positive re-

sponses, on the other hand, allow for creative solutions to new problems. Future leaders must respond in an optimistic and positive manner to change in order to deal effectively with the transformation. They must accept that change is inevitable, recognize the transformation, and realize the need to develop new tools by which to manage the transformation.

Transformation

Transformation takes place in law enforcement, as in other agencies, for many reasons. Post-Watergate morality, societal expectations, accountability for expenditures, technological advances, diversity of values among employees, and scarcity of resources contribute to a sense of loss of a stable state in the organization.

Some managers find themselves at odds with the values they see prevalent in younger employees. A manager must understand, however, that diverse value systems are representative of the population he serves. He must, as a leader, learn to understand the varied value systems in order to manage more effectively within this ever-changing environment.

The new employee, whether employed by law enforcement or any other organization, is motivated by a multitude of factors and looks at employment quite differently from the manager. Today's new employee shops for a job, takes a look at wages and short-term benefits, and makes comparisons from one job to another. He leaves one agency for another if his personal needs are better met. This job transience can result in a lack of commitment that has been evident in many organizations. As Arnold Deutsch explains, "Never before have so many asked so much for doing so little."⁶ This concept, known as the entitlement theory, is defined "... as the perception that one is entitled to some things he or she does not have to work for."⁷

Employees have become very independent and find protection in civil service regulations, affirmative action programs, new personnel practices, and the alternatives civil litigation provides. This sense of independence has created and continues to create serious management problems when a leader fails to use appropriate leadership styles. Managers must be aware that their styles of leadership need to take into account these varied employee value systems as part of the total working environment. Therefore, future leaders need to understand the changing values of employees. In addition, they need to possess specific managerial attributes to use leadership tools effectively.

The Future Leader

According to Harlan Cleveland in his book, *The Future Executive*, the complexity of modern organizational systems is diffusing the opportunity to lead and is intensifying the demands for effective leadership.⁸ Cleveland states that as organizations become more complex, leaders must increase the number of persons consulted in the decisionmaking process. This requires certain demonstrated managerial attributes.

Effective leaders have particular attributes according to Cleveland. The effective leader:

- 1) Always has a great tolerance for ambiguity;
- 2) Makes sense of what appears to be complex and enjoys working in a complex environment;
- 3) Is intellectual and possesses more general rather than specialized experience;
- 4) Provides a forum for open and diverse discussion and consequently receives an

“An integral part of the situational leadership theory . . . is the relationship between the variables within the leader, the follower, and the given situation.”

- abundance of data to use in his decisionmaking process; and
5) Adapts well and handles the tensions that arise in this open climate.

From Cleveland's point of view, the nature of future leadership is its lack of visibility. The leader finds satisfaction in internalizing the fact that he does a commendable job. A leader with these attributes is receptive, then, and employs managerial tools to meet the needs of his everchanging organization.

Managerial Tools: Situational Leadership

One tool that can be useful to an effective leader is Hersey and Blanchard's "situational leadership theory." According to these two authors, "Leadership is the process of influencing the activities of an individual or group in efforts toward goal achievement in a given situation."⁹ An integral part of the situational leadership theory, therefore, is the relationship between the variables within the leader, the follower, and the given situation. Situational leadership affords the manager the latitude to be flexible in his leadership styles and skills in order to vary his behavior. "If the needs and motives of his subordinates are different, they must be treated differently."¹⁰

Experience shows that the acceptance of a leader by a group or an individual is paramount in determining the leader's effectiveness. A follower accepts or rejects the leader and therefore determines the level of personal power the leader has. Even though the leader possesses position power, he will be totally effective only if his followers accept him, award him personal power, and thus produce at successful levels in both quality and quantity of work. Situational leadership,

therefore, places emphasis on the relationship of the leader to his followers. This requires that the leader be aware of the maturity levels of his followers, of the various styles of leadership he can employ, and of the impact of developmental and regressive cycles on his leadership.

Maturity of Followers

The situational leadership model focuses on the maturity of the followers. Maturity is defined within the model as "the capacity to set high but attainable goals, willingness and ability to take responsibility, and education and/or experience of an individual or group."¹¹

The leader must consider these maturity variables for each employee in each assigned task. For example, a police officer assigned to an investigative detail may possess few investigative skills, but may possess many other skills. He is mature in a general sense, but immature in terms of investigative skills. Not only must the leader assess the maturity level of each individual employee, but also the maturity of the group as a whole. An example is the assignment of several officers possessing different maturity levels to the same surveillance. The complexity of their specific assignment must be correlated to their individual skills.

Maturity is composed of two factors—willingness (motivation) and ability (competence). Evaluation of employees requires that the leader assess both maturity factors for each employee. There are a total of four combinations of the two factors, identified as follows:

M1 = followers are neither willing nor able to take responsibility;

M2 = followers are willing but not able to take responsibility;

M3 = followers are able but not willing to take responsibility; and

M4 = followers are willing and able to take responsibility.

The maturity levels of followers, therefore, comprise a range from M1 to M4, with M1 being low maturity level, M4 being high maturity level, and M2 and M3 being considered moderate maturity levels. (See fig. 1.)

Figure 1

High	Moderate	Low
M4	M3 M2	M1
Mature		Immature

Task Behavior and Relationship Behavior

In addition to maturity levels, the situational leadership model "is based on a curvilinear relationship between task behavior and relationship behavior and maturity."¹² Task behavior is the extent to which leaders organize and define the roles of the members of their group (followers) and explain what activities each is to do and when, where, and how to do it. Relationship behavior is the extent to which leaders maintain personal relationships between themselves and members of their group (followers) by opening up channels of communication, providing socioemotional support and "psychological strokes," and facilitating behaviors.¹³

Upon determining the maturity level of the follower or group, the leader

“Employing effective leadership styles at all levels of an organization can be a significant factor in the accomplishment of its goals.”

employs a specific leadership style. As the maturity level of the follower increases in a given task, the leader should begin reducing task behavior and increasing relationship behavior until the follower has reached a moderate level of maturity. As the follower moves into and above the high moderate level of maturity, the leader decreases both his task behavior and relationship behavior. As the maturity level of the follower moves from immature to mature, the leader must select an appropriate leadership style. Situational leadership theory describes four leadership styles comparable to the four maturity levels.

Leadership Styles

Situational leadership divides effective leadership into quadrants. These four areas are defined according to a correlation between task behavior and relationship behavior. Labeling the four leadership styles is useful for quick diagnostic judgments.

High Task/Low Relationship

Behavior (S1) is referred to as “telling” because this style is characterized by one-way communication. The leader defines the roles of followers and tells them what, when, and how to do various tasks.

High Task/High Relationship

Behavior (S2) is referred to as “selling” because most of the direction is still provided by the leader. The leader attempts through two-way communication and socioemotional support to get the followers to accept psychologically decisions that must be made.

High Relationship/Low Task


Behavior (S3) is called “participating” because the leader and followers share in decisionmaking through two-way communication. The leader provides much facilitating behavior since he

has determined that the followers possess the ability and knowledge to perform the task.

Low Relationship/Low Task

Behavior (S4) is labeled “delegating” because the leader lets the followers “run their own show.”

Figure 2



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Because the followers are high in both task and psychological maturity, the leader applies only general supervision.

The leader, then, must select the appropriate style (S1 to S4) to suit the maturity level(s) (M1 to M4) of his followers. The diagram illustrates how this selection process works. By drawing a 90° angle from the appropriate point on the curvilinear continuum (the task/relationship correlation), the leader can determine the appropriate style. The quadrant in which the right angle and the curvilinear continuum intersect is the appropriate leadership style for that follower in that task. (See fig. 2.)

Developmental Cycle

The situational leadership diagram illustrates the process of identifying the maturity levels of followers and determining the most effective leadership style in a given situation. What can a leader do, however, when he identifies the maturity level of followers to be M1, not willing or able to perform the task? The leader must then select from various alternative methods to develop the relevant task maturity of the individual. This approach is known as the "developmental cycle."¹⁴

In developing the maturity of an individual or group, the leader must take a risk. He must delegate more responsibility and immediately reward any progress. Development, therefore, is a two-step process: First, "a reduction in structure (task behavior), and second, if adequate performance follows, an increase in socioemotional support (relationship behavior)."¹⁵ Development must occur in almost all tasks that are assigned to an individual, since his maturity level can vary depending on the task itself.

As the development of the follower progresses in the continuum to the high point of the curvilinear function (from S2 to S3), the process changes. At this point, the leader begins to reduce structure as well as socioemotional support. At this stage, the leader depends on the complexity of the task assigned and the performance potential of the individual or group in making the job assignment.

The Regressive Cycle

What happens, however, when an employee shows less maturity than he previously exhibited in his job? This condition, called the "regressive cycle," occurs when an individual or group begins to behave in a less mature manner than in the past. A decrease in maturity is generally attributed to "high strength competing responses" in the environment.¹⁶ Situations or forces beyond the work environment, such as family or community problems, may begin to affect a follower's work performance. Even though the work situation has not changed, the employee's performance may alter drastically.

For example, this cycle may occur with a model employee who is highly motivated and a high achiever. Not only is he an excellent employee, but he also has an outstanding personal life. The leader may have been employing the "delegation" style effectively. Suddenly, the employee has a serious personal problem, and the quantity and quality of his work begin to decline. A nonsituational manager may take the attitude, "Let's give him time and allow him to solve his personal problem." Hersey and Blanchard believe that what the employee really needs is a little more structure and direction, as well as significant increases in socioemotional support.

The leader needs to change his leadership style from a delegation mode to a participative mode. Once the regression appears to subside and the maturity level is stable and begins to improve, the leader uses the development cycle to reorient his follower.

Conclusion

This overview of situational leadership is presented in an attempt to reinforce the existing need for police executives to use all available tools in managing their organizations effectively. Employing effective leadership styles at all levels of an organization can be a significant factor in the accomplishment of its goals. As society and employee values change, agencies are forced to move from well-established, stable organizational and managerial states. In turn, managers must learn to adapt their styles and to use varied managerial tools in order to become more effective leaders. **FBI**

Footnotes

¹ Donald A. Schon, *Beyond the Stable State* (New York: W.W. Norton and Company, Inc., 1971), p. 17.

² Ibid., p. 31.

³ Ibid., p. 15.

⁴ Ibid., p. 28.

⁵ Ibid., p. 29.

⁶ Arnold R. Deutsch, *The Human Resources Revolution* (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1979), p. 57.

⁷ *The Washington Post*, Parade Magazine, November 25, 1979, p. 27.

⁸ Harlan Cleveland, *The Future Executive* (New York: Harper and Row Publishers, 1972), p. 5.

⁹ Paul Hersey and Kenneth A. Blanchard, *Management of Organizational Behavior: Utilizing Human Resources*, 3d ed. (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1977), p. 84.

¹⁰ Ibid., p. 159.

¹¹ Ibid., p. 161.

¹² Ibid., p. 161.

¹³ Ibid., pp. 103-104.

¹⁴ Ibid., p. 184.

¹⁵ Ibid., p. 185.

¹⁶ Ibid., p. 200.

The Police Problem Employee

By
HILLARY M. ROBINETTE
*Special Agent
Management Science Unit
FBI Academy
Quantico, Va.*

Police supervisors at all levels are concerned with the marginal and unsatisfactory police employee. They analyze causes and symptoms in an effort to understand and to solve the complex problems of job disaffection, dissatisfaction, contraorganizational behavior, and reduced performance.

With steady increases of cost-push inflation¹ and the attendant effects on the costs of recruiting, selection, and training, police managers are looking more closely at ways to improve the performance of current employees. Those officers and police employees who are judged marginal or unsatisfactory are coming under closer scrutiny by police managers for several reasons. Efforts are being directed at finding the causes of marginal performance and in determining solutions to the problem.

This article explores the issue of the marginal performer in the police department and the changing environments in today's society that have created different employee expectations, and therefore, disaffection and marginal performance. As part of this examination, the article also considers the results of a 1981 survey of police managers' perceptions of employee performance and offers some suggestions for dealing with marginal performance.

The Clay-Yates Study

The results of a research study conducted by Special Agents Reginald R. Clay and Robert E. Yates of the FBI Academy indicated the scope of the problem of marginal police performers. The researchers set out to identify and profile the police marginal and unsatisfactory employee by using a questionnaire survey given to a nationwide sample of police supervisors and managers.²

The Clay-Yates study was completed in early 1981. One hundred and eighty-three randomly selected participants of the 117th Session of the FBI National Academy responded to an initial survey instrument. The instrument was modified for validation and then given to an additional 1,200 law enforcement supervisors. Five hundred and fifty-three of these were used to derive a significant sample of data for consideration.³

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Reprinted from the FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin, July, 1982


The study respondents were all supervisors of law enforcement personnel. Ninety-seven percent of the respondents had been police supervisors for over 2 years; 93 percent had been in police work for 7 or more years. The respondent group represented a variety of departments and agencies: 16 percent were from departments of 1,000 or more sworn personnel; 54 percent were from departments of intermediate size; and 30 percent were from small departments (50 or fewer sworn personnel). (See fig. 1.)

garded this employee as their most serious problem. The second most frequently occurring problem was absenteeism and tardiness (19.9 percent) followed by resistance to change (11.2 percent). (See figs. 2 & 3.)

Police Problem Employee Profile

An examination of the Clay-Yates data produces a profile of the police problem employee in the United States today. The problem employee is a male officer assigned to patrol or investigation who has some college education and is between 25 and 39 years

Figure 1




The researchers set out to identify employee problem areas by frequency of occurrence and severity of the problem. Those surveyed were given 16 choices of problem behavior and asked to select the most frequently occurring and the most serious. The responses indicated that the most frequent employee problem area is often viewed as the most serious; 38.5 percent cited the most frequently occurring problem was the police officer who did "just enough to get by." The data also indicated that the supervisors re-

of age. As stated before, the most frequent and most serious difficulty is that he does only enough work to get by. The study shows that the largest single group of these employees (28 percent) were 30 to 34 years of age and had 6 to 10 years' service with the department. (See figs. 4 & 5.)

Implied in the study is a definition of problem employees. The marginal performer is one who has demonstrated the ability and willingness to perform well, but who is actually doing only "enough to get by on the job." ⁴ The

Figure 2

MOST SERIOUS EMPLOYEE PROBLEM AREA



unsatisfactory employee is one whose level of performance is consistently below that established as acceptable by the law enforcement organization.

In addition, the Clay-Yates study asked police supervisors who were managing problem employees to identify the causes of the problems. Although complex by nature, these causes of poor performance can be broadly assigned as follows: (a) External influences, i.e., factors away from the job environment, (b) the personal and unique weaknesses of the individual, (c) departmental mismanagement, i.e., organizational forces other than the immediate supervisor, and finally, (d) the immediate supervisor. Of the Clay-Yates study respondents, 39.9 percent laid the blame of poor performance on the individual employee; 26.9 percent located the cause in outside influences; 26.6 percent accused departmental mismanagement; only 6.6 percent fixed responsibility on the immediate supervisor. (See fig. 6.) In 60 percent of the cases, the duration of marginal performance had extended over a year.⁵

A clear understanding of marginal performance necessitates a closer examination of some of these causes.

External Factors

Today's young police employee grew up in the 1950's and 1960's when a personalistic philosophy began to permeate American society and the national mood focused on material abundance, GNP growth, and technological advancement. American workers began to change the kind of jobs they performed. In the 1950's, 65 percent of the work force was engaged in industrial occupations and only about

17 percent was employed in information (personal service) occupations. In the following 30 years, the number of Americans in industry dropped to 27 percent while the ranks of the "white-collar" information worker rose to 58 percent in 1980.⁶

During the 1970's, a "self-fulfillment" movement started to spread throughout the United States. By the late 1970's, national surveys showed more than 7 out of 10 Americans (72 percent) spent a great deal of time thinking about themselves and their inner lives.⁷ Traditional values were completely reversed, and the self-denial ethic which once fueled the faltering engines of industry was lost in the search for self-fulfillment.

The rising expectations of an expanding middle class and the higher educational levels of those entering the work force combined to produce a perception of needed self-fulfillment. Police departments were not excepted. During this time, the U.S. President's

Figure 3

MOST FREQUENT PROBLEM AREA





Figure 4



Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice called for the professionalization of police. The U.S. Congress voted large Federal appropriations to increase police officer education and management training.⁸ With subsequent liberal LEAA educational funds, law enforcement and criminal justice programs proliferated in newly created junior colleges and technical schools, as well as on traditional campuses. Previously, such programs were not available to the police aspirant. Education raises personal expectations. Those entering the police profession during the 1960's and 1970's brought expectations of advancement and personal income growth which tra-

ditional police departments can scarcely meet. Such a reality is bound to cause individual frustration and other discontent manifested in "burn out" and other forms of counterproductive behavior.


The police "problem employee" of the 1980's comes from that social, economic, and psychological turmoil. The pervading cultural psychology of affluence has reversed the self-denial ethic; the tradition of police service to the community is, in some instances, also reversed. Those who entered police service seeking affluence and self-fulfillment become bored with routines and cynical toward the public after the excitement of mastering police skills is

gone.

Traditional police organization structures leave very little room at the top for large numbers of educated recruits. In 1977, 42 percent of the officers of departments surveyed by the Police Executive Research Forum had associate or higher degrees.⁹

The officers came to police work with expectations of promotion, pay increases, and enlarging job responsibilities. Not all of the expectations can be met. Frustration occurs, enthusiasm for the job diminishes, and behavior changes, often for the worse. Moreover, many of the young recruits joining departments today bring with them a psychology of affluence which moves them to seek increasing salary levels. This attitude flies in the harsh face of economics. Cost-push inflation and antitax movements, such as Proposition 13 in California and Proposition 2.5 in Massachusetts, combine to strain public revenue. Cutback Federal and State budget management requires police to share smaller and smaller portions of public revenues. Budget cuts affect salary levels. Consequently, there is less to go around at a time when individual expectations of affluence are rising. Such countervailing forces are another source of frustration for the individual officer.

Figure 5



Time-Psych Zones and the Expectation Curve

Coupled with social change are the individual, physical, and mental developments of each person's life. These circumstances of personal change can be described as "time-psych zones." Daniel L. Levinson published the results of a study of basic importance in his book, *The Seasons of a Man's Life*.¹⁰ It is the first such study which explains adult development according to an age-linked time-

“ . . . the most frequently occurring problem was the police officer who did ‘just enough to get by.’ ”


table. He relates each stage of development to a man's job as the primary base for his life in society. The findings indicate that as we grow older, motivation patterns change. Personal, physical, and environmental circumstances change. Needs change; therefore, behavior changes.

uct sales. The individual needs more money, more leisure, and more freedom from commitment to job and home. As Yankelovich claims, “. . . desires are infinite. Anyone trapped in the fallacy that the self is a failure to the extent that all one's desires are not satisfied has set herself or himself up

senting new opportunities for achievement. They have a high tolerance for negative hygiene factors in the work environment and conditions.¹² They are future-oriented, seldom reflective, and have a high readiness for training. They have a low tolerance for perceived opportunity restriction. Often, they equate self-fulfillment with career advancement and will consider any real or imagined attempt to restrict their advancement with animosity and resistance.

As officers peak on the expectation curve (usually during or just after Levinson's midlife transition), they adjust their expectations. Motivation patterns and other job performance characteristics change. Those on this flat downside of the expectation curve are resistant to change. They often view a change in tactics, procedures, or policy as a threat to their new-found stability and will actively resist change, or worse, try to subvert it. The old saying about “not being able to teach an old dog new tricks” applies some folk wisdom to the reality. These officers also have a low tolerance for hygiene negatives and can take personal offense at minor adjustments in their work environments. They respond negatively to any deterioration in perks or seniority and working conditions. They are present-oriented and think of success in terms of completing today's task and not in terms of tomorrow's assignment. They have a high tolerance for stable policies, rules, and procedures and a low readiness for training, new job-learning experiences, and additional career-related formal education. (See fig. 7.)

Figure 6



Time-psych zones are the zones of personal expectations which change with age. In early adulthood, during one's first major job responsibility, achievement expectations run strong and high. These are modified by experience and reality during the midlife transition and become settled only through the turbulence of the transition. Often, this transition is marked by confusion of needs and desires. The desire to acquire additional possessions, to taste life in the fast lane, to travel to new places, and to meet new and important people engaged in exciting activities are all seen as needs. Personal goals are shaped by the marketing media which also raises these expectations in order to increase prod-

for frustration.”¹¹ Stability is regained during the middle-adult era and carries over through a less turbulent transition into late adulthood. The significance and effect of the stages and transition on a police officer's career and work-life are important.

The early stages of a police officer's career are usually characterized by high expectations of service achievement. He often daydreams of exciting successes in his assignment. He views the successes as necessary coin with which to buy preferment and career-enhancing assignments of increased responsibility. Persons riding the expectation curve in their 20's and early 30's are adaptive to change. They view change as challenging, pre-

The results of the Clay-Yates study support this expectation curve phenomenon. The large majority of marginal police performers fall in this age group. As reflected in the data, the average marginal performer has between 8 and 16 years' police service.

Change Comes to the Police Department

Changes in the social environment, values, demographics, technology, and economy have all combined to create a managerial atmosphere of turbulence. Once the most stable of municipal organizations, police departments now struggle through strikes, reorganizations, new public policy, and vastly increased operating costs. Between 1967 and 1977, the per capita cost of policing in a large city had risen from \$27.31 to over \$91, an increase of over 257 percent.¹³

Police work is labor-intensive. The human resources are the most effective of the resources applied in policing and also the most costly. Any cost-reduction analysis or efficiency-improvement effort must focus on improving human resource management. The intuitive perception of this reality has generated concerned interest in the management and salvage of the marginal performer.

The marginal or unsatisfactory performer is costly to police organizations. The difficult work of solving the problem of the marginal employee is discomfiting to police managers. Some say it is impossible to take effective action because of legal restraints or union policies. Others cite lack of training in managerial skills for shift supervisors and first-line commanders. All are uncomfortable when confronted with the problem employee. Uncom-

fortable or not, however, police managers must seek solutions.

The Management Challenge

If these data and the trends they suggest are accurately understood, they raise new challenges for police managers. The first is to analyze carefully the factors which contribute to marginal police performance; the second is to find ways to keep the job alive for those who once did it well and with enthusiasm but who have now lost their motivation. Finally, police managers must develop and use effective coaching and documentation skills.

The first challenge, which is analytical in nature, is the most difficult. The police manager is action-oriented. He thrives in an atmosphere of activity. He has little time, inclination, or training for thoughtful reflection. George Odiome identifies this predisposition as an "activity trap." He writes:

"The activity trap is a self-feeding mechanism if you do not turn it around. Everybody becomes attached to some irrelevancy and does his or her job too well. Its ultimate stage is when the [chief] himself loses sight of why the [department] exists, and demands more and more activity rather than results. . . .


"Meanwhile, all this activity eats up resources, money, space, budgets, savings, and human energy like a mammoth tape worm.

"While it is apparent that the activity trap . . . fails to achieve missions, it has an equally dangerous side-effect on people; they *shrink* personally and professionally." ¹⁴

Figure 7

The Expectation Curve

EXPECTATIONS



"Success can be obtained by a recommitment to excellence by the police manager, by a sensitive and attentive concern for the officers under his leadership, and by the acquisition and development of managerial skills."

Without constant attention to the results and contributions that a police manager expects of his subordinates, the manager falls into the activity trap. Some of his subordinates will shrink into the rote process of a job and lose sight of its goals and objectives. With the sure knowledge that activity without goals is wasteful, it is no surprise that these officers become bored or dissatisfied.

As Odiome points out, however, the trap is not inevitable. It can be resisted and circumvented by enlightened and analytical leadership. The challenge of supervisory analysis calls for the police manager to focus on results in directing his subordinates, then clarify and communicate the results to the people doing the work. Only then will the work itself produce the satisfaction and enthusiasm that keeps the police employee productive. This is not an easy task, but it is specifically managerial and executive in nature. Where the symptoms of marginal performance are unenthusiastic and dissatisfied officers, the manager would do well to find out whether looking busy has become safer than being productive.

The next challenge is finding ways to energize employees. With clear goals and objectives identified, how does the police manager secure employee commitment and enthusiasm for task accomplishment?

The answer here lies in the manager's own commitment and enthusiasm. He must avoid the danger of transparent management, which is the depersonalized processing of organizational directives. If he becomes an executive rubber stamp, he will be viewed as an empty suit, not an effective police manager.

The third challenge is that of developing one's own perception, understanding, and communication skills. To meet this challenge, the police manager must examine his own assumptions about the marginal performer. He must test those assumptions against his wider and probably more objective nonorganizational experiences. He must learn to be sensitive to the expectations of his subordinates. He must also keep in touch with his own time-psych zones. More attention is now directed at officers and employees who are not meeting standards.

Daniel J. Bell, writing in *The Police Chief*, verbalizes the interest when he says: "... there needs to be a concentration of effort to move the 'drone' type police officer into other careers outside the police profession."¹⁵ Who is the "drone-type police officer" Bell refers to? Can causes of poor performance be identified and how can they be remedied?

A decision for dismissal or a decision for salvage with the required coaching and counseling must be made. Salvage and renewal are practical, cost-effective ways to meet the challenge. Six out of 10 police managers (65.2 percent) of those surveyed recommend that the marginal police employee be salvaged.¹⁶

Dismissal is difficult and impossible without documentation. Changes in the legal environment, especially those brought on by affirmative action, equal employment opportunity, and the women's movement require job analyses and validated performance standards. Job analysis and validation were activities that were formerly not required of the police. Standards are determined and stated. Formal defense of standards and associated personnel actions are now required, if not in a court of law then in an appeals commission or grievance board.

Strangely, the procedures to support either a dismissal or salvage decision are similar. Effective coaching and a permanent, legal termination begin with documentation. The manager must begin with a clear concept of the unit's goals and objectives. These must be communicated to the employee clearly. The work the employee is expected to do must relate directly to the goals and objectives and be so explained to the employee. The manager is required to plan carefully the marginal subordinate's work, just as the subordinate is required to perform the work. Some measurement of progress must be agreed upon. Performance must be documented on a timely basis; appraisal must be regular, realistic, and frequent.

Performance appraisal is just that—an evaluation of actual performance. The police manager needs to pay personal and honest attention to the work the marginal performer does and the work he fails to do. Only then can both understand when the work is done and the objectives are achieved.

The manager has the opportunity to reinforce behavior in a nondestructive and objective way. The manager's feedback is the employee's guide to improving performance.

Significantly, almost half of the supervisors polled in the Clay-Yates study (44.5 percent) claimed success in dealing with their problem employees. The probability of success is good, but success is the result of difficult managerial work.

In these times of shrinking resources, police managers are looking for ways to do more with less—ways to meet the rising public demand to reduce violent crime, restore peace and tranquility, and spend fewer public dollars. There is no room for continued marginal performance in police work. Success can be obtained by a recommitment to excellence by the police manager, by a sensitive and attentive concern for the officers under his leadership, and by the acquisition and development of managerial skills. **FBI**

Footnotes

¹ The term "cost-push inflation" is used to describe the inflationary spiral in which increasing costs act to push up prices and wages in a cyclical effect.

² *Problem Employee Survey: An Analysis of Employee Problem Areas in Law Enforcement*, Reginald R. Clay and Robert E. Yates, FBI Academy, Quantico, Va., 1981, p. 3.

³ "Of the 1,200 law enforcement supervisors surveyed, questionnaire responses from 535 were selected. The screening factors for selecting questionnaires for gathering meaningful data were gleaned from the following questions: (1) Does the respondent currently supervise employees? and (2) Does he have a problem employee?" Clay-Yates, p. 23.

⁴ Clay-Yates, p. 6.

⁵ Clay-Yates, p. 67.

⁶ John Naisbitt, "The Bottom-Up Society: America Between Eras," *Public Opinion*, April-May 1981, p. 19.

⁷ "In the nineteen-seventies, all national surveys showed an increase in preoccupation with self. By the late seventies, my firm's studies showed more than seven out of ten Americans [72%] spent a great deal of time thinking about themselves and their inner lives—this in a nation once notorious for its impatience with inwardness. The rage for self-fulfillment, our surveys indicated, had now spread to virtually the entire U.S. population." Daniel Yankelovich, *New Rules: Searching for Self-Fulfillment in a World Turned Upside Down* (New York: Random House, 1981), p. 5.

⁸ *The Challenge of Crime in a Free Society*, A Report by the U.S. President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., p. 109. The Commission recommends: The ultimate aim of all police departments should be that all personnel with general enforcement powers have baccalaureate degrees."

⁹ Michael T. Farmer, ed., *Survey of Police Operational and Administrative Practices—1977* (Washington, D.C.: Police Executive Research Forum, 1978), p. 63.

¹⁰ Daniel J. Levinson, *The Seasons of a Man's Life* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1978).

¹¹ Yankelovich, p. 238.

¹² Frederick Herzberg says there are two elements which create employee motivation—the job itself and the hygiene factors. He describes hygiene factors as those things and circumstances incidental to work itself, such as salary, fringe benefits, working conditions supervision, policies, procedures, rules, and regulations. These can be viewed either as positive or negative and can cause dissatisfaction or satisfaction but cannot be viewed as motivators because true motivation, according to Herzberg, comes from the job itself, its scope, its value, and the sense of accomplishment it provides.

¹³ U.S. President's Commission, 1967, p. 91; Farmer, p. 13.

¹⁴ George S. Odiorne, *The Change Resisters* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1981), p. 16.

¹⁵ Daniel J. Bell, "The Police-Personnel Upgrading for Professionalism," *The Police Chief*, vol. XLV, No. 1, January 1978, p. 32.

¹⁶ Clay-Yates, p. 65.

Police Performance Management

By HILLARY M. ROBINETTE

"The new leader is a facilitator, not an order-giver." So writes John Naisbitt in his recent best-selling book *Megatrends*.¹ Naisbitt describes this leader at the end of a chapter on the shift from representative to participatory democracy. Without addressing the merits of Naisbitt's large-scale projections, his idea about the new leader as a facilitator is fascinating, especially when viewed from the perspective of the police supervisor.

Most departments expect the supervisor to be a leader of subordinates, to be a linking-pin between the organization parts, and to manage the performance of those assigned to him. This article examines the elements of performance management and the supervisor's ability to influence these elements. A further objective is to identify those managerial skills and techniques a police supervisor might employ to improve managerial performance and the performance of subordinates. Skills such as coaching and counseling are of central importance if the "new leader" Naisbitt refers to is to be an effective facilitator.

Performance Management

Traditionally, organizations give authority to the supervisor to plan, organize, direct, and control the work performance of subordinates. In business operations such as manufacturing, assembly, or mass-process jobs, the supervisory functions may be relegated to mere scheduling and flow maintenance activity. Quality control becomes the supervisor's main job. The supervisory task in such instances is to watch for, spot, and correct unwanted variance.

Performance management in such situations becomes a challenge when human rather than process factors are the cause of reduced or unacceptable output. But where the output or desired performance is measured less in finite, quantitative terms and more in qualitative, social, or legal dimensions, the elements of performance and the supervisor's influence on these elements takes on special importance.

The Elements of Performance

Scholars differ in their identification of the elements of human job performance. Some have attributed performance to a person's ability to do the task; others claim performance depends exclusively on the

level of motivation. Norman Maier and Victor Vroom were the first to recognize the important interaction of these two variables in determining the level of performance. Using an algebraic model, Maier and Vroom hypothesized that performance (P) is a function (f) of ability (A) and motivation (M): $P = f(A \times M)$.²

An extension of this thinking suggests that performance of most police tasks is the result not only of ability and motivation, but also of a third variable, called role prescription (Rp). Role prescription is the accurate understanding of organizational and supervisor expectations. The new model states that the performance outcome of an employee's efforts is the product of ability, motivation, and role prescription: $P = f(A \times M \times R_p)$. The model is more symbolic than mathematical in as much as it reveals the interaction of the variables on which supervisory activity can be focused.

The first variable, ability, includes all prior education, training, and task-related experience. Motivation is the immediate influence on the direction, origin, and persistence of action. It is often marked by enthusiasm for task accomplishment or the desire to secure the results of effort. Role prescription is the individual understanding of organizational and supervisor expectations concerning the task.

The interaction of these variables is clearly seen by assigning numerical values to each and applying the formula. The following situations use common experiences to illustrate the model. The scale ranges from a low of 0 to a high of 10.

Officer X recently completed recruit training. She was recruited because of her impressive qualifications: a high rank in her graduating college class and several months of success as a claims adjuster for

an insurance firm while waiting for her police appointment. Her performance as a police trainee was described as superior. She reports to her appointed shift supervisor with great enthusiasm for patrol assignment. Using the 10 scale, we must assign high values for motivation and for ability, say $A = 7$ and $M = 8$.

After a hurried welcome, the supervisor suggests that Officer X assist a senior officer on the shift until the supervisor can find some time more convenient to discuss her proper assignments. Disappointed, but with only slightly diminished enthusiasm, Officer X finds herself assisting an "old timer" whose enthusiasm has been reduced to the comfort of routine and whose motivation is to do "just enough to get by and stay out of trouble."

In this situation the use of the model is revealing. As noted, a fairly high and known potential ability is rated at 7; motivation at 8. Zero is awarded for role prescription, i.e., understanding of specific shift and supervisory expectations. The result is $P = f(7 \times 8 \times 0)$. The product is a valueless outcome.

Any variation in the value of each of the variables will affect the outcome accordingly. If the supervisor pushed aside the paperwork and explained his expectations of a new officer on his shift before assigning Officer X, the formula would show a very different outcome. The variables interact as multipliers and are more than merely additive. Consequently, the lower or higher the value of each element, the lower or higher the performance. If any one element is zero, the product or output is zero.

Performance expectations cannot be quantified in such a simplistic manner, but this formula indicates that performance

HILLARY M. ROBINETTE is a supervisor special agent of the FBI. A 14-year veteran of the Bureau, he is currently assigned to the Management Science Unit of the FBI Academy, Quantico, Virginia, where he teaches "Managing the Marginal and Unsatisfactory Performer" to the FBI National Academy and does research on the topic. An adjunct instructor at the University of Virginia, he holds a 1979 M.B.A. degree from the University of Dayton. He has been a visiting lecturer at the Canadian Police College in Ottawa, Canada, and presents workshops for local police agencies in Managing Marginal Performance throughout the United States.

outcome depends on more than ability, motivation, or understanding alone.

Other scenarios can be constructed. Officer Y has demonstrated enthusiasm, motivation, and ability for several years while assigned to patrol. He has been successful and garnered many commendations as a beat officer. As a result of a reorganization, Officer Y is transferred from the patrol division to a detective squad with a different supervisor. Unfamiliar with the new job and its specific skills, his performance can be expected to drop initially. Until his ability with the new skills is increased to the level of his ability in the previous assignment, he will not perform at the accustomed level.

We can assign high values for (M) and (Rp) since Officer Y has a sure knowledge of his chief's expectations and at least some knowledge of his new supervisor and the nature of the new work. However, because of new and unfamiliar skills, performance factors, and investigative techniques, a much lower (A) value will prevail. The resulting product, therefore, will be less than might otherwise be expected.

In yet another case, Officer Z, whose 13 years of service are filled with accomplishments and whose understanding of expectations is thorough and complete, will not perform at a high level if his motivation for his assigned task is severely diminished. If, for example, he has mastered the skills of street work and has become comfortable but unchallenged with the routine of patrol, he may begin to do even these poorly. A low (M) value will contribute greatly to a reduced performance outcome.

The Supervisor's Effect

If the model is indeed analogous to reality, further exploration of the way the supervisor affects each of the elements is instructive.

Ability is the aptitude, power, and competence to do a task. Aptitude requires mental and physical skills appropriate to the task. Power to accomplish requires not only the enabling authority—which in most cases is concurrent with the assignment—but also confidence when confronting the task. Confident and repeated performance of the job produces competence.

The supervisor directly affects the ability of subordinates by clear instruction, congruent example, direction, and correction; in short, by coaching.

The supervisor's direct effect on the motivation variable is less easily understood. Our understanding of human behavior and motivation is complex and incomplete. Sometimes we can mistake for motivation the activity that managers generate. The application of external pressures or enticements usually generates short-term movement. True motivation, however, is internal

and dynamic and is not subject to extended manipulation.

On the other hand, this does not mean that the supervisor has no effect on the motivation of subordinates. On the contrary, the effective supervisor will establish a working environment that fosters motivation, while an ineffective supervisor can create an environment that kills subordinate motivation. Activity may continue in the short term as long as pressures remain or enticements escalate, but remove the pressures and enticements, and the activity ceases.

A good coach is one who can bring out the "stretch and reach" from subordinates. Instructions are clear. Corrections are immediate, positive, and supportive.

The ability to successfully perform most police tasks is determined by ability, motivation, and role prescription (the accurate understanding of organizational and supervisor expectations). These variables interact as multipliers, not merely as additives, so the higher the value of any one variable, the higher the performance.

Responses to subordinates' performance are consistent and uniformly appropriate.

Of greatest impact, though, is the supervisor's personal example and managerial maturity. Personal frustration does not infect his or her speech and manners. The mature manager does not spawn disaffection and dissatisfaction by blaming leadership or the amorphous "they" for necessary but unpopular decisions. Managerial maturity requires that a supervisor lay aside irresponsible chatter, saying what he means and meaning what he says. What supervisors say and do directly affects the motivation of subordinates.

The supervisor's influence on the third element of the performance management model is clear. As a coach and counselor, the supervisor is the key communicator of organizational and personal performance expectations. The coaching task is daily, directive, and usually supervisor-initiated. Counseling, on the other hand, is less frequent, usually initiated by the subordinate, and requires different skills.

Managerial Coaching

Many supervisors learn coaching techniques by the seat of their pants. They draw lessons from their experiences with seniors to whom they report. They imitate supervisors that they worked for whom

they hold in high regard. In the absence of specific training in the exercise of coaching skills, they learn by trial, error, and intuition. In many cases, these supervisors are successful. When things are going well and performance deficiencies are small, few coaching interventions are needed. Supervisors fail in coaching, however, when they avoid confronting performance deficiencies with subordinates. Small problems have a way of growing.

Problem behavior, if left unaddressed, will become a well-established part of a subordinate's role prescription. This leads to a double work-standard, which ultimately leads to the perception of inequity among the shift members or work group. The perception will, in turn, lead to unproductive work behavior at best and polarity, division, and disunity at worst. In either case, it must be a matter of managerial concern. Ignoring a problem will not make it go away. An effective supervisor learns and uses confrontation skills.

Problem confrontation need not collapse into hostility. When it does, the usual reason is found in the supervisor's failure to plan the interview, failure to control the interview, ignorance of pertinent facts, or some combination of these. Sometimes, in an attempt "to be nice," the supervisor will be less than direct and the problem-solving confrontation does not occur. Effective confrontation requires a directive interview technique. The confronting supervisor should describe the problem and keep it separated from personality.

Both parties must be confident that dignity and self-esteem can be preserved. The supervisor must adopt a strategy to effectively initiate the confrontation. Then he must clarify the issue by listing and valuing the subordinate's viewpoint. The real-life issues will be clarified and practical problems will be differentiated from value issues.

Success only can occur if the supervisor views the confrontation as a form of negotiation to secure a positive behavior change by the subordinate. The object of the confrontation must be clearly established in the supervisor's mind if he is to clarify, negotiate, and resolve the issue that generated the confrontation.

Some err by deciding to avoid important issues because of a lack of confidence with the skills, or by trying to out-power the subordinate over unimportant issues. The use of power or recourse to organizational authority alone to secure a change should be a last resort, saved for the most recalcitrant. A good coach deals with problems as they arise, while their dimensions are still manageable and before they become sources of emotional hostility. Because of the complexities of human behavior, there are no guarantees of success, but if the manager fails to initiate the confront-

tation, there is no *probability* of success.

Managerial Counseling

A very different managerial situation arises when a troubled subordinate comes to the supervisor looking for help. The counseling interview is usually initiated by the subordinate, except if it is the outcome of a supervisor coaching session. The skills and techniques for an effective counseling interview are different from those for a coaching or confrontation session. Coaching is directive with an immediate, negotiated resolution or agreement. Counseling requires non-directive interview skills, patience, and a sincere desire on the part of the supervisor to help.

First, the supervisor provides a supportive atmosphere in which the subordinate can identify and solve his own problems. The counseling supervisor does not give advice; he does not agree with error; he listens and strives to help the subordinate solve the problem or live with the predicament.

Non-directive counseling techniques are based on the assumption that a person can solve his own problem if the counseling supervisor can empathize in a supportive climate. Techniques of non-directive, client-centered counseling were popularized by Carl Rogers and are widely used in therapy.³ Of course, a supervisor is not expected to be a therapist for subordinates, but sometimes the application of listening skills can help subordinates solve their own problems or adjust to their predicaments. In each instance, work-related behavior will improve. Empathy is not often seen as an important managerial trait. But leadership studies provide ample evidence of a positive correlation between empathy and leadership. Based on 15 studies concerning leadership and empathy, R.D. Mann noted that 74 percent of the results were positive. He concluded that although researchers generally have been unable to obtain positive results that are statistically significant, they *have* obtained positive results with impressive consistency.⁴ Results obtained in another study suggested that supervisors who do not understand the behavior of their subordinates tend to feel inadequate and insecure. As their frustration increases, the supervisors become less able to obtain cooperation and satisfactory performance.⁵

Conclusion

The supervisor has a direct influence on a subordinate's ability. He instructs, trains, educates, and corrects, thus increasing the ability variable through managerial coaching. The supervisor affects the motivation variable mainly by example, but also by understanding the behavior of subordinates and, where possible, by providing a supportive climate in which the subordinate can solve or learn to live with problems affecting work behavior.

Finally, the supervisor is the primary communicator of organizational and managerial expectations. He defines the subordinate's role prescription not only as a coach but also, when appropriate, as managerial counselor. A subordinate can only understand his place in an organization when a well-informed and articulate supervisor tells him what it is. Coaching and counseling are learnable skills that provide the willing supervisor with the tools to do this. If the supervisor is skillful as a directive coach and a non-directive counselor, individual or group performance will improve.

John Naisbitt is on target when he writes ". . . if you can develop the skills of facilitating people's involvement in decision-making processes, you can become a very effective leader in your work."⁶ Managerial coaching and counseling are those very skills. ★

¹John Naisbitt, *Megatrends*. (New York, NY: Warner Books, Inc., 1982), p. 188.

²Kae H. Chung, *Motivational Theories and Practices*. (Columbus, OH: Grid, Inc., 1977), p. 112.

³For a detailed explanation, the interested reader is referred to *Client-Centered Counseling* by Carl Rogers, Houghton-Mifflin, 1951.

⁴Bernard M. Bass, ed., *Handbook of Leadership: A Survey of Theory and Research*. (New York, NY: The Free Press, 1981), p. 114.

⁵*Ibid.*, p. 115.

⁶Naisbitt, p. 118.

"Discipline is becoming . . . a more difficult and painful task for the police executive."

Without exception, discipline is one of the most controversial managerial issues today. During discussions with law enforcement managers, it is not uncommon to hear them vent a great deal of frustration about the management of discipline. Although the amount of frustration increases or decreases based on the particular aspect discussed, little consensus exists regarding the appropriate methods of or approaches to discipline.

Managers in general, and law enforcement managers in particular, have always considered disciplining employees a basic management prerogative. Traditionally, managers have been relatively free to impose penalties without concerns about being challenged. Managers disciplined whenever employees violated organizational rules or when employee performance appeared to deteriorate. In the past few years, however, statutory law and other legal developments have steadily reduced management's traditional "rights" to discipline.¹ For example, employees now

under investigation for possible disciplinary action are afforded more protection from arbitrary managerial actions. Legislation and court decisions have affected, and in many cases, reduced the law enforcement manager's discretion; the inclusion of a "police officer's bill of rights" in collective bargaining agreements at city, county, and State levels has also impacted management's right to discipline.²

Discipline is becoming, therefore, a more difficult and painful task for the police executive. Some managers unfortunately respond to this difficult task by working hard to avoid it. Because of this, disciplinary matters are handled inconsistently and ineffectively and result in more grievances being filed and even more serious personnel problems, including:

- 1) Loss of employee respect for law enforcement managers;
- 2) Loss of employee trust and consequent increased hostility toward law enforcement managers;

Traditional Approach

In most law enforcement agencies, the term "discipline" has a negative connotation and implies punitive action. Most agencies emphasize and communicate clearly written rules of conduct which management views as the basis for equitable disciplinary policy. Strict adherence to these rules and other legal principles is recognized as essential to equitable disciplinary action. In spite of the time and effort management spends in an attempt to be fair, however, the punitive aspects of traditional discipline remain permanently fixed in the minds of most employees.

The traditional and most commonly used approach to handling discipline is viewed as one of structure and law. A review of the text, *Managing for Effective Police Discipline*, and the article, "Police Agency Handling of Officer Misconduct: A Model Policy Statement," delineates this structural approach. The major emphasis in each text is the establishment of a system

Discipline: The Need for a Positive Approach

By

RONALD F. ASHER*

Special Agent

Federal Bureau of Investigation

FBI Headquarters

Washington, D.C.

*Special Agent Asher was formerly assigned to the Management Science Unit, FBI Academy, Quantico, Va.

- 3) Increased employee dissatisfaction, resulting in decreased productivity;
- 4) An increased number of employee grievances going to binding arbitration for final disposition; and
- 5) Increased employee turnover, resulting in additional recruitment, selection, training, and other personnel costs.³

for managerial control which incorporates the following steps as significant actions in a responsible disciplinary process:

- 1) Setting standards and rules of conduct;
- 2) Developing mechanisms for detecting violations;
- 3) Providing for the receipt of misconduct complaints;
- 4) Establishing responsibility for handling complaints;

-
- 5) Providing for temporary and emergency suspensions; and
 - 6) Setting policies and procedures for investigating, charging, resolving, and imposing sanctions and appeals.⁴

Traditional discipline has sometimes been referred to as "progressive discipline." Zach and Bloch point out in their definition, however, that progressive discipline is, in reality, actually negative. Progressive discipline is defined as:

"A system of escalated penalties made known to employees in advance and imposed with increasing severity for repeated infractions. Such a system relies on the recognition that repetition of infractions with escalating penalties will ultimately lead to termination. . . ."⁵

Unfortunately, this definition accurately describes the disciplinary system most often used in many law enforcement agencies. Under certain circumstances, progressive discipline is appropriate. Isolated incidents of employee misconduct may be cause for the application of progressive disciplinary actions. It is also important, however, to recognize that in many instances, progressive discipline is not effective and has severe limitations.

In discussing the limitations of progressive discipline, the following concerns are identified:

- 1) The burden for improvement is left almost entirely to the employee;

- 2) Discipline is currently little more than a way of getting rid of people;
- 3) Supervisors generally provide only negative feedback pertaining to employee's performance;
- 4) Supervisors and managers tend to let employees' problems drag on until the problem is so serious that there is almost no hope of solving it;
- 5) Supervisors frequently define a problem as "a poor attitude" or "low morale" or some other state of mind;
- 6) Managers tend to label employees rather than describe their unacceptable behavior; and
- 7) In progressive discipline, the employee appears as the sole source of the problem.⁶

These difficulties suggest the need for a more positive or corrective approach to the management of police discipline.

Positive Approach

Positive or corrective discipline is based on the premise that the majority of employees are willing and able to accomplish their assigned duties. The essence of positive or corrective discipline is the positive use of employee training and development rather than as a last resort disciplinary technique. As Asherman has noted, corrective discipline is based on the assumptions that the employee's behavior will improve for a time when disciplinary action is taken, and that if the manager rewards the improved behavior, the employee will continue to improve rather than regress.⁷

Corrective discipline, therefore, has the following advantages over progressive discipline:

- 1) Both employee and supervisor share responsibility for solving the problem;

"Although many of the issues surrounding discipline have not changed a great deal, employee expectations have."

- 2) Supervisors begin to work on the problem as soon as it appears;
- 3) Supervisors identify poor performance in terms of specific behavior;
- 4) Supervisors make clear to employees exactly what is expected;
- 5) Supervisors tell the employee whether they are meeting expectations;
- 6) Supervisors reinforce all improvements; and
- 7) Supervisors measure employee performance.⁸

These advantages demonstrate that police discipline should be corrective in nature so that desired future individual behavior is achieved within the organization.

Even though most law enforcement managers agree that it is necessary to have a systematic approach to handling disciplinary matters and a knowledge of the legal issues concerning disciplinary actions, police managers continue to have problems properly handling disciplinary matters. Managers must continue to control, but with a new emphasis on the human aspects of discipline. Police discipline need not be a frustrating, unrewarding experience for the manager. The manager can administer positive discipline by keeping in mind the basic elements of a disciplinary process and by including open communication, a positive attitude toward discipline, a good managerial example of behavior, and an appropriate organizational environment in his bag of managerial tools.

What is communicated to employees depends on managerial actions. It is important, therefore, that the manager know what his values are and whether his values help or hinder in accomplishing organizational goals. He must consider what he is communicat-

ing to employees. If managers are going to try to manage more effective organizations, they must emphasize developmental, not retributive, approaches in dealing with personnel.

It is virtually impossible to monitor and control the behavior of personnel on the job, let alone behavior off the job. More rules and regulations stringently enforced do not necessarily mean that an organization runs better. The question is not whether positive or corrective discipline is better than negative or progressive discipline, but how can managers better assist employees to develop within the organization. Managers are given positions of authority and responsibility and are expected to accomplish organizational goals by effectively using human resources. A substantial part of management is the development of employees, and part of the developmental process requires the appropriate use of discipline.

Many managers have, perhaps, simply lost sight of their responsibilities. If we accept, however, that organizational goals are important and worth achieving, it follows that we must achieve these goals through the use of employees' talents and energy. Management remains an art form that includes the ability to deal effectively with either individuals or groups. Formal power and authority are less important than effectively handling personnel. For law enforcement managers, therefore, the structure and the system may be less important than the individual manager's actions.

Managers must accept that they are responsible for employee behavior and must, therefore, be concerned with their own managerial attitudes. The law enforcement manager with a positive attitude toward the internal discipline system, a sound set of values, and a conscientious effort to communicate can be a major asset in making an organization effective. Conversely, a manager with a negative attitude can actually contribute to an organization's ineffectiveness.

Although many of the issues surrounding discipline have not changed a great deal, employee expectations have. Increasingly, employees expect to be treated fairly and insist upon positive or corrective approaches to discipline rather than merely punitive discipline systems. If organizational goals are to be accomplished and employees' expectations met, employees must be treated as mature, responsible, thinking, worthwhile adult human beings. These expectations seem reasonable; managers who are unable to provide supportive environments are becoming liabilities in modern organizations. For example, authorities have begun to examine the issue of employee rights and the disciplinary process and have suggested different types of rights—rights that have a basis in law and tradition, and more importantly, rights that are freely given because of the positive impact on accomplishing organizational goals.⁹

In keeping with these trends, law enforcement managers must reevaluate their positions and the effects of their behavior on the disciplinary process within their organizations. The manager must be willing to accept the responsibility for discipline and must also accept the responsibility for pro-

viding an example of professional behavior to his employees.

The positive approach defines discipline as part of the control process directly related to the impact of a particular type of behavior on job performance. Actual performance is measured against a planned standard. Disciplinary action or actions are taken to bring job performance up to the desired standard.¹⁰ Because of the emphasis on job performance, immediate supervisors must be more than passively involved in the disciplinary process.

The training and development of employees should include the setting of an example of professional behavior by the manager. Attempts to motivate or to discipline are useless if the manager is unmotivated or undisciplined. Communicating organizational values is a total process. Most employees listen less intently to what is said than to what is meant. The total organizational environment becomes the manager's medium of communication. How the manager expresses his own values and how he projects his professional behavior communicates as much to his employees about his expectations as the written rules and standards for disciplinary action.

If law enforcement managers are to communicate organizational values to employees effectively, the managers themselves must believe in those values. If there is to be any credibility in the communication process, employees must perceive that managers have a basic faith in the disciplinary process. Managers can more easily communicate a positive or corrective approach toward discipline if they sincerely believe that most employees desire to

conform to reasonable organizational standards. A positive approach to discipline requires a positive attitude toward employees, including the basic belief that most employees are willing and able to be productive organizational members.

Conclusion

No one familiar with the role of the law enforcement manager argues that it is an easy job. It is unfair, however, and irresponsible for law enforcement managers to deny their accountability for and control over the behavior of employees. All managers should be responsible for the proper disciplining of their employees.

Managers need, therefore, to rethink and redefine what goals they want to accomplish through disciplinary policies and procedures. It is necessary for managers to determine their own values, however, and how the examples they set affect their employees prior to considering organizational needs. Law enforcement managers must be aware of their own professional values. They must present professional demeanor and behavior worthy of emulation. When employees respect the system and the manager, they demonstrate appropriate job behavior for organizational development.

Managers must also learn to communicate with employees during conflict situations often caused by differing expectations. Therefore, it is time for law enforcement managers to begin evaluating their own actions in order to assess what they are communicating to employees. How that communication is effecting organizational behavior should determine what changes may be necessary in their managerial approach to discipline. Managers must continually strive to meet organizational goals with reasonable harmony.

Organizations can no longer afford managers who communicate only personal interest and/or negativism. Increasingly, managers must be held accountable for the accomplishment of organizational goals. In order to accomplish these goals, managers must strive toward establishing organizational environments that are conducive to human resource development. Those environments, by necessity, must include a positive or corrective approach to discipline rather than the negative or progressive system with which law enforcement systems have traditionally lived. An environment in which the manager demonstrates professional behavior and values and communicates an expectation of professional behavior from his employees allows for positive, corrective discipline to become a reality. **FBI**

Footnotes

¹ Edward L. Harrison, "Legal Restrictions on the Employer's Authority to Discipline," *Personnel Journal*, vol. 61, No. 2, February 1982, p. 136.

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³ Ira G. Asherman, "The Corrective Discipline Process," *Personnel Journal*, vol. 61, No. 7, July 1982, p. 528.

⁴ *Managing for Effective Police Discipline*, International Association of Chiefs of Police, 1977, p. 45; "Police Agency Handling of Officer Misconduct: A Model Policy Statement," Police Executive Research Forum.

⁵ Arnold M. Zack and Richard I. Bloch, *The Arbitration of Discipline Cases: Concepts and Questions* (New York: American Arbitration Association, 1979), p. 11.

⁶ Asherman, p. 529.

⁷ Asherman, p. 530.

⁸ Asherman, p. 530.

⁹ Donald E. J. MacNamara, "Discipline in American Policing," *Modern Police Administration*, ed. Donald O. Schultz (Houston: Gulf Publishing Company, 1978), p. 132.

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II. POLICE MANAGEMENT

THE ROLE OF THE
LAW ENFORCEMENT EXECUTIVE

By Donald C. Witham
and
Paul J. Watson

I. Introduction:

Effective and impartial enforcement of the law is one of the most crucial functions of American government. To a substantial extent, the preservation of our form of government and the rights of our citizens is dependent upon competent and professional law enforcement agencies. These agencies require skilled and dedicated executives if they are to successfully perform this critical function. The goals of American law enforcement cannot be achieved by simply upgrading the quality of our police recruits. The effectiveness of American law enforcement depends upon the quality of its leadership.

The executive position in law enforcement is extremely demanding. The pressures and requirements on law enforcement are numerous, and most of these forces impact directly upon the position of the chief executive. What, then, is the job of the police executive in modern society? What are the necessary skills and abilities for this job? This article is directed at providing some answers to these questions. While fully recognizing that each position is somewhat unique, there are several important similarities which can be examined to facilitate our understanding of the position of the law enforcement executive.


II. The Concept of Role

Traditional theorists have concentrated their study of organizational phenomenon on the formal organization. They are interested in and preoccupied with the organizational chart, job descriptions, standards of performance, and lines of authority. These theorists claim that this kind of information accurately describes the

functioning of organizations. Although this information can be of value, a more illuminating approach to understanding the behavior of a law enforcement executive can be borrowed from the field of Social Psychology, and its concept of role. In this article, role will be discussed primarily in the context of organizations; however, the concept is not limited to such a narrow interpretation. Role can be defined as the set of activities and expected behaviors associated with any position or office.¹ Most people, either consciously or unconsciously, perform many roles each day. For example, any police officer may function as spouse, parent, law enforcement official, citizen, church member, and student in any given day. Behavior is adapted to the particular role of the moment. The relationship an individual has to others who are important in each situation identifies his role. These other people set expectations about the behavior of the person in the role. The individual assumes different behaviors as he tries to conform to the expectations of these significant others about each of his roles.

These significant others with whom an individual has to interact regularly to successfully perform his job are called the role set.² Generally, in performing his job, an individual's role set includes superiors, subordinates, colleagues, and people in the work flow. Who are the people with whom the law enforcement executive must interact to achieve his goals? The role set of a typical executive is included on the following page. Frequently, a majority of the members of the role set of the chief executive are from outside his organization. This fact serves to highlight the liaison or diplomat

TYPICAL ROLE SET OF A LAW ENFORCEMENT EXECUTIVE



Executives of other
departments of the
jurisdiction, and other
law enforcement
executives

role of a chief executive for his organization. Generally, the higher an individual advances within an organization the more likely his role set will include a larger proportion of individuals from outside his organization. It is important to note that, to be effective, the executive must interact successfully with all members of his role set. These interactions require time, perseverance, and dedication, and may well necessitate that the executive spend less time running his organization. Time is both the greatest enemy, and the most valued resource of the executive. Time must be apportioned appropriately to the various members of the role set to facilitate successful interaction. This will probably result in less time being available to lead the organization than is desired by many executives. In the words of former Los Angeles Police Chief Edward M. Davis, "I don't run the police department, I just see that the police department is run well."³ Consequently, the police executive must select competent subordinates, delegate responsibility, and establish the necessary controls.

The members of the role set attempt to influence the behaviors of the executive. Their expectations about his behavior, messages about appropriate behavior and standards of performance based on pre-established norms, values, and perceptions, are continuously being transmitted to the executive.⁴ Also, the executive has his own personal expectations about the appropriate behavior of a person holding his position. Consequently, the executive sends himself messages about how to behave. Obviously, the members of a law enforcement executive's role set will have radically differing views about what constitutes acceptable behavior. For example, the press will probably desire that the executive be easily accessible, candid,

and willing to comment on virtually any matter related to the department. Political leaders may expect that he will be a budget conscious official who will also ensure that the department does not "rock" the political boat. Subordinates will probably desire a leader who will defend the department against attack and fight for pay raises and other benefits for personnel. In such a situation, the executive is incapable of satisfying some of the expectations without conflicting with others. This situation, known as role conflict, is all too familiar to high level officials. It is a very fortunate and unique executive who does not encounter role conflict. As the diagram depicts, the executive is the man in the middle.

There are other role problems of which an executive must be aware. The problems include role overload, role ambiguity, and person-role conflict. Role overload occurs when it is physically impossible to satisfy all of the expectations of the role set. There is just not enough time to meet all the expectations. Another potential problem is ambiguous expectations transmitted by members of the role set. These expectations are either vague or inconsistent. The problem becomes: what do they want me to do? For any executive, there will be situations where there is inadequate information to make a decision or no clearly correct choice. Yet, the executive will be required to act. Therefore, a critical attribute for a police executive is a tolerance for ambiguity. A final type of difficulty encountered is person-role conflict. This problem arises when the required behavior of a position occupant is contrary to the executive's personal image character, or values. An example of this person-role conflict is the situation in which a compassionate executive is required to fire an old friend for some sort of egregious misconduct. Very few executives can take such action without emotional upheaval.

Executives should identify the members of their own role set; and actually write down their names. Next, the executive should attempt to identify the expectations of the members, and what types of role problems these expectations will pose for him as a police official. In this manner, problem areas can be identified and strategies developed to reduce or minimize these problems. The problems will not be eliminated; however, the identification of problems is a very significant step in resolving the situation. When problem areas are identified, the executive should consider spending more time with the applicable member of the role set. Improved communication may result in a modification of the expectations, or at least the member will better understand the nature of the difficulty.

The Nature of Executive Work

Management textbooks and literature frequently create the image of an executive working at an uncluttered desk in a luxurious office. This executive is depicted as planning, organizing, coordinating, and controlling his organization in a rational manner. In a thoughtful fashion, this ideal executive makes critical decisions after careful analysis of the situation. Competent, motivated subordinates are readily available to offer insightful input to the decision process. A calendar is available showing a carefully scheduled and planned workday. The only difficulty with this picture is that it is inaccurate for the vast majority of executives.

Numerous studies have documented that executives work at an unrelenting pace, that their activities are characterized by brevity, variety, and discontinuity, and that they are oriented more toward

action than reflection.⁵ The following chart highlights the distinctions between the rhetoric and the reality of executive work.⁶

Rhetoric	Reality
Thoughtful decision making.	Most of the workday is devoted to interaction with other people; getting and exchanging information persuading and negotiating.
Clearly scheduled and logically planned workday.	Impromptu, sporadic, and unplanned contacts; jumping from issue to issue and among different people.
Efforts devoted to "leading" subordinates, who defer to higher status.	Most of the time with outsiders; even subordinates challenge frequently the manager's authority.
Decisions made by rational judgment of individual in correct position to evaluate all the factors.	Decisions are the product of a complex brokerage and negotiation process, extending overtime and involving large numbers of interested parties.
Objectives and goals clear and consistent.	Multiplicity of goals identified with different groups and interests that are conflicting and even contradictory; often-changing priorities.
Results proportionate to individual effort and capability; steady progress; decisive accomplishment.	Results are the product of many uncontrollable forces which are slow to emerge and difficult to predict; incremental steps - two back, three forward.
Authority equal to responsibilities.	Significant deficiencies in the power to command resources and permissions necessary to fulfill assigned objectives.
Clear goals established and subdivided into milestones and benchmarks.	While managers need to break down larger activities into explicit goals and subgoals, in fact, most of the manager's tasks have no beginning or end; problems flow through, and there is often little possibility of neatly completing activities or solving organizational problems "once and for all."

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Company)

Furthermore, Peter Drucker has pointed out that top management tasks differ fundamentally from those of other management groups.⁷ Every building block of the organization is usually defined by a specific contribution; that is patrol, investigations, personnel, etc. The one exception is top management: its job is multidimensional. Not only is the executives' work multidimensional, almost all of the tasks performed are recurrent tasks which must be attended to repeatedly.

It may be helpful in understanding the nature of executive work to compare and contrast that work with the work of a mid-level manager. Most people ascend to an executive position from a mid-management position. Hierarchical organizations generally fill executive positions from individuals serving at one or two levels lower in the organization. This approach to selection seems to be especially true in law enforcement. The following pairings emphasize the significant distinctions between the managerial and the executive role.

<u>Manager</u>	<u>Executive</u>
Task Oriented	Goal Oriented
Short Term Planner	Long Term Planner
Program Oriented	Mission Oriented
Works in Present	Works in Future
Recommends	Decides
Looks in (Organizational focus)	Looks out (Environmental focus)
Represents Unit	Represents Institution
Sees Part	Sees Whole
Operates in Internal Politics	Operates in Internal and External Politics
Data Oriented	Concept Oriented ⁸

The behavior of the executive as described above point out very clearly the conceptual nature of executive thinking which allows one to act according to the objectives of the total organization and its relationship to outside influence. The ability to conceptualize requires a different orientation; to be successful, an executive must think and act differently from when he was a manager.

Central Functions of the Executive Role

Having examined the nature of executive work and the concept of role, it is now possible to combine this information to identify behavioral dimensions critical for executive success. The authors suggest four primary roles which executives must fulfill to be effective. Although the list of important roles is much longer, these four are the functions which an executive cannot afford to ignore. The critical roles are: diplomat-liaison, coordinator, initiator of interactions, and manager of change. Each of these roles will be examined in some detail, and defined broadly enough to encompass the essential components of the behavior of the competent administrator.

Diplomat-Liaison

The police organization does not exist in a vacuum. It is part of a system of government which is likely to compose several other departments. The organization will of necessity interact with these departments, with other law enforcement agencies, the media, business organizations, and the general public. The chief executive is expected to function as a spokesperson for the organization. Certainly, many of the routine aspects of this function can be

delegated to subordinates or specialized units. Common examples of such delegation are public affairs offices and community relations units. Still, the executive must maintain regular contact with and effective control over such units. Their performance is too crucial to be totally supervised by subordinates. When difficulties are encountered, people want to hear from the chief. In emergencies, telephone calls are directed to the executive's office and not to some subordinate unit. It is the chief administrator who must negotiate with the political powers over issues such as the budget. The editor of the local paper and the producer of the nightly television news do not want to talk to the media officer. They demand access to the chief. It is incumbent, therefore, upon the executive to be fully aware of departmental operations. Additionally, the chief must have the foresight to previously establish relationships of trust and respect with such officials.

The executive's ability to function as a spokesperson and a representative of his organization will shape the perceptions of the public and other leaders regarding his effectiveness and his organization's productivity. As most officials are aware, the perception or image of effectiveness is at least as important as the reality of effectiveness. Lawrence Lynn, while referring to the performance of federal executives in Washington, wrote that there is no good measure for their performance.⁹ The situation of the Washington executive is quite similar to that of many law enforcement administrators in this respect. Appearances can be far more important than reality. The press is often instrumental in shaping the executive's image, and the press is often misinformed.¹⁰

Additionally, the executive may have to deal with union leaders representing his officers. In his capacity as negotiator and representative of his department, it is most helpful for the administrator to develop direct communication lines based on trust and respect with union officials.

Coordinator

Large police organizations, just like other organizations, are highly complex and differentiated. They require personnel with diverse and specialized skills. These skills are usually not acquired in a year or two of experience. Many people think of our present society as the age of the specialist. If an organization is to be effective today, it is highly dependent upon the skills, talents, and knowledge of numerous specialists. Some examples of law enforcement specialists are homicide investigators, bomb disposal officers, communications experts, motorcycle officers, internal affairs investigators, community relations officers, computer experts and driver safety officers. To facilitate development of these skills, and in order to ensure control and coherence in its operations, virtually all large law enforcement agencies are structured along functional lines. For example, various investigative functions are brought together under the control of an investigative division, as other related functions and activities are grouped within appropriate divisions. This functional approach to organizational structure capitalizes on the economies of division of labor and specialization of work.

It is a primary function of the executive to coordinate and integrate these various functions and divisions of his department. As top administrator, he must be able of conceptualize the total mission or purpose of his organization, and to integrate the experts and specialized duties into broad functional divisions. He must rise above parochialism and function as a synthesizer. In the words of Paul Appleby, "The expert should be on tap, not on top."¹¹

It is inevitable that conflicts will occur between divisions. It is healthy and natural for officers within the varying units to view their work as the most important task of the agency. At the same time, the executive needs to concentrate on the smooth, efficient operation of the entire machine. He has to be alert for unnecessary redundancy within the boundaries of the separate divisions. Jurisdictional conflicts over turf, be it programs, cases, or whatever, cannot be allowed to become dysfunctional. The executive must be capable of persuading, cajoling, and negotiating with his subordinates to ensure cooperative and coordinated effort toward organizational goals.

This is not meant to suggest that conflict should be stifled, but it must be controlled. In his classic book, The Future Executive, Harlan Cleveland states that the wise executive is wary of too much consensus, too early, from too small a group.¹² Cleveland says that the executive should seek tension and not narrow cooperation, because organizations, like muscles, are most effective when tense and not flaccid.¹³ Subordinates should feel free to express dissenting opinions. Then, subordinates will compete to identify creative alternatives. Disagreements can generally be resolved dispassionately and without rancor.

While performing his coordinator role, the executive is focusing upon his organization. It is necessary that he see the big picture; however, a word of caution is appropriate. To coordinate the activities and negotiate the conflicts that will arise, he will occasionally need to become intimately involved with the details of the issues. He must take the time to manage. Careful, thoughtful analysis of complex problems is often not possible from afar.

Initiator of Interactions

Perhaps, the most common definition of management is the ability to get things done through the efforts of other people. This ability to work well with others is important at all managerial levels - including that of the executive. The executive must establish a professional relationship with the members of his role set. Research has shown that the quality of these relationships is almost entirely dependent upon the frequency of contact.¹⁴ Strangers are usually distrusted or disliked. To develop trust and friendship, executives must anticipate spending between 50% to 75% of their work day talking with others.¹⁵ It is not enough that the executive be accessible, effectiveness is correlated with the ability and willingness to initiate these contacts. One study determined that better managers initiated between 35 to 80 percent of their contacts.¹⁶ If the executive does not initiate contacts, he is likely to find that his time is being monopolized by some subordinates, and that he has little or no contact with others. The duration of the contact is not nearly as critical as its frequency in determining the quality of a relationship.¹⁷

Research suggests that almost every managerial job requires great quantities of interactional energy.¹⁸ Is it possible that a reclusive or highly introverted person would have a personality structure which would hinder his successful performance as an executive? In other words, is there a managerial personality? Most human behavior experts have become extremely cautious about attempting to correlate personality traits with executive performance. Still, personality is a critical variable in how an executive job will be performed, since so much of the job involves discretionary interactions with other people. The authors of this article suggest that to be effective, a shy or introverted executive at least be able to play the role of an extrovert and be an initiator of interactions while performing his duties.

Manager of Change

It has become trite to proclaim that our world is changing rapidly. This fact is all too apparent to thoughtful people. Still, the rapidity of change has important implications for the leaders of organizations. James MacGregor Burns defines (political) leadership as broadly intended real change.¹⁹ Leonard Sayles writes that introducing change and managerial effectiveness are almost synonymous.²⁰ Unless an executive aspires to be a mere caretaker or a defender of the status quo - strategies unlikely to lead to a long tenure - he must become involved in implementing change. Two important facts need to be faced squarely. Change, although necessary, does involve substantial costs. The entire process must be carefully monitored by the top administrators. And, open communication with all employees throughout the change process is invaluable.

The management or implementation of change is an important skill for those desirous of attaining an executive position. The existing literature on managing change is voluminous and it is not possible to adequately address this crucial function in the space available here. Readers are encouraged to begin their study with Organization Development and Change by Edgar F. Huse.²¹

Conclusion

Effective law enforcement is dependent upon competent executives. In attempting to understand the behavior of executives, the concept of role can be much more beneficial than reliance upon a job description or an organization chart. Law enforcement executives are frequently subject to conflicting behavioral demands from the members of their role set. These conflicts can be somewhat minimized by analysis of the demands, and increased communication within the role set.

Administrative work taxes the time and energy of executives. The executive, therefore, should concentrate on his primary roles. The primary roles are as follows: diplomat-liaison, coordinator, initiator of interactions, and manager of change. A better understanding of executive work including important behavioral skills can lead to improved executive performance, and even more importantly to better law enforcement.

FOOTNOTES

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³Edward M. Davis, Staff One: A Perspective on Effective Police Managment, (Prentice-Hall, Inc.: Englewood cliffs, NJ, 1978), p. 112.

⁴Katz and Kahn, Op. Cit., p. 182.

⁵ Henry Mintzberg, "The Managers Job: Folklore and Fact," Harvard Business Review, July-August 1975, p. 50.

⁶Chart reprinted with permission of McGraw-Hill Book Company, NY from Leadership - What Effective Managers Really Do ... and How They Do It, 1979, By Leonard R. Sayles, p. 12.

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⁸David E. Gray, Unpublished paper on "Executive Development", presented at an American Society of Public Administration Meeting, Phoenix, Arizona, April 10, 1978, p. 3-4.

⁹Lawrence E. Lynn, Jr., Managing the Public's Business - The Job of the Government Executive, (Basic Books, Inc., Publishers: NY, 1981), p. 69.

¹⁰Ibid.

¹¹Paul H. Appleby, Morality and Administration in Democratic Government, (Louisiana State University Press: Baton Rouge, LA, 1952), p. 145.

¹²Harlan Cleveland, The Future Executive - A Guide for Tomorrow's Managers, (Harper and Row Publishers: New York, 1972), p. 21.

¹³Ibid., p.22.

¹⁴Leonard R. Sayles, Leadership - What Effective Managers Really Do...and How They Do It, (McGraw-Hill Book Company: NY, 1979), p. 64.

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¹⁶Ibid., p. 66.

¹⁷Ibid., p. 67.

¹⁸Ibid., p. 224.

¹⁹James MacGregor Burns, Leadership, (Harper and Row Publishers: New York, 1978), p. 434.

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Labor Relations:

The Law Enforcement Administrator's

DILEMMA

Richard M. Ayres

**FBI Academy
Quantico, Virginia**

Every type of union is represented in law enforcement today from the local independent associations to those on the state and national levels, including the groups affiliated with organized labor. No law enforcement administrator is immune to the employee unrest that leads to unionization, job actions, strikes, and votes of no-confidence.

Sheriff departments in particular are experiencing more and more unrest as witnessed by strikes in Santa Barbara, Los Angeles, and most recently, the San Diego County Sheriff's Department.

Problems Will Continue

Unfortunately, the dark mood at the bargaining table is not likely to get brighter in the near future. A bargaining climate influenced by such factors as the taxpayers' revolt, high inflation, tighter local budgets and employee layoffs will only result in added frustration on both sides of the table.

Along with these factors is an anti-union attitude and tough bargaining posture developing among some elected officials, making them more tolerant of strikes by public employees, including law enforcement. This "hardline" posture will no doubt be reinforced by the events in the recent air traffic controllers strike, and could cause further breakdown in communications and negotiations and eventually lead to more employee militancy.

With law enforcement asking for larger raises to keep up with the rising costs of living, and the

localities responding with "there is no more money in the budget," the battle lines are drawn.

Public Abuse?

However, at the root of much of the present discontent within law enforcement lies something deeper than mere economics. Professor Robert Doherty, Associate Dean of Cornell University's School of Labor and Industrial Relations, suggests there might be another, less tangible, factor at work. He contends that the police feel they are being abused; that they are doing the Lord's work and not being appreciated. Doherty may be right. Police are, after all, continuing to be assaulted and killed as they attempt to be the guardian of the public's life and property.

Just a few years ago, the major issue on every politician's platform was that of law and order. Today the law and order issue has taken a back seat to inflation and foreign affairs, but it is still a major concern. This year, the Attorney General of the United States launched a major campaign to develop strategies to combat violent crime.

A result of the extensive political and media coverage of the crime issue is the belief on the part of the police that they are playing an important role in society and that they should be paid commensurately with their services. When the pay raises are not forthcoming, the police perceive that their city and county and police administrators, as well as the public, do not appreciate them.

The Central Issue

Economics, then, is the central issue in almost all labor disputes. To

state it simply, the police perceive wage increases as a way of keeping score to determine whether they are appreciated for carrying on "the Lord's work."

The belief that they are not being appreciated can have a far-reaching impact on the police and on their work itself. As they begin to feel less and less important, the police are forced to accept the idea that theirs is just another job, and at that point, all satisfaction and commitment goes out of that job.

Today, the young officer no longer looks upon his work as a value in life. Instead, it has become merely a means to an end. Naturally, as the job itself becomes less of a value, the commitment level decreases; while, at the same time, job alienation increases.

Throughout the rank and file can be heard the cries: "Isn't anyone listening to me - I am the one doing the work," or "No one in management cares; they think the job I do is unimportant."

The problem is not so much that society's values have changed; but, that police administrators have failed to express full appreciation for the work performed and to speak out on behalf of the employees. The employee dissatisfaction that results from management's failure to express itself then manifests itself in various forms of labor/management conflict.

As the sheriffs, chiefs of police, and commissioners by the dozens experience this conflict, they begin to suffer from the lack of confidence of their own people. As a consequence, they see themselves as victims, caught between rising crime rates and shrinking police budgets.

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THE FAILURE TO RECOGNIZE THE IMPORTANCE OF OPEN COMMUNICATIONS IS OFTEN THE BASIS FOR JOB ACTIONS OR EXPRESSIONS OF DISSATISFACTION

”

They believe themselves to be visible and vulnerable symbols, caught in a crossfire between politicians, the public, and disgruntled employees.

The sheriff and chief of police see their positions as being akin to the circus clown who has the job of sticking his head through a hole in a wall for baseballs to be thrown at him. When someone remarked to the clown that he had a difficult job, he answered, "Well, yes and no. You see, it's not the baseballs; you can see them coming and have an opportunity to dodge and duck them. The difficult part of this job is the dart game that's going on in the back." So it is with the sheriff and the chief who is shot at from both sides, the politicians and the public on one side, and the union representing the officers on the other.

There Are Options

Although this is the dilemma in which the law enforcement administrators find themselves, there are options they can exercise in an effort to reduce employee dissatisfaction and conflict. The role of the administrator is crucial throughout the labor relations process and needs to be thoroughly understood by management. Once unions have been recognized, administrators must be prepared to give more time and attention to labor relations in general and the union in particular. They must be prepared to educate themselves about what is undoubtedly an unfamiliar field, and they must be willing to work for rapport with

employee representatives. This rapport is best achieved by open-handed dealing which fully recognizes the union's right to exist and to represent its members' desires, and by a commitment to a harmonious relationship - bearing in mind that the union members are still employees.²

Obviously, for good labor relations to exist, there must be constant communication and cooperation between the law enforcement administrator and the union leaders. The latter should have easy access to the administrator and should not have to go through the chain of command to see him. Through informal communications, labor and management can often eliminate problems before they arise, or diminish their disruptive impact on the department.³

Law enforcement administrators must also strive to develop new methods for providing effective and sincere manager/worker communication in order to eliminate job alienation. Don Pomerleau, former Police Commissioner of Baltimore, stated: "Employee organizations develop many times because we have not established all inclusive and progressive communications. We and our subordinates have not listened, nor have we provided our personnel with a means to seek redress for their real or imagined problems. The old autocratic and dictatorial approach to problem solving has come under severe criticism, and rightly so."⁴

Today's employees, with their high level of education, want to have greater input into the policy and decision-making process of the organization. If they are denied this

employee input, via good management practices, then it can be expected that the union will demand such input at the bargaining table.

Open Communications Is Key

The failure to recognize the importance of open communications is often the basis for job actions or expressions of dissatisfaction. These actions are often saying: We want you, the sheriff or chief, to take a more responsive posture on certain issues; and secondly, we feel this is the only way that we, members of the association, can communicate both publicly and internally our displeasure over the policy decisions and other forms of action that you have reached.⁵

There is no way other than through organized and collective force that an employee can feel independent enough to challenge the actions of management. Yet, when employees organize a union or participate in a job action, administrators often condemn them as unappreciative. In reality, the employees are expressing a desire to stand on their own feet and speak with a voice of authority, rather than be subservient. This need exists in most people, and when management does not provide a vehicle to satisfy it, a union will.

In essence, the employees are saying: "We need a leader -- a spokesman - to speak out publicly on issues that are affecting the day-to-day operations of the agency. If you, the administrator, will not be that leader, that spokesman, then we as a union will fill the void."

Sheriff John Carpenter, Santa Barbara County California, reflects

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Richard M. Ayres is Unit Chief of the Management Science Department of the FBI Academy in Quantico, Virginia. In addition to his duties as Unit Chief, he teaches and conducts research in the area of police labor relations and collective bargaining. He holds a B.S. degree from Dickinson College, M.B.A. degree from Iona College, and J.D. degree from the Washington College of Law, American University.

ting on the strike by his employees in 1979, maintained: "The principle that there is nothing wrong with showing concern for employee plight is merely common sense, although there could easily be a tendency for management to assume a position of silence in order to maintain impartiality. Department management must be sensitive to the economic situation of employees. An attitude of indifference, or worse, a negative attitude, will provoke employees to 'fend for themselves.'"⁶

The law enforcement administrator must therefore establish mechanisms for the effective exchange of information within his agency. He must determine what his employees want; how they feel; and must act on this information. He must be the leader and the spokesman for the department. He must speak out publicly on issues affecting the efficient operation of the agency and the legitimate concerns of the officer in the street.

The administrator's failure to communicate and to stand with the employees, and to communicate their concerns and needs to the public and elected officials, can only lead to greater union activity.

Many law enforcement officials see themselves in a no-win situation, caught trying to satisfy two opposing constituencies. The local administrator demands that they be part of the management team, while at the same time, the union or employee association demands visible support for its goals.

Political Considerations

It is this political setting which distinguishes the public sector from the private sector. Decisions in private industry are made on a bilateral basis as opposed to a fragmented one in the public sector. In the private sector, decisions are based on profit and loss, while in the public sector, they are based on the results at the ballot box. High visibility on the part of a chief of police or sheriff is not always politically expedient. Certainly, it is less so for the chief who is not elected and can be easily removed from office, which is evidenced by the fact that the average tenure for a major

city chief today is two and one-half to three years.

Nevertheless, the message is clear, if law enforcement officials are to be effective administrators in reducing employee dissatisfaction and union activity, they must become politically involved. This involvement should not be in the sense of partisan politics or favoritism, but if it is considered political to speak out on issues affecting the efficient operation of the agency or working conditions of the employees, then they ought to be political.

Effective Leadership Needed

In conclusion, to solve his dilemma, the police administrator will have to be a more effective leader. He will have to: (1) develop new methods for providing effective and sincere manager/worker communication to eliminate job alienation; (2) demonstrate full appreciation for the work being performed and develop mechanisms for recognition of meritorious service; and (3) become actively involved in issues relating to the criminal justice system and working conditions of the employee. The administrator's influence and the effectiveness of his endeavors will grow in direct proportion to his involvement and ability to communicate. Should he decide not to become involved, he must heed the words of Plato: "The punishment of wise men who refuse to take part in the affairs of government, is to live under the government of unwise men." ☆

Footnotes

Richard Ayres

Labor Relations

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THE NATIONAL SHERIFF ★

OCTOBER-NOVEMBER 1981

Group Decisions: The Promise and the Reality

By DONALD C. WITHAM

*Special Agent
Management Science Unit
FBI Academy
Quantico, Va.*

There is a discernible trend in most large organizations toward allowing groups or committees to make more decisions. In part, this trend is merely a reflection of our heightened awareness of the increasing complexity of society. This complexity serves to make it less and less likely that one individual will possess the requisite knowledge, skills, and abilities to design optimal solutions to critical problems. It is reasonable to assume that several talented persons acting together possess more of these necessary attributes.

There is another reason for this trend. This reason is less obvious to the casual observer and it is frequently advanced as a moral imperative. Ever since the Hawthorne Studies, behavioral scientists have been extolling the benefits of participative management. Some management theorists function as disciples of this ideology. The question has been perverted from whether participation works to how to make participation work. This transformation of the question has not been insidiously motivated; it is an example of confusing values with goals. The argument goes as follows: Democracy is good. Participative management is democratic. Therefore, participative management is good.

Advocates of participation point out the increased satisfaction of organizational members involved in the decisionmaking process. This increased satisfaction is an important benefit of participative management; however, the principle goal of organizations is not the satisfaction of their members. Organizations are purposive social arrangements. Accomplishment of the purpose, be it profitability, efficient provision of services, etc., is the proper goal of organizations. The use and degree of participation in the decisionmaking process is a practical issue, not a moral one. Additionally, techniques which can minimize the liabilities will be presented. Judicious use of these techniques and information will help in closing the gap between the promise and the reality of group decisions.

The Promise

"When many are got together, you can be guided by him whose counsel is wisest. . . . If a man is alone, he is less full of resource, and his wit is weaker."

Homer—The Iliad

A survey of a number of large organizations found that 94 percent of them used committees.¹ Committees are the most common type of formally designated groups in organizations. Although many people harbor negative feelings about them, committees are obviously widely employed by organizations. Law professor Allen F. Westin of Columbia University predicts that the 1980's will be an era of individual employee rights.² Westin states that employees will insist upon the right of participating in major organizational decisions. Apparently, the pressures upon executives to allow people to

participate in the decisionmaking process will be increasing.

The major advantage of group decisions is that more information can be considered and weighed during the process. Specialists and experts can contribute ideas, techniques, and strategies which may be unknown to other members. Members from different divisions or geographical areas can present varying perspectives. Since information is a valued resource for decisionmakers, uncertainty and risk can be reduced to some extent as a result of more data and more accurate information. Executives are required to learn to live with ambiguity, but all of them are interested in minimizing it.

Successfully implementing a decision is also of concern to executives. More than a few good decisions, carefully considered and based on accurate information, have failed because of difficulties in implementation. A major problem during implementation can be resistance by organizational members. Allowing persons affected by the decision to become involved in the process of consideration is an effective method of gaining commitment to the decision. This involvement enhances their understanding of the decision itself and the underlying rationale. Additionally, people work harder for that which they help to develop. Group involvement in decisions can be a significant aid in implementing them.

Ideally, the ideas and information of group members can be combined and refined by others. In such a fashion, it is possible that the input to the decision process by the group can exceed the sum total of the input of all members. This notion of synergy, or combined action, can be a distinct advantage of group decisions. The brainstorming technique was developed to facilitate this phenomenon. Alex F. Osborn, a Madison Avenue executive, developed the technique to assist in triggering creativity in the field of advertising. He explained the term as meaning the use of the brain to storm a

creative problem and "to do so in commando fashion, with each stormer audaciously attacking the same objective."³ A large number of ideas, the wilder the better, is sought from group members in a spontaneous, unstructured manner. Judgment of the ideas is deferred during collection to minimize inhibiting the members. Although brainstorming can be useful, it appears that the technique has been oversold. Many group members become inhibited in the presence of their peers or seniors. Consequently, their contributions to the group are reduced. Research has shown that the combined efforts of individuals working alone will result in more and better solutions than those produced by face-to-face unstructured groups.⁴

An example of a successful group decision is the response of the U.S. Government during the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962. President Kennedy and the National Security Council considered a wide variety of options to the Soviet deployment of offensive missiles to Cuba. Robert Kennedy, the Attorney General, was assigned the role of devil's advocate by the President.⁵ In this role, he would point out the deficiencies and risks of all options.

This activity served to prevent a stampede of premature support for any alternative. Facts were gathered, alternatives considered, and decisions made and implemented in a relatively calm and calculated atmosphere. The Nation benefited enormously from this effective group decisionmaking process.

The Reality

"Group thinking is dominated by the average thinking, because group pressure tends to favor the majority."

Norman R. F. Maier⁶

For every successful group decision, people can point to several unsuccessful ones. Consider the Bay of Pigs or the failure to be prepared for the attack on Pearl Harbor. Something is apparently wrong within many groups. The primary difficulty is the lack of understanding by executives of group dynamics—how the structure and processes of groups affect individual members and their behavior.

In organizational settings, two tendencies are particularly damaging to group decision processes—individual dominance and groupthink. Individual dominance can result from placing a senior executive or high-status individual within a group. Such people inhibit the participation of junior group members, who defer to the expertise or preconceptions of dominant members. This speeds the process, but the benefit of wide input into problem consideration and resolution is lost. Extroverted and articulate members can dominate groups on the basis of their personalities rather than by what ideas they have to offer with respect to the problem under discussion. When selecting members, care must be exercised to avoid individuals who will dominate the group.

Alfred Sloan was aware of the problem of individual dominance while he headed General Motors. He established committees with himself as chairman, but he did not attend early meetings. He was careful to keep his views and ideas from other members during the analytical stage of the process in order to facilitate open and candid discussion of the situation. Only when careful development of ideas and alternatives had taken place would Sloan become actively involved in the group.⁷ This tactic can be effectively used by many executives.

Another difficulty which can seriously impair the performance of group decisions is groupthink. The term "groupthink" was coined by Irving Janis. Janis defines groupthink as, "the concurrence-seeking tendency observed among highly cohesive groups."⁸ Cohesiveness indicates the appeal or allure a group has for its members. Membership in certain groups is highly desirable for reasons ranging from career enhancement to social affiliation. When cohesiveness is strong, it can occasionally make the members' need for uniformity and consensus stronger than their need for accuracy and correctness.⁹ In such situations, the group is more likely to do a better job at producing unanimity than top quality decisions. The group becomes isolated from reality, begins to feel invulnerable, and engages in excessive risks. Groupthink inhibits careful and comprehensive consideration of alternatives. Dissent within the group is discouraged and equated with disloyalty. Groupthink can have devastating results for organizations.

Individual dominance and groupthink are the two most serious potential problems of using unstructured groups in decisionmaking. There are other problems of which executives must be aware, such as cost, time, and risk. It costs more money for a group rather than an individual to make a decision. Depending upon the nature and magnitude of the issue, the cost may be worthwhile or wasted. Evidence suggests that groups spend more time than individuals to reach a decision.¹⁰ Again, the situation will determine whether the timing of the decision is of significance. With respect to risk, several studies have attempted to determine whether individuals or groups make riskier decisions. The tentative and controversial finding is that groups may be more willing to take risks than individuals.¹¹ This finding is surprising to most executives. It may be that individuals in a group can better hide their responsibility for failures—responsibility for results can be diffused throughout the group. Still, there is no definitive evidence that groups make riskier decisions than individuals. One researcher believes that groups serve to reinforce the prevailing attitudes of the members.¹² If initial attitudes are on the conservative side, subsequent group activity moves toward more conservatism. Conversely, if the average attitude is toward risk-taking, the group moves in the direction of higher risk.

Closing the Gap

The reality described above is not inevitable. Executives can take actions which will substantially improve group performance. There is a rapidly growing body of literature on group effectiveness which can be of assistance.

In unstructured groups, members censure their input because they are inhibited by fear of ridicule. This occurs despite instructions to the contrary. No matter how nonjudgmental the environment is structured, members will not indiscriminately articulate ideas that come to mind. Consequently, individuals working alone are more creative in their approaches to problems.

If interaction can be eliminated or minimized during the search and data collection phases of the decisionmaking process, member inhibition and censorship can be avoided. Committee creativity can be enhanced. The Delphi technique and the Nominal Group technique are structured group processes which limit interaction, and therefore, enhance group creativity and effectiveness. Managers are encouraged to read *Group Techniques for Program Planning*¹³ which provides a comprehensive description of both processes.

The Nominal Group Technique (NGT)

NGT was developed by Andre Delbecq and Andrew Van de Ven in 1968,¹⁴ and since that time, has been widely employed in a variety of settings. NGT is a structured group process which requires a facilitator to direct the proceedings. Approximately five to nine participants are brought into a room and seated at a table. In front of each participant is a pad of paper. The facilitator describes the decision or problem under consideration, and a problem statement for each participant is written on his pad. The facilitator advises the members of the importance of the task and the need for their individual contributions. The members are then instructed to write down individually and in silence their ideas regarding the problem. Sufficient time is allotted for the generation of ideas. The facilitator must avoid lengthy clarifications of the task and act as an example for other members by writing his ideas on the pad of paper.

Once ideas have been developed, the facilitator, using a blackboard or a flip chart, begins recording the ideas of the members. This is accomplished in a round-robin fashion with each member presenting one idea each round.

The process continues until all ideas have been recorded. Participants are allowed to pass when they have exhausted their ideas, but may present ideas in later rounds, should they develop new ones. At this point, the total input of the group is easily visible to all members. It is not necessary to report ideas that are identical to those already listed; however, each member can and should decide if his idea is a variation of one suggested. Variations are welcomed to aid creativity. Since the ideas are recorded sequentially, it is difficult to recall exactly who proposed which concept. Thus, it is hoped the ideas will be examined objectively on their own merits. The list becomes a depersonalized group product.

The facilitator asks the members if any of the ideas recorded on the chart are unclear. If so, a brief discussion is conducted to clarify the ideas. Also, members disagreeing with the ideas are afforded an opportunity to voice their concerns. It is most desirable to have ideas clarified by members other than the original contributor. The facilitator can ask, "What does that idea mean to you, Joe?" In this way, emphasis is on idea clarification and refinement rather than excessive or destructive criticism. Usually, a skillful facilitator is able to list ideas so that they are readily understandable. This clarification phase should not be allowed to become argumentative, emotional, or time-consuming, but the facilitator cannot move so fast as to hamper the discussion.

When the ideas are understood by all group members, the facilitator requests that each member rank order the ideas in their importance. If numerous ideas are developed (more than 20), it may be necessary to take two votes. The first vote will eliminate several low priority ideas, and the second vote will produce the aggregate judgment of the group on the most important ideas. It may be helpful to hold another brief discussion of the ideas for the purpose of further clarification before the final vote. This decision process uses mathematical averaging,

which has been shown to increase the ability of a group to reach a decision that reflects true group preferences.¹⁵ By this method, the judgment of each member is equal to every other member's judgment. The aggregate group judgment obtained during the final vote represents the group determination. The facilitator concludes the meeting and thanks the participants for their contributions.

Small group research has determined that groups having five to nine members are most effective.¹⁶ This guideline is also applicable to NGT. Members should be selected based on their anticipated contribution, not because of their position or out of politeness. NGT is appropriate for complex group decisions. The process is limited to consideration of a single issue and is rather time-consuming. NGT usually requires 60 to 90 minutes.¹⁷ Less structured approaches should be used for simple or routine considerations or when several items need to be resolved at one meeting.

The Delphi Technique

The Delphi technique, sometimes referred to as the Delphi method, is a group decision process that uses written communication.¹⁸ Individual members can be either anonymous or known to each other, but they are not brought physically together during the process. The written communications do, however, remain anonymous. The technique essentially consists of a series of questionnaires.

The key to successfully employing Delphi lies in carefully and accurately developing the Delphi question. The question must reflect the needs of the sponsoring group, and it must be sufficiently clear and broad so as not to frustrate and demotivate the respondents. Respondents should be selected because of their knowledge, their interest in the situation, and their motivation to complete several questionnaires.

They must also possess good reading and writing skills. The first question is stated broadly to encourage a wide variety of responses. Numerous respondents can be involved in this process which can entail enormous amounts of work for the staff. Generally, 10 to 15 participants are adequate. The staff collates and lists the positions of the respondents for the first round.

All first round positions, solutions, and forecasts are communicated to each participant in the second round. Participants are permitted to modify their positions in the second and succeeding rounds, but they must document the reasons for the modification. Participants rank order the positions by importance. The process continues through subsequent rounds until the group approaches a consensus.

Delphi, a very time-consuming process, can require several months. A highly skilled and industrious staff is a prerequisite to success. Research indicates that such a process leads to better decisions than face-to-face groups.¹⁹ The technique can be effective for identifying problems, setting priorities and goals, and identifying problem solutions. It is particularly applicable for long-range forecasting and future research. The technique deemphasizes personalities and status and focuses participant attention on the matter under consideration. It can be used to aggregate judgments where persons are hostile toward one another.

Delphi is being employed in an ongoing study concerning the future of criminal justice. The study is being conducted by Ralph G. Lewis and Ronald Schneider of Florida International University in North Miami, Fla.²⁰ The study asks respondents to list the five most critical problems that will be faced by criminal justice administrators in the year 2000. Studies of this nature should be most helpful to law enforcement executives.

Conclusion

It seems obvious that the trend toward increasing reliance on group decisionmaking will continue. Group decisions can be of inestimable value to law enforcement executives who have an understanding of group dynamics. Problems such as individual dominance and groupthink cannot be ignored without serious risks. Techniques such as NGT and Delphi have been validated and successfully employed in a wide variety of settings in both the public and private sector. There is little evidence that the advantages of these processes are appreciated within law enforcement.

As law enforcement becomes more complex and specialized and resources further constrained, the quality of our decisions must improve. Group participation in the decisionmaking process is a practical issue, not a moral consideration. Effective decision groups can contribute significantly to a favorable future for law enforcement.

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Footnotes

¹ David R. Hampton, Charles E. Summer, and Ross A. Webber, *Organizational Behavior and the Practice of Management*, 3d ed. (Glenview, Ill.: Scott Foresman and Co., 1978), p. 243.

² "Issues of the '80s: Employee Rights," Nancy L. Ross, *The Washington Post*, June 13, 1980, Section C, p. 8.

³ Alex F. Osborne, *Applied Imagination*, (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1953), p. 297.

⁴ David R. Hampton, et al., *Organizational Behavior and the Practice of Management*, p. 247.

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 281.

⁶ Norman R. F. Maier, *Psychology in Industry*, 3d ed. (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1965), p. 194.

⁷ David R. Hampton, et al., *Organizational Behavior and the Practice of Management*, p. 254.

⁸ Irving L. Janis and Leon Mann, *Decision Making—A Psychological Analysis of Conflict, Choice and Commitment*, (New York: The Free Press, 1977), p. 129.

⁹ David R. Hampton, et al., *Organizational Behavior and the Practice of Management*, p. 254.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 248.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, p. 248.

¹² *Ibid.*

¹³ Andre L. Delbecq, Andrew H. Van de Ven, and David H. Gustafson, *Group Techniques for Program Planning*, (Glenview, Ill.: Scott Foresman and Co., 1975).

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 7.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 55.

¹⁶ David R. Hampton, et al., *Organizational Behavior and the Practice of Management*, p. 251.

¹⁷ Andre L. Delbecq, et al., *Group Techniques for Program Planning*, p. 81.

¹⁸ N. C. Delkey, "The Delphi Method: An Experimental Study of Group Opinion," Rand Corporation Memorandum—RM 5868-PR, June 1962.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*

²⁰ Interview with Ralph G. Lewis, Florida International University, North Miami, Fla., September 1980.

CONTEMPORARY PERFORMANCE APPRAISAL SYSTEMS

CONTEMPORARY PERFORMANCE APPRAISAL SYSTEMS

I. DEFINITION

Performance Appraisal—"A systematic review of an individual employee's performance on the job to evaluate the effectiveness of his work."¹

II. PURPOSE OF PERFORMANCE APPRAISALS

Organizations traditionally have two purposes when appraising employee performance. The first is for evaluation or judgement. The second is for development. The evaluative or judgemental process of appraisals can be used as data for merit reward systems, transfers, promotions, etc. The application of appraisals in this instance could have considerable impact on employee performance where good performances are favorably rewarded. Failure of the evaluative or judgemental process of appraisal therefore would negate management's efforts to correlate rewards with employee performance.

The second major purpose of appraisals is developmental. An appraisal in this area allows the employee the opportunity to improve his performance by revealing to him the areas of needed improvement and growth. It is noted at this point that certain factors influence the potential for success in either the evaluative or judgemental process or the developmental growth, or improper management counseling.

¹Dale Yoder and Herbert Heneman, Jr., *Staffing Policies and Strategies* (Washington, D.C.: The Bureau of National Affairs, Inc., 1974), p.4-161.

The aforementioned two purposes are by no means all inclusive. Authors in the area of performance appraisals utilize their literary license to establish a multitude of purposes for performance appraisals. Some address performance appraisals from an individual employee measurement and development position as I have chosen, some from a multiple program approach, e.g., "Administrative, performance improvement, research"² (R.S. Barrett), some from an organizational point of view, e.g., "maintenance of organizational control and measurement of human resource efficiency,"³ to name a few.

III. PROCESS FOR DEVELOPING PERFORMANCE APPRAISALS

In order to develop a performance appraisal process the following factors must be determined:

- 1) a job description
- 2) a standard of performance
- 3) a method of rating
- 4) the selection of a rater
- 5) the frequency of administration of the rating process
- 6) the means of preparing for the appraisal

Since performance in a job is to be evaluated or appraised it is necessary that we have a job description on which to base the appraisal. From the written job description, we must select traits

² Ibid.

³ L.L. Cummings and Donald P. Schwab, Performance in Organizations—Determinants and Appraisal (Glenview, Ill.: Scott, Foresman and Company, 1973), p.55.

of job-related factors to be used in the rating of the individual. This selection must be made with care, for unless vital job-related traits are chosen, the ratings are meaningless. These job-related traits must be:

- 1) important to the job
- 2) observable
- 3) measureable
- 4) distinguishable

Next a standard of performance for that job must be determined. Many authors define a standard of performance as a yardstick against which an employee may be judged to determine the adequacy of his performance. "It is the level at which the administrator may expect a reasonably competent employee to perform a particular task or duty." ⁴

If you asked an employee whether employees should be rated against each other or against standards of performance, he would probably answer "against standards of performance." If you asked him or his superior whether standards of performance existed for all of the traits or factors that employees were rated on in that particular department, the answer would probably be negative. Although the process has such recognizable deficiencies it does offer many advantages such as:

- 1) provides a measuring stick or guide to appraise a subordinate's real performance

⁴ Edward F. Beckwith, "Take the Guesswork Out of Performance Rating," Supervisory Management, Vol 10, No. 6 (New York: American Management Association, Inc., June, 1965).

- 2) provides a more objective standard for evaluation and salary increases than surface impressions
- 3) provides a vehicle leading to a performance discussion between a superior and a subordinate
- 4) can form a basis for agreement between a superior and a subordinate on improvement goals
- 5) presents a guideline on which the superior can evaluate the performance of his entire department
- 6) presents a guideline on which the employee can base his effectiveness
- 7) can indicate to a superior how effective he has been (feedback)

The basic requirements for a standard of performance are:

It must be obtainable, exceedable, high enough to meet the management needs, based solely upon average output, written, developed with the help of employees, established by superiors, revised and kept up to date.

The three basic factors which ultimately affect the validity of the performance standard are: relevance, reliability, and acceptance. The method of rating must be reliable, meaning different appraisers would evaluate the same employee's performance the same way. There must be relevance between the "form" and actual job performance. If reliability and relevance are lacking, acceptance will naturally be lacking also.

IV. METHODS OF RATING PERFORMANCE

Many approaches to rating employees have been developed, some through a scientific process, some through a process of evolution. Regardless of their origins, all attempt to accurately depict the level and degree of performance. Due to the number and variations of different rating methods, only the most commonly utilized will be reviewed.

Methods of rating performance can be categorized under two general headings: 1) comparative procedures, and 2) absolute standards.

The comparative procedures approach is generally characterized by two features: comparing an employee against other employees on an interest dimension, and on a global dimension determining the employee's effectiveness to the organization. The most popular comparative procedures are: 1) straight ranking, 2) alternate ranking, 3) paired comparison, and 4) forced distribution. These first three procedures are simple ranking processes. Straight ranking is a comparison of appraisees. The evaluator considers all the employees and selects the best performer, the second best, etc., through the poorest performer. To make an alternative ranking the evaluator selects the best performer, then the poorest performer, the second best, second poorest, etc., until all employees have been ranked. In a paired comparison the evaluator compares each employee against all other employees, one at a time. An employee's overall ranking is determined by how many times he is chosen over the other employees.

In a forced distribution the evaluator is forced to assign a certain percentage of his employees to each of several categories on each factor. For example, the evaluator would rate ten percent of the employees highest on a factor, 20 percent above average, 40 percent average, 20 percent below average, and ten percent lowest.

The absolute standards appraisal system differs from comparative systems on two points. An employee is evaluated against one or more written standards rather than against another employee. Also, several aspects of overall performance are generally measured rather than one global dimension.

The absolute standards method consist of two general types:

1) the evaluator attempts to determine if, in a qualitative sense, the appraisee possesses or does not possess, some performance characteristic, and 2) the evaluator attempts to measure the degree to which each appraisee possesses certain characteristics, e.g., conventional rating procedures and behaviorally anchored rating procedures.

Qualitative methods include the use of critical incidents, checklists, and forced choice.

The use of critical incidents requires that acts critical to the successful performance of the task are identified, usually through information from supervisors of employees to be evaluated. These incidents are then extracted into a smaller number of behavioral categories. The evaluator is then given this list of general categories to use in recording positive or negative incidents that occur pertaining to the general categories.

"A weighted checklist is developed by first obtaining a number of statements about employee performance on the job to be rated. A comprehensive list of these statements is developed

judgementally by persons familiar with the job. Each statement is then evaluated by a group of persons (e.g., the supervisor of the jobs to be appraised) on how favorable or unfavorable it is for successful performance. This evaluation of items is typically done on a seven- or eleven-point scale, where low values represent unfavorable scores and high values represent favorable scores."⁵ When the individuals judging the favorability of a performance item disagree on that item, it should be removed from the final check list. The items remaining on the list should be "weighted" by the average score obtained from the group evaluations. The evaluators are given the final checklist, which does not contain the weights assigned to each item. Their task is to indicate on the form, whether or not an appraisee engages in each item. The ultimate evaluation of the appraisee is then determined by summing the scores of items checked for him.

Forced choice procedures involve a series of statements about job behavior. The statements are normally grouped to contain two, three, or four items. The evaluator chooses the item which is most descriptive to the appraisee. When three or four items are in a group, the evaluator may also be required to select the least descriptive item. The items selected for inclusion in the group are subject to two constraints: 1) item's ability to determine the difference between

⁵ Cummings and Schwab, Performance in Organizations, p.86.

successful and unsuccessful performance and 2) item's desirability index. Items that differentiate between very effective and ineffective performers are weighted while items not differentiating go unweighted. Desirability refers to the judge's assessment that the statement is a favorable or unfavorable statement to make about a worker. The ultimate evaluation score for the appraisee is determined by summing the discrimination index (which has been predetermined) for the items checked, e.g., high scores indicate high performance and low scores, low performance.

The quantitative method of evaluating by absolute standards requires the evaluator "...to specify the degree to which statements about performance pertain to the appraisee."⁶ Generally conventional rating scales have several statements reflecting employee characteristics, with either a continuous or discrete scale established for each item. The use of discrete scales results in better interrater agreement. Discrete scales usually vary from four to twenty-five points. The number of points on the scale is critical. Too few points do not allow for sufficient information to determine evaluations and too many ask for finer discriminations than the evaluator is capable of making. Research indicates, that for most rating situations, seven to nine points is about the minimum up to a maximum of twenty-five.

⁶ Ibid., p.90.

A behaviorally anchored rating scale attempts to overcome two methodological problems inherent in conventional ratings, i.e., types of items included in the assessment, and method of scaling the items. As in the critical incidents procedure, the development of behaviorally anchored rating involves 1) supervisors citing examples of outstanding or unsuccessful employee performance on the job, and 2) incidents condensed into a smaller number of general categories. The third step is similar to weighting items in the checklist procedure, i.e., judges rate each critical incident and incidents are eliminated when judges are unable to agree on their value. The remaining incidents are assigned to respective general categories with scales for each category developed according to their average assigned value. The evaluator then uses the form to rate each appraisee on each category. The evaluation the employee receives is determined by summing the assigned scores across all general categories.

V. EVALUATION OF RATING METHODS

The comparative procedures (other than forced distribution) operate on the unrealistic assumption that job success consists of only one general characteristic. Although the ranking process counteracts somewhat the leniency, central tendency, and strictness errors, problems arise due to two or more evaluators not defining overall effectiveness in the same way. Another difficulty results from the problem of comparing two or more groups of rankings, i.e., the high performer in one department may only be average in another

department. Finally, there is the difficulty of using procedure to provide sufficient feedback for developmental purposes.

Forced distribution usually includes comparisons on several performance factors rather than on one global dimension. This process allows one to identify the "halo error" through similarity of scores given each appraisee across factors. Although leniency errors are negated somewhat in this process, there still exists the probability of appraisees as a group not conforming to the established distribution.

Conventional rating processes reflect the potential for interindividual halo, leniency, strictness, and central tendency errors. The assessment bias on the part of the evaluator for or against an employee cannot be significantly negated in this process. In addition, conventional ratings tend to focus on personality characteristics of the employee rather than on performance behavior.

The alternative methods using absolute standards were designed in an effort to correct one or more limitations of conventional rating. Forced choice and weighted checklist procedures...attempt to differentiate between observing behavior and the evaluation of that behavior by keeping the values reflecting the the favorability of each item of the appraisal form.⁷ Forced choice is most effective in this regard by equating the items on desirability. Constant errors and interindividual errors should be reduced by these procedures.

⁷ Ibid., p.42.

Forced choice and critical incidents emphasize the need to include only valid terms in an appraisal form (true also about behavior anchored rating scales). Forced choice accomplishes this by weighting only items shown to differentiate between successful performers, and critical incidents by generalizing from specific examples of effective or ineffective performance.

The critical incidents method is a better procedure for feedback purposes than is forced choice in that the evaluator has specific incidents to discuss with the appraisee. Conversely, in forced choice neither the evaluator or appraisee has any basis for determining if the observed behavior is superior to behavior not observed.

Each of the qualitative methods (critical incidents, checklist, or forced choice) involves a considerable developmental effort.

The behaviorally anchored approach which also requires considerable developmental work, is a favorable alternative to conventional ratings. It, like critical incidents, involves the subsequent appraisee in the developmental process, thus lending commitment to the process by both evaluator and appraisee.

The behaviorally anchored approach, through its feedback, has a high potential value for employee development. During the rating process, specific employee behavior is discussed with the appraisee along with the type of behavior desired by the organization.

VI. SELECTION OF RATERS

Performance can be evaluated by any of the following:

- 1) the superior (immediate supervisor) of the appraisee
- 2) organization peers
- 3) the appraisee himself (self-evaluation)
- 4) subordinates of the appraisee
- 5) individuals outside the immediate work environment of the appraisee.

Due to his legitimate right to make both evaluative and developmental decisions, and the control of rewards and punishment received by subordinates, the immediate supervisor has become a most common and logical evaluator. A more valid appraisal results from performance feedback of several superiors at the same organization level, or at successive levels. The assumption is that the immediate superior is able to neither observe nor weigh all the dimensions of a subordinate's behavior in the same way as upper management, as regards to contribution toward organizational goals. Other problems with the immediate supervisor's role as evaluator are that 1) the reward/punishment control may be threatening to the subordinate, 2) the appraisal communication process has a tendency to flow only downward, 3) little coaching and development transpire, and 4) superiors feel uncomfortable "playing God."

The effectiveness of a peer appraisal process tends to be enhanced by a high degree of interpersonal trust among peers, presence of a non-competitive reward system, and good availability to peers of information on an appraisee's performance. Such an environment is is often found in highly professional organizations, e.g., professors

in universities, scientists in industrial organizations. Where these factors are missing appraisal potential of peers is lost. Such an environment would create a conflict for the evaluator, i.e., does one evaluate one's peer highly thus possibly placing one's own position at a lower level or does one evaluate his peer poorly and possibly lose his friendship. Peer appraisals have been found to be invalid, and in some instances disruptive, for such reasons.

During the 1960s with the major emphasis on personal growth and self-motivation, self-appraisals began to visibly surface as a result of developmental focus in performance evaluation.

According to Cummings and Schwab "several positive results have been found to be associated with self-appraisal including;

- 1) more satisfying and constructive appraisal interviews
- 2) less defensiveness by performers regarding the appraisal interview as well as the overall appraisal process.
- 3) improved job performance." ⁸

On the other hand, self-appraisals are seldom consistent with supervisory appraisals. These inconsistencies can be accounted for by:

- 1) difference in perception and degree of importance of a particular dimension of the performer's job
- 2) tendency on the part of subordinates to evaluate their performance more favorably than do their superiors
- 3) differences in the selection of what is evaluated, e.g., personality of performance.

Although self-appraisals are subject to biases and distortion, they are effective tools for self-development, personal growth, and goal commitment programs.

⁸ Ibid., p.106.

The appraisal by subordinates can be a most effective process for developing managers. Knowing how a superior is perceived by his subordinates can have the effect of changing his behavior. The effectiveness of this process would be most beneficial if used selectively rather than as an on-going process. This process would allow the superior and the organization the opportunity to receive feedback as to how effective a manager he is, as perceived by his subordinates. Some subordinates think they do not have a legitimate right to evaluate their superiors. They often fear reprisals. Subordinate appraisals can also have the effect of eroding the legitimate personal power and the reward and punishment power of the superior. As in the superior to subordinate appraisal process, we find a personal bias present. The subordinate may be appraising the superior not on his performance contribution to the organization, but on his ability to meet the needs of the subordinate.

The utilization of appraisal by outsiders (away from immediate work environment) whether from the personnel department or external consultants, is determined by two general conditions:

- 1) "the need for specialized expertise, either as a trained observer or in a substantive content area
- 2) where the objectivity of the appraisal by someone without a vested interest in the outcomes of the appraisal."⁹

The effectiveness of appraisals by outsiders is seen in the area of assessment and promotion of managers. The field review type

⁹ Ibid., p.108.

of outside appraisal, which focuses on job content and job performance of the appraisee, can be most effective for administering organizational rewards and punishment.

Two positive aspects of appraisals by outsiders are that managers escape the distasteful process of subordinate performance appraisal and appraisals of subordinate's performance are consistent due to one evaluation source. On the other hand, the superior is avoiding an essential part of his job, two representatives of management are spending time doing each appraisal, and the opportunity for meaningful exchange between superior and subordinate concerning the subordinate's performance is questionable.

VII. FREQUENCY OF APPRAISALS

It is generally accepted practice to prepare a written performance rating at least once a year. A number of companies prepare semiannual ratings. Special situations may require more frequent ratings.

Actually, rating is a day-to-day activity. The supervisor should be giving feedback to his employees as to their performance more frequently than once or twice a year. Such feedback can be of an informal nature. To ensure his own objectivity, the supervisor should maintain a written record especially reflecting extreme performance so as to accurately and adequately reflect on performance during formal appraisal interviews.

VIII. PREPARATION FOR APPRAISAL

Preparation for the appraisal interview is critical and should be preceded by rater training. The employee should be advised in advance of the appraisal interview date. The purpose for this is to allow him sufficient time to reflect on his own performance and to think of things he may wish to discuss at the interview. If the supervisor has done his job, there would be few surprises for the employees.

The supervisor, prior to conducting the appraisal interview, should have discussed the employee's performance rating with his superior, made a list of what he wishes to discuss with the employee, keeping in mind that he (supervisor) is to concentrate on strengths and not dwell on weaknesses. During the interview the supervisor should discuss the rating, item by item, with the employee and allow him the opportunity for oral and written rebuttal to a particular rating or ratings.

IX. SUMMARY

There are two basic purposes for a performance appraisal. It must be evaluative or judgemental and developmental. The evaluative process provides data for merit reward systems, transfers, promotions, etc. The development process allows the employee the opportunity to improve his performance by working with his superior in areas of needed improvement and growth.

The process for developing a performance appraisal system basically involves written job descriptions including selection of traits of job related factors, establishing a standard of performance, determining methods of rating, rater selection, frequency of rating, appraisal interview.

A critical part of the appraisal process is the method of rating performance. Most rating methods can be categorized under two general headings: comparative procedures (straight ranking, alternative ranking, paired comparison and forced distribution) and absolute standards (critical incidents, weighted checklist, forced choice, conventional rating, and behaviorally-anchored rating scale). Regardless of the method of rating chosen, if it is not reliable, relevant, and acceptable to the appraisee, it will be ineffective.

An evaluation of the different methods of rating performance indicated both strengths and weaknesses. The comparative procedures, while negating the leniency, central tendency, strictness, and halo errors on the part of appraisers, tends to either evaluate on one global dimension, as in straight and alternative rankings, and paired comparison or evaluates on several dimensions with little control on appraisees not conforming to the established distribution, as in forced distribution. In either case, the process does not lend itself to specific performance data for sufficient appraisee growth and development.

A more critical process of evaluating performance, the absolute standards method, is very time consuming to develop, requires appraiser training, and is costly. However, it is superior to comparative procedures, in that it addresses specific employee performance behavior and except for forced choice, provides an excellent vehicle for developmental feedback during the appraisal interview.

Organizations use a variety of individuals in evaluating performance, e.g., immediate supervisor, peers, self-evaluation, subordinates, field-review specialists, each of which can be effective or ineffective, depending on the organizational setting. The one appraiser that should be used in most all organizations is the immediate supervisor, due to his legitimate right to make both evaluative and developmental decisions involving his subordinates. The peer, self-appraisal, and subordinate appraisals, can best be used as a "check" on the immediate superior's effectiveness at appraising employee effectiveness.

It is generally accepted practice to prepare a written performance rating at least once a year, although a number of companies prepare semiannual ratings. Rating should actually be a day-to-day activity, i.e. the supervisor giving frequent feedback to his employees as to their performances. To adequately reflect on performance during formal appraisal interviews, the supervisor should have maintained a written record especially reflecting extreme performance.

Preparation for the appraisal interview is critical and should be preceded by rater training. The employee should be advised in advance of the appraisal interview data, to allow him (subordinate) time to reflect on his performance.

The supervisor should: Discuss the employee's performance rating with his superior, prior to conducting the appraisal interview: concentrate on employee strengths, during the interview and not dwell on weaknesses; and discuss the rating with the employee, item by item.

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Productivity

A Challenge for the 80's

By

JAMES H. AUTEN

*Police Training Institute
University of Illinois
Champaign, Ill.*

Productivity—that's what the decade of the 80's is about. How does one get more production from existing resources. Not only must industry in the United States solve the productivity problem but so must police administrators. In general terms, productivity can be defined as the relationship between inputs and outputs. For industry, it is the cost of providing a product to the public compared to the profits the product generates for the company. The more profit that can be generated at the lowest possible cost, the more productive the operation. Number of dollars is the usual measure at the output end of the process while input costs are usually measured in terms of both human and material resources.

Police administrators face similar productivity problems; however, there are some important differences. Over the past few years, the police administrator has seen his resources at the

input stage diminish while the need for the product of these resources has increased. This phenomenon is quite likely to get worse before it gets better—if it ever does improve. Certainly, the police administrator who honestly expects to be permitted to hire additional personnel in the next few years is the exception rather than the rule. The prospects for a leveling off of this trend are bleak. As fewer public dollars—all the police administrator has to rely on since his organization does not produce profits—are available, and as other public service agencies in the community are able to provide fewer services to the community, it is highly likely that the demand for services from the law enforcement agency will increase. The demand will not disappear; it will simply shift from one public service agency to another—the police.

As a result, the police administrator is faced with the problem of obtaining more productivity from existing levels of resources, knowing full well that those resources will probably diminish in the future in the face of an increasing demand for the output of those resources. Fortunately, for the police administrator, even though his resources at the input level will not be increased in terms of actual numbers, the resource he has can be expanded. The primary resource of any police agency is the personnel it employs. Approximately 90 percent of the dollar resources of a typical police agency are expended to meet personnel costs. Since the departments' primary resource is people, and since people have the capability of growth through development of unrealized potential, the police administrator has the capability of expanding the output of his resources without having to actually realize an increase in those resources.

This potential for increasing the output of the resources without actually increasing the level of resources rests in the concept of improving the job performance of the officers. Productivity can be improved simply by improving job performance of the officers.

There are various alternatives for the police administrator who is seeking ways to improve the productivity of his officers through improved job performance. Methods of managing the demands for service, of more efficiently allocating and deploying patrol personnel, and of developing alternative patrol strategies all hold the promise of improving productivity. Even though the police administrator has some alternatives to employ in this endeavor, the potential for the success of all the alternatives lies in the same source—people and the manner in which they, as individuals, perform their jobs. Accordingly, if the police administrator is to see his organization realize the potential of these alternatives, there must be, within the organization, a system for effectively evaluating the job performance of these individuals. Before job performance can be improved, it is necessary to know both how and how well the job is being done. Only then can ways to expand the productivity of the people and the jobs they do be devised.

Performance Appraisal Systems

Even though most police departments have performance appraisal systems, most of them are woefully inadequate in terms of suitability for measuring the on-the-job performance of police officers. These systems are predominantly based upon misconceptions of what police officers do. The misconceptions continue to prevail in spite of substantial evidence to the contrary. A quick glance at the instruments used by most police departments in appraising the job performance of officers reveals categories such as appearance, cooperation, loyalty, interest, attitude, judgment, attendance, personal factors, knowledge of work, etc. Most of these evaluative judgments are usually based on numbers of arrests made, traffic citations issued, field interviews conducted, property inspections completed, and crimes investigated.

All of these categories reflect important considerations and duties conducted by the patrol officer, but to a large extent they do not comprise the majority of his on-the-job performance. Numerous research studies have consistently revealed that the vast majority, estimated from 70 percent to 90 percent, of the patrol officer's working day is spent in activities that are not directly related to crime or the enforcement of law. Most of the officer's time is spent in subtle ways of maintaining order within the community or in providing miscellaneous public services to members of the community. If a per-

"All too frequently, goals are formulated by police administrators in an organizational vacuum with little or no input from other members of the organization."

formance appraisal system is going to assess the quality and quantity of an officer's job performance, it must examine what that officer is actually doing on the job and not what we might think, wish, or hope he is doing. This is the first step in improving job performance and making individuals more productive.

Essentially, the process of appraising the job performance of individual officers is nothing more than evaluating the quality and quantity of their work. When we do this, we are engaged in the process of determining or fixing the value of that work which entails making judgments. However, the process of making judgments that permit us to place some value on work performed is not quite as simple as it may sound. Judgments are usually made relative to certain personal expectations regarding what is being judged whether it be the behavior of our children, friends, boss, or people who work for us. What makes the process somewhat unfair is that we tend to keep these expectations to ourselves—we fail to communicate them to those being judged. As a result, many times persons are being judged by an expectation standard of which they are unaware. It is very difficult to measure up to the expectation of another when we do not know what those expectations are.

Organizations also fail to communicate their expectations to their employees. Most police administrators can probably state the goals of their department within the community, and most police officers probably have a vague notion of the department's goals. However, how many departments have taken the time to both formally consider and formulate these goals, and more importantly, how many departments have formally communicated these goals to every member of the organization? How many departments have further enhanced the probability of attaining these goals by developing specific objectives to be accomplished by each element and individual within the organization? The department may have a goal of crime prevention, but has it communicated its expectations of how each individual in the organization is to contribute to the attainment of that goal? In the final analysis, this is what performance appraisal is all about. It is the process of communicating the department's expectations about the quality and quantity of work performance and then judging the value of that job performance according to those expectations.

The overriding objective of any performance appraisal system should be to permit these value judgments to be made so that performance weaknesses/deficiencies can be identified and corrected in order to improve job performance. At the same time, the appraisal system should identify individuals whose performance exceeds the expectations. More specifically, the objectives of performance appraisal are:

- 1) To keep employees informed as to what is expected of them and how well they are doing in meeting these expectations;
- 2) To recognize and reward good work on the part of employees;
- 3) To recognize weaknesses in employees so they can be corrected;
- 4) To recognize strengths in employees so they can be built upon;
- 5) To identify employees who would profit from specific types of training and to identify general departmental training needs;
- 6) To provide a continuing record of an employee's performance;
- 7) To guide decisions in matters of promotion, transfer, suspension, termination, and other personnel matters;
- 8) To verify existing performance standards;
- 9) To check the accuracy of existing job descriptions or classifications; and
- 10) To verify the accuracy of recruitment and selection practices.

If these objectives can be attained, it is possible to know *what* employees are doing, *how* they are doing it, and *what* specific steps need to be taken to improve job performance, thereby improving individual and departmental productivity.

Developing an effective performance appraisal process requires the development of an evaluation system which will be comprised of several components. The first of these components, departmental/organizational goals, has already been examined;

however, its importance cannot be overemphasized. To be effective and efficient, organizations need goals. Goals are a general statement of purpose or intent of an organization. They should reflect what the organization is attempting to accomplish in the community, and as such, should mirror the expectations of the community. As communities vary, so will their expectations concerning the police department. A set of goals established by one department for its operations will not necessarily be appropriate for another department in a different community setting.

Another consideration in the goal setting process involves the manner in which the department formulates them internally. All too frequently, goals are formulated by police administrators in an organizational vacuum with little or no input from other members of the organization. The exact opposite should be the case. As mentioned previously, if goals are to have meaning, they must be communicated to and *understood* by all members of the organization. Additionally, members of the organization must perceive the goals as being desirable and attainable, or it will be unlikely that they will expend any effort toward their attainment. Formally seeking and thoughtfully considering the input of organizational members is a necessary step in satisfying these concerns. Only after members of the organization have an

understanding of what is to be accomplished can any consideration be given to how it will be accomplished.

Determining how the goals of the organization will be accomplished leads us to the second component in the performance appraisal system—the job description. The job description should contain an item-by-item listing of the principal duties/tasks, responsibilities, and accountability for each position within the organization. It should be a clear statement of the department's expectations of how each position in the organization should function/perform in fulfilling its role in attaining the organizational goals.

If the performance appraisal process is to be effective, there must be a job description for every position within the organization. If a position does not contribute to the attainment of an organization's goals, it should not exist. Each position should influence the overall productivity of the organization. Unless job descriptions exist, individuals have no way of knowing what duties are to be evaluated.

Since job descriptions are of such importance to the performance appraisal process, it is essential that they reflect the job as it is actually being done. The role of the police officer in our society has changed substantially in the past several years and will probably continue to change. As the job changes, so should the job descriptions. Attempting to make judgments about the performance of personnel based upon job descriptions that were written 10 to 15 years ago serves no meaningful purpose. Having valid job descriptions for each position within the organization permits the development of the third component in the performance appraisal system—performance standards.

Job descriptions delineate what individuals in various positions should be doing to further the attainment of organizational goals; performance standards delineate the department's expectations of *how* individuals are to perform in meeting the requirements of the job descriptions. Performance standards should be written for each task/duty listed in the job description. These performance standards become the "yardstick" by which judgments are made regarding the value of individual job performance.

From Organizational Goals to Performance Standards

An example of the developmental sequence from organizational goals to performance standards would be as follows:

- 1) *Organizational Goal*—To ensure the safe, efficient movement of vehicle and pedestrians in the community.
- 2) *Job Description*—To enforce existing traffic laws as appropriate. (For purposes of this example, only one task relating to the goal has been selected—obviously there would be others.)
- 3) *Performance Standard*—In looking at the single task/duty selected from the job description, there are at least three possible performance standards that need to be developed, including knowledge of existing traffic laws, the parameters of individual officer discretion so that the "as appropriate" expectation might be fulfilled, and the proper completion of traffic citations.

"It is in the creation of specific objectives that the potential for individual job improvement rests."

For the purposes of this example, let us use one of the standards cited—the proper completion of the traffic citation. The performance standard might look like this: When completing a traffic citation, officers of this department shall use only a black ballpoint pen. All necessary information will be printed in legible form. Officers should exercise care to ensure that all information is recorded accurately and that all appropriate blocks are completed. At the completion of each tour of duty, officers will turn in their completed citations to their immediate supervisor for review.

Returning to the criteria for a well-written performance standard, this standard can be evaluated as follows:

- 1) *What is to be done*—Completion of a traffic citation.
- 2) *How it is to be done*—Officers of this department shall use only a black ballpoint pen. All necessary information will be printed in legible form. Officers should exercise care to ensure that all information is recorded accurately and that all appropriate blocks are completed.
- 3) *How it is to be evaluated*—At the completion of each tour of duty, officers will give their completed citations to their immediate supervisor for review.

Clearly, the process of developing performance standards for each task/duty contained within a job description and for each job description within the organization is extremely time-consuming. However, it is the only way to develop the criteria necessary to make valid value judgments about the adequacy of individual job performance.

Performance standards must be developed to incorporate all aspects of individual job performance. Currently, most police departments have developed performance standards to measure the aspects of a patrol officer's job performance that directly relate to enforcement of the law and control of crime, such as arrests made, traffic citations issued, field interviews performed, complaints investigated, property inspections completed, etc. It is simply a process of recording and comparing numbers—numbers that can be manipulated. Appraising performance based upon these numbers is a legitimate part of the process, but its significance has been vastly overemphasized. Since much of what a police officer does has nothing to do with crime or enforcement of the law, attempting to base the evaluation of an individual's contribution to the attainment of organizational goals by making judgments based upon the numbers generated from law enforcement-related activities is to base the judgment on only a small portion of the officer's total activity. If the performance appraisal system is to serve its intended purpose, performance standards must exist for those activities that are not directly related to the control of crime or the enforcement of the law. To do otherwise is to overlook most of what a police officer does.

Specific Objectives

A meaningful system for performance appraisal should include the creation of specific objectives. Up until this point in the developmental sequence, the focus has been on departmental expectations—departmental

goals, departmental job descriptions, and departmental performance job standards. While all of these components relate to the successful performance of the job, they do not directly relate to the individual capabilities of the person performing the job. Specific objectives exist to put the performance expectations of the organization into individual terms, i.e., what each individual needs to do to perform the job successfully. Because each of us has different abilities and capabilities, we cannot be expected to perform a given task/duty in exactly the same manner as another individual.

It is in the creation of specific objectives that the potential for individual job improvement rests. When these objectives are created by the supervisors in consultation with each of their subordinates, and an attempt is made to go beyond the maintenance of the status quo, and incentives are provided to motivate subordinates, there is a possibility for improved job performance and increased productivity. In writing specific objectives for individuals, it is important that they be:

- 1) *Stretching*—Objectives should take the employee beyond their current status performance and personal growth.
- 2) *Attainable*—Objectives should be realistic in the sense that the individual is capable of reaching the objective. Unless the individual sees the objective as attainable, it is unlikely that he will expend the effort necessary to reach it.

- 3) *Measurable*—Progress toward the attainment of the objective should be measurable or there is no meaningful way to evaluate progress/growth.

Essentially, when supervisors sit down with subordinates to formulate specific objectives, they are forming a "contract" that becomes the basis for future performance appraisals which, in turn, requires the formulation of new specific objectives for each officer each time the performance appraisal process is conducted. If an officer's performance already exceeds the performance standard, specific objectives should still be formulated if there is ever to be improved performance.

It is quite legitimate for performance standards to reflect the minimum acceptable level of performance expected by the department, acknowledging the individual differences in humans. However, it is important to remember that the ultimate purpose underlying the formulation of specific objectives is to take people beyond their current capabilities.

Although the final component in the performance appraisal system, an incident file, is not mandatory, its existence makes performance appraisal easier. If a performance appraisal system is to be effective, the judgments being made about the value of work performed should be made on the basis of personal observations. Unfortunately, time has a way of blurring the image of how others do their jobs. The "halo effect" commonly experienced by evaluators is a manifestation of the passage of time. Maintaining an incident file helps the evaluator avoid this phenomenon, making the process more objective. This type of file consists of notations on the significant aspects of an individual's performance

made either on a regular basis or as they occur. If someone performs some job-related task/duty in a manner that exceeds expectations, that fact should be noted. Conversely, it should be noted when an individual performs a job in a manner that falls below the expectation. Supervisors should log all counseling sessions they have with subordinates following a less-than-satisfactory performance of a task/duty. In this manner, overall, rather than isolated, performance can be evaluated. The incident file should be an open system, accessible to both the supervisor and the subordinate. Keeping a "black book" defeats the intended purpose of the file—open communications between the supervisor and subordinate.

When reviewing the components in the performance appraisal system, it becomes apparent that each component is linked to and builds on the other. The existence of organization/departamental goals requires the development of job descriptions; the existence of job descriptions requires the development of performance standards; the existence of performance standards requires an objective appraisal of progress made in improving job performance. When all of these components are linked in proper sequence, there exists a process that permits the meaningful appraisal of job performance, and more importantly, the process can become a vehicle for individual growth and development, resulting in increased individual and departmental productivity.

Today, most police administrators have already been confronted with the dilemma of "getting more from less." Available evidence indicates that many of them are making a concerted effort to resolve the dilemma, and not surprisingly, they are having some success. While resolving the dilemma in the face of diminishing resources and increasing demands for the product of these resources, the police administrator should find solace in the fact that his primary resource—people—is expandable. Productivity can be improved by improving officer job performance. The key to improving individual job performance is in objectively assessing the value and meaning of each individual's unique contribution to the organization. A valid performance appraisal process permits the assessment of this value. Through its use, it is possible to identify each individual's strengths and build upon them to improve job performance.

The potential of the human resource is the most wasted resource in this country. None of us really come close to realizing our full potential. When we begin to work toward that goal, we will begin to realize our capacity for improvement. Then, and only then, will we begin to solve the "get more from less" dilemma. **FBI**

FUTURISTICS:
NEW TOOLS FOR
CRIMINAL JUSTICE EXECUTIVES*

by

William L. Tafoya
Special Agent
Federal Bureau of Investigation

FBI Academy
Management Science Department
Quantico, Virginia 22135

(703) 273-0700

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EDITORIAL NOTE

A number of colleges and universities offer lectures, courses, and even graduate degrees in futuristics or closely related disciplines with an emphasis on the future. Some associations and organizations consider "the future of ..." during conferences, seminars, or workshops. A few "think-tanks" and futures-oriented consulting firms offer their services to corporations, government agencies, and the military. Such programs and organizations are listed in: The Future: A Guide to Information Sources, 2nd ed. published in 1979 by the World Future Society, 4916 St. Elmo Avenue, Bethesda, Maryland 20814-5089.

Since July, 1982, the Management Science Department at the FBI Academy, Quantico, Virginia, has been offering a three-credit graduate course entitled, "Futuristics: Forecasting Techniques for Law Enforcement Managers." This unique course, conducted by Special Agent Tafoya, is specifically aimed at teaching the use and application of forecasting techniques as an aid in law enforcement decision-making. It is believed to be the first course of its kind to be offered anywhere in the nation.

ABSTRACT

The way in which criminal justice executives assess the need for organizational change is vitally important to the law enforcement mission within the criminal justice complex. If there is one thing that practitioners should have learned from their past mistakes it is that they have relied too heavily on experience and not enough on meaningful innovation.

Expanding ones knowledge of divergent neoteric approaches to the solution of crime problems is essential to ones ability to usher in the rapidly approaching twenty-first century. Such knowledge calls for educational objectives with a forward time-bias. The management of change requires the conversion of what "could be" into what "may be" in pursuit of what "should be." Determining what can be necessitates learning the techniques of the emerging discipline of Futuristics. This paper will discuss the historical development and philosophical underpinnings of the discipline as well as the principles, premises, and priorities of Futuristics.

For the past 50 years police departments across the nation have become more and more sophisticated in their ability to capture, record, and report crime statistics. Each year thousands of police departments meticulously and scrupulously collect crime data which are reported to the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and subsequently published in the annual report, Crime in the United States; more commonly referred to as the Uniform Crime Reports (UCR). What do these figures mean? How are they interpreted? To what use are these data put by police decision-makers?

A small change (in any category)--a two to four percent increase, for example--seems to be given little thought by most law enforcement executives, traditionally trained researchers, or the public. Only the news media seem to take notice of the annual figures and then for only a short period of time. Apparently such minor changes are viewed as inconsequential and of little cause for concern. Yet such gradual change, when examined over the long run, is quite dramatic. What is being done about it? Should these statistics be put to better use? Had projections for 1980 been made in 1960, would that information have made any difference? Would it have changed the way police departments were managed? Would their resources have been utilized more efficiently or effectively? How would crime prevention strategies have changed?

Law enforcement organizations perform their police services in a variety of ways.¹ How did a patrol officer, conducting a field interrogation of a suspicious person with out-of-state identification, run a records check at 3:00 A.M. in 1960? How does an officer do that today and how long does it take? How did a police manager get ten or more copies of a crime report 20 years ago? How is it done today and how long does it take? What was the extent of law enforcement's community relations efforts in 1960? What is it today and why?

Were the police unionized then? How about today? These are but a few of the critical issues that confront the police decision-maker today. A number of other factors will influence and define the nature of the functions to be performed by the police of tomorrow.² There is virtually no evidence that in 1960 the police were concerned about 1980. There is very little evidence that in 1980 the police have given much thought to the year 2000 or beyond. Are we destined to learn only from our mistakes--after the fact--or can we turn our experiences into an anticipation of things to come?

In spite of the advances that have been made in policing in the past two decades, American law enforcement continues to operate much as it did at the beginning of the century.³ Why? Is it simply a matter of localized resistance to change? There is evidence that when people perceive that a change will affect them adversely--even if they are wrong--they will resist the change by whatever means available.⁴ Even when they are unable to articulate any harmful effect, people will sometimes resist change.⁵ Is this the result of a failure on the part of the organizational change agent? Was there a failure to properly assess the needs of the organizational members prior to the implementation of the change? Or is the reason for the octogenarian state of policing more complex than simple parochialism and provincialism? Do the reasons extend beyond the bounds of one's own organization, community, or state? Could it be what Alvin Toffler has termed "Future Shock?"⁶

THE LEGACY OF FUTURE SHOCK

What is future shock? Future shock is a dizzying disorientation which springs from the premature arrival of the future. It is a time phenomenon the

product of which is a greatly accelerated rate of change that takes place in society and arises from the super-imposition of a new culture on an old one.⁷ Toffler further defines future shock as, "the distress, both physical and psychological, that arises from an overload of the human organism's physical adaptive systems and its decision-making processes."⁸ Simplistically stated, future shock is the human reaction to overwhelming change.

By and large mankind has been able to cope with change because it has been gradual and extended over long periods of time--virtually unnoticed. During this century, however, and especially since the end of World War II, the perplexing rapidity of change which we have been forced to accept seems to have moved forward inexplicably and undaunted. The tranquil stability most of us seek and need seems to have vanished. Both unsettling and unnerving, no one appeared to have a clear understanding of what was happening to society or why. No one was able to articulate a logical explanation of the complex chain of events that were rending the fabric of society. With the 1970 publication of Alvin Toffler's Future Shock, however, the consciousness of people began to be raised world-wide with regard to radical change and the phenomenon Toffler called, "Future Shock."⁹

Many of the changes thrust upon society have been difficult to cope with: psychedelic churches, married priests, atheist ministers, Jewish Zen Buddhists, homosexual movie theaters, wife swapping clubs, and more. The turned on, tuned out, and now generation, are all--simultaneously--part of a curious social flora.¹⁰ The ten year period beginning in the mid-1960's was a particularly unsettling era for law enforcement. During the drug scene, dowagers and delinquents alike were getting high on uppers and downers. During the anti-war movement, protesters and pacifists--in the name of peace--destroyed and devastated property, maimed and murdered targets of the so-called

"imperialist establishment." The neophytes and proselytes of the flower power gurus eagerly embraced the "make love not war" karma. The "over 30" crowd, however, viewed this utopian slogan as nothing more than a thinly veiled advocacy for promiscuous sexual experimentation and exploitation. It was not seen as merely the innocent egalitarianism and social naivete' of do-gooders. The retort of youth was, "You don't understand!", giving new meaning to the generation gap.

The revolving door of the criminal justice non-system, from the U.S. Supreme Court to the local misdemeanor courts, all seemed to be working at cross purposes with law enforcement at the precise moment in time when blue ribbon committees were extolling the virtues of the systems approach. The concept of juvenile justice was being played against the police by street-wise hoodlums who conned probation officers and flaunted their contempt for "the system" while committing very adult-like crimes.¹¹ An endless and seemingly incessant harangue of commissions and criminologists were eagerly exploring the problem of crime on the streets and intimating that they and not the police knew how policing should be done.¹² Finally, there was the perception of the police that the public did not support their efforts and, in fact, harbored hostility toward them. All of these new experiences for law enforcement made the job of policing especially difficult, frustrating, and stressful during the mid-60's and early 70's.

The recognition that the police could not do the job that was conventionally ascribed to them had an ambivalent effect on the police.¹³ On the one hand there was the subconscious relief that someone had finally comprehended what law enforcement was up against; the recognition that they could not "do it all."¹⁴ On the other hand there was the self-consciousness of being confronted with that distasteful realization. It was an awareness that did little to enhance self-esteem or the image of a super-cop. All of this has been very destabilizing. It has contributed to if not resulted in resistance to

change at the operational level and a jaundiced perspective of innovation at the managerial and executive levels.

Bureaucratization was championed by August Vollmer, O. W. Wilson, and other police pioneers as a hallmark of professionalization. It was successful for almost 40 years in reducing political pressure and patronage. Stability and consistency of operations were two other benefits of bureaucratization. It was an early successful innovation of police administration which has outlasted its usefulness for most law enforcement agencies and has metamorphized into over-bureaucratization.¹⁵ This presents four major problems for police administrators: poor morale among police employees, lack of communication, loss of control, and adverse impact on police-community relations.¹⁶ At least two conditions seem to evoke the need for a reduction in bureaucratic hierarchy and managerial style today. One is the influx of young, socially sophisticated, often brash, inquisitive, and usually highly educated men and women into policing.¹⁷ The other is the realization that police organizations are operating and will continue to function in a turbulent environment.¹⁸

The organizational environment in which many people work surfaces a number of repetitive jobs in which standardization--a key component of bureaucratization--exists.¹⁹ Law enforcement has made a "science" of standardization and routinized methods. A careful reading of "Breaking the Code," in Toffler's The Third Wave, is like a review of the history of police administration.²⁰ Even the military no longer holds sacrosanct the precepts of Frederick Taylor.²¹ Unless we learn from the mistakes of the past we are bound to repeat those mistakes. But worse we will be compelled to endure the future if we do not shape its course.²² One may choose to ignore the breakdown of industrialized society and disregard the deterioration of community values. One may endeavor to exist in the shadows cast by the future that others will fashion, or confront the changes before us and devise ways to cope through adjustment and adaptation.²³ No matter what we do, however, we will not

remain unaffected.²⁴ And whether we realize it or not, most of us are already involved in resisting or creating change.²⁵ There is, however, a danger in airing such facts. Those who treasure the status quo may seize upon the concept of future shock as an excuse to impede change.²⁶ Reckless attempts to halt change, moreover, will produce consequences as destructive as irresponsible efforts to advance change.²⁷

The way in which law enforcement managers and executives assess the need for change, therefore, is vitally important.²⁸ If there is anything we should have learned from our mistakes of the past it is that as a profession we have relied too heavily on experience and not enough on innovation. Expanding our knowledge of divergent new approaches to the traditional issues of policing is essential to staving off future shock.²⁹ Such knowledge must evolve from educational objectives and methods with a forward time-bias.³⁰ This is important because virtually all of our educational institutions and programs seem to be firmly entrenched in the traditions of the past. The management of change requires the conversion of what "could be" into what "may be" in pursuit of what "should be." Determining what "should be" calls for the discipline of futuristics.³¹

FORECASTING VS FORTUNE TELLING

Forecasting is the purest form of futuristics.³² One analogy portrays forecasting as the illumination from the headlights of an automobile being driven at night through a snowstorm. A bit of what lies ahead is revealed although not clearly enough so that the driver can advance without trepidation. While the driver may not recognize every landmark or be able to read every road sign, enough of the darkness is uncovered to avoid disaster and enables the driver to proceed to the intended destination.³³

But forecasting is not predicting in the generally accepted sense of the word. A prediction is a statement about what will happen (usually to an individual). A forecast is a statement that projects what could happen (but never about individuals), what may be changed, or what should be brought about. A forecast suggests what might occur if... .³⁴

VIEWS OF THE FUTURE

Three general views of the future are prevalent today. Adherence to one or the other of these views will shape one's attitude toward forecasting and futuristics. They are:

- Apocalyptic
- Teleogic
- Prophetic

The apocalyptic view holds that nothing lies ahead but a cataclysmic end. Negativism and pessimism characterize this outlook. Life is preordained. Nothing man does means anything. Nothing he does will make a difference. Destiny will not be changed. Iranian religious literature, for example, seethes with vivid symbolism influenced by weird demonology and a stark dualism between this world and the next.³⁵ The modern fatalist is the chic nihilist who retreats from responsible action and thought.

The teleologic view holds that the universe is moving toward some fixed end as well. But here, the future is seen as being played out for some purpose inherent in the universe itself. That unwinding is directed by an absolute power that man is unable to comprehend completely but in whom trust must be placed. The protestant ethic and the doctrines of catholicism pervade this perspective. Man can receive his great reward through piety, penitence, prudence, and parturition. The modern determinist is the neophyte of the

vitalist doctrine who hopes to achieve eternal salvation through hard work and an exemplary life--through repentance and forgiveness.³⁶

The prophetic view holds that man's future is neither doomed nor determined. Reasoned, purposeful optimism epitomizes this vista. Man can direct his destiny. Free will allows man to control his actions, influence his environment, and decide what legacy he will bequeath future generations. This unconditional openness allows man to escape the paralysis of the past. It also requires well-regulated innovation and a continuous reappraisal of one's beliefs. This vision decries an extolling of yesterday's dogma and revels in the unfolding of unprecedented novelty. This is the world of the modern futurist. The modern futurist is the inventor of tomorrow.³⁷

MISCONCEPTIONS, MYTHS, AND MYSTICISM

There are a number of popularized notions about those who are interested in "The Future," depending on one's personal philosophical orientation. For the self-styled "realist" who sees himself as a practical individual, "the future" generally means the next 24 hours or next week, but by no means beyond next year. "THE FUTURE," is silly to contemplate; it is the purview of starry-eyed idealists. Some of these beliefs are based on recent, direct experience and understanding. Most, however, are based on misconceptions, myths, and mysticism which date to the dawn of mankind and of which few have any knowledge or understanding.

Misconceptions seem to polarize in one of two camps. At one extreme there is the stereotype of the dreamer, the eternal optimist who is not very practical, realistic, or "down-to-earth," and whose whimsical flights of fancy are not to be taken seriously. The fantasies of this individual are usually dismissed as utopian but harmless. At the other end of the continuum is the

foreboding stereotype of the sorcerer's apprentice: someone in league with malevolent forces. This is the person who is seen as a practitioner of astrology, divination, necromancy, shamanism, demonology, or the occult, and whose tools and practices include the use of tarot cards, tea leaves, entrails, crystal balls, incantations, palmistry, talking in tongues, witchcraft, and black magic. The pronouncements, prognostications, and prophecies of this individual are generally thought to be on the lunatic fringe; the "weirdo" or "wacko" who is demented and sometimes dangerous.

Myths were probably originally designed to serve two purposes. First, to account for natural phenomena by representing such facts as being the result of the willful action of external forces. Second, to provide the necessary authority and validation for the practices and institutions of the time. Myths are found in all cultures. They have been perpetuated because they serve people unconscious of or uninterested in organic processes. Eight types of myths exist: those that deal with 1) the origin and organization of the world; 2) the creation and nature of man; 3) the genesis and characteristics of natural phenomena (animal, vegetable, astral, or meteorological); 4) rhythms of nature and alternation of the seasons; 5) the inherent antitheses of both the physical and "moral" natural order, such as light and darkness, good and evil; 6) the primordial history of the world and its ultimate fate; 7) the nature of "other" worlds; and 8) primeval relations between gods and traditional heroes.³⁸

Mysticism is an intuitive form of knowledge beyond the bounds of normal sense perception and reasoning. It is associated with levitations, locutions, and mysterious wounds. Three types of mysticism are reported in the literature. Mysticism of nature involves a transcendent unity or "allness" with nature. In this state the physical world is everything. Monistic mysticism involves the perception of oneself as identical with The Absolute and at the

same time perceiving that nothing but The Absolute exists--a denial of the physical world. Theistic mysticism involves a transcendent and supreme reality but without losing one's own identity. It neither makes an "all" of the physical world, nor denies its existence.³⁹

Futurists disdain all such beliefs. In our relatively short move of 800 lifetimes from the troglodyte to the terminal man we seem to have become hobbled by a great deal of psychological and pseudointellectual baggage.⁴⁰

FUTURISTICS AS A DISCIPLINE

Since the dawn of antiquity, man has been fascinated with images of the future. The Oracle at Delphi in ancient Greece was the subject of much interest for over a thousand years.⁴¹ In Greek mythology, Apollo, the god of prophecy, is said to have traveled to Delphi at an early stage in the Hellenic Period (sometime between the third and the first century, B.C.), to seek out the counsel of the Oracle.⁴²

Futuristics, however, is a distinctly modern phenomenon, developed by scholars and scientists seeking to address societal ills in original and novel ways. Futuristics combines historical fact, scientific knowledge, and human values with vision to create images of what could occur in the future.⁴³

Historical Development

As early as 1902, the British science fiction writer, H. G. Wells, suggested that the future should be a field of serious study. American sociologist S. Colum Gilfillan, in 1907, was the first to propose a name for the study of the future, "mellontology." In 1920 at Columbia University he formalized his proposal in his master's degree thesis, "Successful Social

Prophecy in the Past." A refugee from Nazi Germany, political scientist Ossip Flechtheim advocated studying the future as an academic subject in 1943. A year later he coined the word "futurology" to describe the scientific study of the future.

Two events generated by Army-Air Force General H. H. Arnold, a military defense planner, contributed significantly to the futuristics movement. In 1944 he instigated the first forecast of future technological capabilities and military armaments. Two years later he persuaded the Douglas Aircraft Corporation to study the potential for airborne intercontinental warfare. This was accomplished by establishing Project RAND, an acronym for Research and Development. In 1948, with funding from the Ford Foundation, Project RAND detached itself from Douglas Aircraft; the RAND Corporation thus became the first "think-tank."

Two subsequent events at RAND further added credence to the futuristics movement. The first was the 1953 development of the Delphi Technique, a means of polling experts on a specific topic while overcoming the negative aspects of group dynamics. The second was the 1959 publication of a paper entitled, "The Epistemology of the Inexact Sciences." This vitally important paper provided the philosophical underpinnings for the emerging new discipline of futuristics. Mathematician Olaf Helmer was involved in both of these events; the former was with Norman Dalkey, the latter with Nicholas Rescher.

In 1961, another (now well-known) "think-tank" was founded in Croton - on-Hudson, New York by a physicist and former RAND research analyst, Herman Kahn. Richard Meier addressed the subject of the future in his resources planning classes in the School of Natural Resources at the University of Michigan in 1961 and subsequently in the city planning and architecture classes

at the University of California at Berkeley. The first association of futurists, Mankind 2000, was formed in London by historian Robert Jungk in 1965. Alvin Toffler taught the first course dealing exclusively with the future in 1966 at the New York City New School for Social Research, it was entitled, "Social Change and the Future." That same year the World Future Society was founded in Washington D.C. under the leadership of journalist Edward Cornish. The International Futuribles Association was formed the following year in Paris by attorney Bertrand de Jouvenel. "Alternative Futures," and "Seminar on Futurism," are two courses taught by Howard F. Didsbury, Jr., at Kean College of New Jersey beginning in 1967. At British Columbia's Simon Fraser University, W. Basil McDermott began teaching a course entitled, "The Study of the Future," in 1968. The Club of Rome was also formed in 1968, by Italian economist Aurelio Peccei, as was the Institute for the Future, founded in Menlo Park, California by Olaf Helmer. A futures study program was started in the School of Education at the University of Massachusetts at Amherst in 1970. In 1971, the University of Southern California opened its Center for Futures Research in the Graduate School of Business Administration. The Futures Group was founded by aerodynamics engineer Theodore Gordon in Glastonbury, Connecticut that same year. The first full-scale graduate degree program in futuristics was pioneered in 1974 by the University of Houston at Clear Lake City. Before 1960 there were few futurist organizations; by the end of that decade a great many had been formed. Fewer than one hundred futures courses were being taught world-wide in the early 1960's. By the early 1970's literally thousands of courses dealing with the future were being offered throughout the world. Nominally, then, it may be said that as an independent discipline, futuristics emerged in the late 1960's.⁴⁴

Principles, Premises, and Priorities

As with all other disciplines, futuristic statements are based on certain assumptions. Those assumptions revolve around the nature of the universe and the role of man in that universe. Futurists, like management scientists, educators, psychologists, sociologists, criminologists, and other behavioral and social scientists, disagree among themselves as often as they agree on important issues in their field of study. Understanding what constitutes the issues that are consentaneously important to futurists will help to explain how the discipline of futuristics differs from the other, traditional social and behavioral sciences.

Consensus is developing around three basic principles which form the basis of the discipline:

- The Unity or Interconnectedness of Reality
- The Significance of Ideas
- The Crucial Importance of Time

Futurists do not view the world as a hodge-podge of independent, unconnected entities acting in random fashion only coincidentally interacting purposefully and meaningfully. Rather futurists envision a holistic universe, a huge mega-system, the activities of whose systems, subsystems, and components interface and interact in synergistic fashion; futurists are very much systems-oriented.⁴⁵

Futurists do not cling to the status quo, the tried and true beliefs of the past. They do not believe that what was good enough yesterday is good enough for today and will, therefore, be good enough for tomorrow. Futurists explore divergent new ways of dealing with old problems and imagine unprecedented new ways of anticipating potential new problems. The inevitability of change is central to the thinking of most futurists.

Frequently overlooked by non-futurists, however, is the significance of an idea, the catalyst for any change. Ideas are the germs of thought which breed concepts and constructs and finally give birth to theories. Convinced that ideas can move mountains, futurists are extremely interested in the systematic development of ideas.⁴⁶

Futurists are not preoccupied with immediate concerns but do not discount them. Most disciplines are almost totally absorbed with the problems of today and steeped in the tradition of yesterday. Most people believe that thinking about what might happen 10 to 20 years from now to be nothing more than frivolous conjecture; the problems of today are too consuming to worry about tomorrow. Further, such people tend to pay little attention to small fluctuations; small shifts are too trivial to bother with given all the other things with which one has to contend. Yet a change as small as two percent per year in any crime category would mean a doubling of that crime in 35 years.⁴⁷ This would occur given an uninterrupted change in the direction and velocity of the crime. An extrapolation of UCR data for any number of cities will demonstrate that crime can quadruple in an even shorter period (20 years).

Futurists tend to focus on time frames of five years and beyond. This is based on a conviction that in most organizations a three to five year time lag exists between the making of a decision and its impacting upon the organization. The number of decisions made five years ago and before in most organizations are just now taking hold. We can expect to see very little change next month or next year resulting from major decisions made today. Decisions made today and planned to begin in five years, however, can shape the future. In two decades virtually anything can be brought about in our institutions and organizations. While a 20 year delay may well be unacceptable for us as

individuals in our personal lives, society and its organizations, such as police agencies, are not so constrained. In our roles as organizational members and decision-makers, we often mistakenly impose our own conception of time as a frame of reference in considering issues relative to our organizations. This is a critical error that must be corrected. One may be retired and forgotten but the organization will continue to travel along the course that was charted by someone who preceded those presently at the helm.

Futurists generally conceptualize six future time frames:

- | | |
|-------------------------|---------------------|
| ● Immediate Future | Present to 2 years |
| ● Short Range Future | 2 - 5 years |
| ● Mid Range Future | 5 - 10 years |
| ● Long Range Future | 10 - 20 years |
| ● Extended Range Future | 20 - 50 years |
| ● Distant Future | 50 years and beyond |

As police decision-makers we frequently become immersed in the multitude of problems that confront us on a daily basis. As such we often believe that we are too busy to plan and merely try to "stay on top of things." As the harried executive, we become organizational firefighters, moving from one hot spot to the next, never quite managing to put out the fire. Is it any wonder then that we take little notice of a mere two to four percent annual increase in the crime rate? What we fail to recognize is that the crisis we face today is probably the minor problem that we ignored yesterday.⁴⁸

Consensus is also solidifying around three fundamental premises or postulates:

- The Future is Not Predictable
- The Future is Not Predetermined
- Future Outcomes can be Influenced by Individual Choice

No serious futurist believes that the future can be predicted. Use of the word "prediction" is perhaps unavoidable but unfortunate in that the popularized notion has confounded the discipline of futuristics. Frequently taken to refer to a foretelling by a soothsayer, such a "prediction" is thought to be a message from a supernatural source. This use of the word reached its high point in the Judaeo-Christian religion wherein the pronouncements of future events and proclaiming God's will to seek obedience was the primary function of the prophet.

To further confuse the issue, "prediction" is used in the traditional disciplines as well, but not always to refer to a "forecast." The word "prediction" is routinely used to describe the existence or nonexistence of a relationship between variables. One predicts from an independent variable to a dependent variable. Aptitude tests, for example, predict future achievement; intelligence tests predict present and future ability to learn and to solve problems.⁴⁹

Futurists cannot predict because fragmentary data about the past and present are coupled with an incomplete understanding of the processes of change. Neither can the direction nor influence of individual choice be anticipated to any degree of certainty. While uncertainty can be minimized in the physical sciences, social and behavioral scientists do not enjoy the same luxury where social, political, or economic systems are concerned.

Futurists believe that individual choice can influence future outcomes. Man can exercise choice. Therefore, man can influence particular events given knowledge of the alternatives. While there are no guarantees that the exercise of choice will produce the desired result, it will have some effect on the outcome.⁵⁰

Consensus is taking shape with respect to three primary priorities or goals. Futurists strive to:

- Form Perceptions of the Future (The Possible)
- Study Likely Alternatives (The Probable)
- Make Choices to Bring About Particular Events (The Preferable)

If man can influence future outcomes, perceptions of the future must be formed. The possible paths to the future must be conceived and described. Fresh new images of the future must be generated in a variety of ways. This enables us to be alert to risks as well as opportunities. What is possible is what "could be"; this key role is characterized as image-driven. This is usually left to so-called visionaries, not because it must be, but because it has been. What is required is breaking the fetters of one's imagination. It is the vital, creative goal of futuristics.

Once new images have been generated likely alternatives must be studied. The probable paths to the future must be analyzed; qualitatively as well as quantitatively. This usually involves an exploratory examination which calls for estimating the probability of events and trends and evaluating consequences of certain choices. What is probable is what "may be"; this aim is characterized as analytically-driven. It is the detached, systematic, and scientific goal of futuristics.

Having imagined the possible and analysed the probable, it is necessary to make choices among alternatives in order to bring about particular events. The preferable paths to the future must be decided. Here, normative or prescriptive options must be pursued. What is preferred is what "should be"; this intent is characterized as value-driven. It is the managerial, decision-making goal of futuristics.⁵¹

Regardless of what lies ahead, we can best be prepared to deal with it if we anticipate the future in an imaginative, analytical, and prescriptive

manner. This means that police managers and executives must not be seduced by the "quick fix" easy answers that are so readily available from charlatans, whose intuitively appealing answers rely on ignorance, fear, and gullibility, or by the "tried and true" tenets of the past. When it becomes dogma, "experience" can be as dangerous as the rear mirror of an automobile. The organizational "driver" needs to glance occasionally into the rear view mirror. If one's gaze becomes fixed on what has passed, however, disaster is a virtual certainty.

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Needs Assessment: Key to Organizational Change

William L. Tafoya

William L. Tafoya is a Supervisory Special Agent of the Federal Bureau of Investigation and serves as a faculty member of the Management Science Department, FBI Academy, Quantico, VA 22135, and adjunct professor of Management, University of Virginia. He holds a B.S. in criminal justice administration from San Jose State University, an MPA in public administration from the University of Southern California, and is completing his dissertation research for the Ph.D. in criminal justice and criminology at the University of Maryland. A former police officer, Mr. Tafoya has several publications and has guest lectured extensively. His research interests are in futuristics, artificial intelligence, and robotics.

The need for change in the delivery of law enforcement services in America has long been recognized and advocated (Fuld 1909; Fosdick 1915; Graper 1921; Vollmer 1936; Smith 1940; Wilson 1950). More recently "Change Agent" advocates have outlined strategies for implementing organizational change in law enforcement agencies (Duncan 1972; Murphy and Brown 1973; Toch, Grant, and Galvin 1975; Livingstone and Sylvia 1979; Guyot 1979; Territo 1980). Some of the proposals for change have come about as a result of self-assessment but most as a result of the social unrest of the mid 1960s and early 1970s. The turmoil generated by this unrest was of such magnitude that four presidential commissions were appointed within a 5-year period to study the problem (President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice 1965; National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorder 1967; National Commission on the Causes and Prevention of Violence 1968; President's Commission on Campus Unrest 1970).

Although law enforcement agencies have been operating under great pressures and much public scrutiny during the last 15 years, it is in this period in the history of American law enforcement that the greatest advances have come about (Kuykendall and Unsinger 1975, p. 13; Goldstein 1977, p. 8; Reppetto 1978, p. v). Despite the number of changes that have taken place, the majority of the proposed changes have fallen far below that which was expected or have failed altogether (Territo 1980, p. 398). In spite of the pressures to change—the technology that exists, the strategies proposed—American law enforcement continues to

operate much as it did at the beginning of the century (Kuykendall and Unsinger 1975, p. 13). This situation is undoubtedly disheartening to all those police executives who, in the past two decades, have viewed themselves as Change Agents. In spite of their most earnest efforts and dogged determination, failures have exceeded successes. Why?

THE POWER OF PERCEPTION

It is suggested that one of the most important reasons for such failings has to do more with how that change is perceived by those who are called upon to implement the change than by any other factor. The power of perception is well established in the literature (Graham 1968; Dieterly and Schneider 1974; Tosi and Carroll 1976; Ford and Jackofsky 1978; Jackson 1979; James and Jones 1980). It has been noted, for example, that people who perceive, even though incorrectly, that some change will affect them adversely, will almost always resist the change by whatever means are available to them (Kaufman 1971, p. 11). People will sometimes resist innovation even when they are unable to identify any harmful effect (Territo 1980, p. 396). Oddly enough, law enforcement executives and managers frequently either fail to take notice of the power of perception of individuals, groups, and informal organizations, or they grossly underestimate the consequence of misperceptions (Territo 1980, p. 390). Typically, the importance of the contribution that can be made by organizational members if they are consulted in advance of implementation is overlooked as a result of such an underestimate (Territo 1980, p. 393).

The likelihood of generating a positive attitude toward the desirable change is greatly enhanced when the conditions associated with the change are related to and understood by the resistant organizational members (Filley 1975, p. 128). This can most easily be accomplished when those initiating the change understand *why* people resist the change (Territo 1980, p. 397).

RESISTANCE TO CHANGE

The key to understanding why people resist change is here referred to as needs assessment. The "needs" of the individual, group, or informal organization must be assessed in terms of their belief in the value of the proposed change (Hultman 1979, p. 25). As the individual contemplates the change proposed, he consciously or subconsciously asks himself the question, "Does my organization need this change?" The individual simultaneously internalizes and transforms this question into, "Do I need this change, and is it in my best interest?" (Davis 1982, p. 65). This rationalization process is so subtle that the individual may truly believe he is not resistant on behalf of his own interests, but rather is based on the perception that the change is not in the best interest of the organization (Culbert and McDonough 1980, p. 8). The two processes are intrinsically intertwined and become indistinct: the organization does not need the change. Blockages to further consideration develop which amount to a barrier. These blockages must be understood and then overcome if meaningful change is to take place (Connor and Patterson 1982, p. 18).

BLOCKAGE QUESTIONNAIRE

Francis and Woodcock (1975) have developed an instrument that may be of value as a needs assessment device. The authors describe the instrument as the Blockage Questionnaire. They define a blockage as that which prevents people in organizational settings from putting their intelligence, energy, and effort to productive use (Francis and Woodcock 1975, p. 3). The logic of this definition is supported by current research (Culbert and McDonough 1980; Pitcher 1981; Rolland and Janson 1981; Connor and Patterson 1982; Davis 1982; Randolph 1982). Each of the dimensions or blockages is described as typical people problems (Francis and Woodcock 1975, p. 9-13):

- A. *Inadequate Recruitment and Selection.*
The people being hired lack the knowl-

edge, personality, or skills appropriate to the organization's needs.

- B. *Confused Organizational Structure.* The way in which people are organized is wasteful or inefficient.
- C. *Inadequate Control.* Poor decisions are made because of faulty information in the hands of inappropriate people.
- D. *Poor Training.* People are not learning efficiently to do things that would materially improve their performance.
- E. *Low Motivation.* People do not feel greatly concerned about the organization and are not willing to expend much effort to further common goals.
- F. *Low Creativity.* Good ideas for improvement are not being properly put to use, so stagnation occurs.
- G. *Poor Teamwork.* People who should be contributing to common tasks either do not wish to work together or find that there are too many obstacles to do so.
- H. *Inappropriate Management Philosophy.* Conscious and unconscious management principles that underlie decisions and create the atmosphere are unrealistic or inhumane.
- I. *Lack of Succession Planning and Management Development.* Sufficient preparation for important future job vacancies is not being undertaken.
- J. *Unclear Aims.* The reasons for doing things are either obscure or badly explained.
- K. *Unfair Rewards.* People are not rewarded in ways that satisfy them, or the reward system works against the health of the organization.

Each of these blockages consists of 10 statements which are postulated to be reflective of that specific dimension. The respondent is directed in advance to consider each of the 110 statements in relation to the entire organization or a specific department, group, or team within the organization (Francis and Woodcock 1975, p. 25). Consequently, the instrument is adaptable for any part or all of the organization. The respondent is to quickly consider each statement in sequence indicating agreement by "x-ing" out the number corresponding to the statement and simply leaving blank the number of the statement for which the respondent does not agree (Francis and Woodcock 1975, p. 26). After considering all of the statements,

FIGURE 1
BLOCKAGE QUESTIONNAIRE ANSWER SHEET

■ Follow the instructions given at the beginning of the questionnaire.

■ In the grid below there are 110 squares, each one numbered to correspond to a question. Mark an "X" through the square if you think a statement about your organization is broadly true. If you think a statement is not broadly true, leave the square blank. Fill in the top line first, working from left to right; then fill in the second line, etc. Be careful not to miss a question.

A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	I	J	K
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11
12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22
23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	32	33
34	35	36	37	38	39	40	41	42	43	44
45	46	47	48	49	50	51	52	53	54	55
56	57	58	59	60	61	62	63	64	65	66
67	68	69	70	71	72	73	74	75	76	77
78	79	80	81	82	83	84	85	86	87	88
89	90	91	92	93	94	95	96	97	98	99
100	101	102	103	104	105	106	107	108	109	110
Totals										

■ When you have considered all 110 statements, total the number of "X's" in each vertical column and go on to the next page.

SOURCE: *People At Work: A Practical Guide to Organizational Change* by Dave Francis and Mike Woodcock, by permission of University Associates, Inc., La Jolla, California © 1975.

the respondent is to total the number of agreements per blockage dimension. The answer sheet is an 11x10 grid with a letter designating the blockage column into which the statements corresponding to the dimension are arranged (Francis and Woodcock 1975, p. 32); see figure 1.

Agreement with a statement (for example, "It would help if people showed more interest in their jobs") would indicate that the respondent was "blocking" on a specific dimension, here, motivation. Interpreting the results is quite simple as well. It is basically a self-scoring instrument; ideally a trainer or facilitator interprets the results. Although, following the text, the respondent could do that as well. Obviously, if used as an organizational diagnostic tool, individual interpretations would be less useful than aggregating the data. The higher the number of affirmative responses within a specific dimension the more serious the blockage (Francis and Woodcock 1975, p. 34). The blockages can also be easily rank-ordered from the most serious (highest number of affirmative responses per dimension) to the least serious (lowest number of affirmative responses per dimension). This enables the

organization to assess which blockage dimension requires the most immediate attention.

SUBJECTS

The Blockage Questionnaire was used in four law enforcement organizations: the Metropolitan Police Department (MPD), Washington, D.C.; the U.S. Capitol Police (USCP), Washington, D.C.; the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), Washington Field Office (WFO), Washington, D.C.; and the Baltimore County Police Department (BCPD), Towson, Maryland. The police subjects were all managerial personnel (first-line supervisors, middle managers, or executives) of their respective organizations. The FBI-WFO subjects were all special agents of the FBI. A total of 919 instruments were collected from these 4 organizations.

Between June 1978 and July 1980, the Blockage Questionnaire was administered to 455 police officers of the MPD. This represents 58.41 percent of all MPD managerial personnel. The instrument was administered to 159 police officers of the USCP between

April and December 1979. This represents 87.84 percent of all USCP managerial personnel. The Blockage Questionnaire was administered to 265 (70.11 percent) of the special agents of the FBI assigned at WFO in January 1980. All (100 percent) of the managerial personnel are included in this number. In September 1981, the instrument was administered to 40 police officers of the BCPD, representing 90.24 percent of all BCPD managerial personnel.

METHOD

The Blockage Questionnaire was not specifically designed for law enforcement use by the developers of the instrument, Francis and Woodcock. This researcher, however, views the instrument as being easily adaptable through minor modification for such use.

First, some word changes were made to enhance clarity. For example, in the case of the police respondents, the statement, "No one seems to have a clear understanding of what causes the *company's* [emphasis added] problems," was changed to read, "No one seems to have a clear understanding of what causes the *department's* [emphasis added] problems." In the case of the instrument used to collect data from FBI respondents, the word "company's" was changed to "Bureau's." All such statements were likewise modified to fit the organizations.

Second, a section was added to obtain demographic data, for example, age group, tenure, length of present assignment, educational background, and so on. Such data were used for purposes of cross correlations.

The Blockage Questionnaire was first used as a diagnostic tool in a law enforcement organization with the MPD in conjunction with a series of 40-hour management training programs conducted over a 2-year period. Likewise with the USCP, the instrument was used in conjunction with a series of 40-hour management training programs. At the FBI-WFO, the Blockage Questionnaire was administered in a series of training sessions as part of a change in managerial practices and reorganization plan. At the BCPD, the instrument was used as the primary vehicle for the design of a management training program.¹

¹The Blockage Questionnaire was administered at the BCPD by representatives of MACRO SYSTEMS, Inc., Silver Spring, Maryland. Their use of the instrument was based on their having been made aware of the instrument in February 1979 while pursuing another project which involved the assessment of various management training programs on behalf of the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration (LEAA). That exposure occurred in assessing the manage-

In all cases, the instrument was administered to all respondents during the first hour of the first morning of the training session. All of the training sessions were conducted in the same classroom of each of the respective organizations. The respondents were neither volunteers nor self-selected. That is, all training program participants were administered the instrument as a function of the first day's "starting up" process. The same instructions were given to all the respondents by the same trainer—this researcher (with the exception of the BCPD).

Administration group sizes varied moderately. At the MPD, the mean average was 23 (the range was 18-30) participants per session. At the USCP, the group size mean average was 18 (the range was 15-21). At the FBI-WFO, the mean average was 50 (the range was 25-80). At the BCPD, six administrations with a mean average of seven respondents were conducted. The conditions in each classroom where the instrument was administered in each organization were exactly the same.

RESULTS

At the MPD, 18/35 (51.43 percent) of all the department's executives (chief of police, assistant chiefs, deputy chiefs, and inspectors), 183/223 (82.06 percent) of all the middle managers (captains and lieutenants), and 254/521 (48.75 percent) of the first-line supervisors (sergeants) completed the instrument.

At the USCP, 7/11 (63.64 percent) of all the department's executives (chief of police, deputy chiefs, and inspectors), 39/48 (81.25 percent) of all the middle managers (captains and lieutenants), and 113/122 (92.62 percent) of all the first-line supervisors (sergeants) completed the instrument.

A similar hierarchical correspondence does not exist in the FBI; consequently, a direct comparison in rank structure is not possible. At the FBI-WFO there were 4 executives (a special agent in charge and 3 assistant special agents in charge) and roughly 20 supervisory special agents. In the FBI, the title of special agent could properly be categorized as middle manager or first-line supervisor depending on the nature of the specific managerial responsibilities. All of these FBI agents were included in the number reported

ment training program being conducted by this researcher and another FBI instructor for the MPD. MACRO SYSTEMS apparently saw the potential for the instrument's use as a diagnostic tool at that time and subsequently used it as such. Aside from the BCPD, the other three administrations at the MPD, USCP, and FBI-WFO were conducted by this researcher.

as having completed the instrument (265 or 70.11 percent of all the special agents assigned at the WFO in January 1980).

At the BCPD, 11/12 (91.67 percent) of all the department's executives (chief of police, colonels, and majors) and 26/29 (89.66 percent) of all the middle managers (captains) completed the instrument. The Blockage Questionnaire was not administered to first-line supervisors (sergeants) at the BCPD.

DISCUSSION

Descriptive analysis of these data produced some very interesting results. Correlations across different organizational levels revealed surprisingly different perceptions about the same dimensions, both within each organization independently as well as across organizational bounds. For example, poor teamwork and low motivation emerged consistently as the most serious problem areas in both the MPD and USCP. However, when the rank-ordering of the dimensions was done as a function of hierarchical rank, sergeants rank-ordered poor teamwork and low creativity as the most serious problems in their respective organizations. They rank-ordered inadequate control as one of the least serious problem areas in their departments. Conversely, executives in both of these departments rank-ordered poor teamwork and inadequate control as the most serious problem areas in their departments. These same executives rank-ordered low creativity as one of the least serious problem areas. The rank-ordering of the dimensions at the BCPD was consistent with that of the MPD and USCP. The BCPD respondents rank-ordered low motivation and poor teamwork as the most serious problem areas. Inappropriate management philosophy was rank-ordered as the least serious problem area. At the FBI-WFO, unclear aims, lack of succession planning, and management development were rank-ordered as the most serious problem areas, and unfair rewards was rank-ordered as the least serious problem area.

This was interpreted to indicate that managerial personnel at different hierarchical levels have conflicting perceptions about what causes problems within their organization. It is also possible that this could result in different managerial levels working at cross purposes. The need for a realignment of the views of organizational members is suggested by these findings. Alignments tell people how to do their job, how to interpret each organizational event, and how to responsibly undertake one's organizational duties without the necessity of subverting individual per-

sonal needs (Culbert and McDonough 1980, p. 131). The implications are worth noting. If policy makers perceive a problem with certain organizational mechanisms, such as those relating to the control function, directives could be issued to implement a change to "tighten up" the perceived inadequacy. Lower-level managers responsible for implementing the change, who perceive existing control mechanisms to be "tight enough" already, could resist, subvert, or even sabotage the implementation strategies leading to further frustration on the part of the policy makers who are unable to understand why the change did not work as intended. This situation could be further exacerbated in view of the evidence that managers' perceptions of the most serious organizational problems are related to department affiliation (Tosi and Carroll 1982, p. 142). This means that not only could a policy maker be at odds with his subordinate managers who are responsible for implementing the mandated change, but with the policy maker's own peers as well, each of whom has his own set of "agenda" to attend to. How, then, is an executive or manager to successfully implement change?

The "answer" to the dilemma, like a Gordian knot, is actually a complex of factors that must be recognized independently but applied in a synergistic fashion. Even if the explanation could be unraveled, it is unlikely that the components, independently, would have a meaningful effect. Bunker (1972, p. 75) suggests that understanding the implementation process is enhanced if one thinks of the process as being influenced by actors at a finite number of key leverage points each exhibiting different levels of commitment. Connor and Patterson (1982, p. 19) have constructed a Commitment Model to help identify the stages of commitment to organizational change. Davis (1982, pp. 65-66) suggests that interaction requires determining contexts and content of unquestioned assumptions if managers are to understand the ways in which people perceive problems. In terms of the actors in the change process, Argyris (1972, p. 29; 1976, p. 61) suggests that human effectiveness increases as involvement and dynamic interpersonal growth increases among people. Connor and Patterson (1982, p. 26) suggest that to achieve maximum support from participants in the change process they must be "driven by an internal motivation that reflects their own beliefs and wants," as well as those of the organization. This kind of commitment requires that the participants be:

1. Provided with as accurate and complete in-

formation as is possible

2. Considered and involved in the planning as well as the implementation of the change
3. Rewarded for their participation and assistance.

Recent evidence reaffirms the importance of rewards and knowledge of results (Pitcher 1981, p. 133). Hultman (1979, pp. 48-50) suggests four conditions favorable to change. First, people are more likely to change if their present values, beliefs, or behaviors no longer allow them to adequately meet their needs. Second, people are usually more willing to change a value, belief, or behavior if they perceive that the change will help them meet their own needs. Third, people are more likely to change if they can do so voluntarily rather than as a result of coercion. Fourth, people are much more likely to change if they are actively involved in the change process.

CONCLUSIONS

A modified version of the Blockage Questionnaire appears to have merit as a diagnostic tool and perhaps as a predictive instrument for law enforcement use. The consistency of these findings suggests the reliability of the instrument. Further empirical and scientific testing, of course, would help to unravel the complex issues involved in isolating perceptions along different dimensions. As noted by Randolph (1982, p. 117) and others, while the literature on organization development has grown rapidly, few of the studies of its effects can stand the rigorous testing expected of behavioral science research.

RECOMMENDATIONS

The Blockage Questionnaire is intuitively appealing for its simplicity of administration, ease of scoring, and uncomplicated interpretation. The instrument, in its present form, is viewed as useful and worthy of use.

A refinement of the methodological issues normally raised in connection with the presentation of data obtained from nonstandardized instruments will enhance the instrument and make it more acceptable to the scientific and academic community. Francis and Woodcock themselves do not make any pretense about the sophistication of the instrument. In fact, they admonish the reader of their text that the Blockage Questionnaire "is not scientifically accurate" and suggest that the results obtained using the instrument should be subjected to further confirmation (Francis and

Woodcock 1975, p. 33). Because there is only sketchy information in the text about how the instrument was developed, several things could be done to shore up the Blockage Questionnaire as both a diagnostic and predictive tool.

First, a table of specification should be constructed to determine the relationship between the content and behavioral elements of the instrument (Payne 1968, p. 27). Second, an item analysis would be useful in determining if the best available items (statements) had been selected for the final form of the instrument (Payne 1968, p. 145). Because of the large number of dimensions and items, it would be best to do item-total correlations, difficulty indices, and intercorrelations among items on a computer (Kerlinger 1973, p. 708). Third, reliability and validity should be established. The instrument, any instrument, is of little value if it does not measure consistently—reliability—and does not measure what is intended to be measured—validity (Simon 1969, p. 24). While the Blockage Questionnaire appears to have produced consistent results, this issue should be subjected to scientific testing. Fourth, pretesting and a pilot study should be done to "try out" the instrument and to gain insight into the methodological problems inherent in analysis of the data, administration, scoring, and so on (Derlinger 1973, p. 697). The data collected by this researcher could constitute such pretesting and a pilot study. Fifth, the dichotomous (Agree-Disagree) response scale should be converted to a Likert-type scale (Strongly Agree to Strongly Disagree) in order to assess the relative degree of intensity of the blockage (Kerlinger 1973, p. 496). Sixth, a factor analysis should be done to determine if the number of dimensions in the present instrument could be reduced to a smaller number of factors. Such an analysis might ultimately reduce ambiguity in some dimensions that comprise the present instrument. For example, dimensions A and D (inadequate recruitment and selection and poor training) might contain a significant amount of common factor variance to be interpreted as a single dimension (Derlinger and Pedhazur 1973, p. 360). The factor analysis should be carried out after the scale has been converted from a dichotomous to a five-point multichotomous response. This would serve to reduce the artificial multicollinearity which occurs when factor analyses are performed on dichotomous responses (Blalock 1963, p. 237; Kerlinger and Pedhazur 1973, p. 396).

These procedures would enhance the credibility of the Blockage Questionnaire. At present, it is not possible to accurately assess the results obtained. There needs to be a gauge against which to measure the

results. What does it mean, for example, to say that a respondent agrees with 6 of 10 statements in a particular blockage dimension? Is it reasonable to expect that "most" people in the same organization, reacting to the same set of statements, under the same conditions of administration, would respond in the same way? Would the same individual react to the same set of statements in the same manner on a retest? Is the number of agreements too high or too low? Do the statements in each blockage dimension accurately reflect the nature of that dimension and only that dimension, or is there some overlap? Do the statements discriminate properly? These issues should be resolved if the Blockage Questionnaire is to be used extensively enough for more generalized comparisons of law enforcement organizations and if it is to be used as a predictive device.

IMPLICATIONS FOR THE FUTURE

At the BCPD, the Blockage Questionnaire was used as a diagnostic tool in the development of a management training program. In conjunction with a reorganization plan and change in managerial practices, the Blockage Questionnaire was used as a diagnostic tool at the FBI-WFO. The information that was surfaced was *perceived* to be of value to the special agent in charge in his successful implementation of a reorganization plan. The question that remains unanswered is, "Can the Blockage Questionnaire be of similar benefit to other law enforcement executives in the future?" The question raised by Davis (1982, p. 72) is worth pondering: "Currently, how many employees carry out their jobs every day with a clear idea of the organization's fundamental purpose?" In discussing the organization of the future, Toffler (1980, p. 281) suggests that society will need managers who can function as capably in an open-door, free-flow style as in a hierarchical mode, who can as easily walk in an organization structured like an Egyptian pyramid as in one that looks like a Calder mobile, with thin managerial strands encasing a complex set of virtually autonomous modules that move in response to the gentlest breeze. It is unlikely that Toffler was referring to private industry managers alone. Law enforcement agencies will undoubtedly continue to mirror the values of society. The kind of flexible and knowledgeable manager that society will need in the 21st century will be needed in law enforcement. This implies that the law enforcement executive and manager of tomorrow must be able to diagnose and forecast organizational needs using the views of the organization's most precious resource, its people.

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The Police: From Slaying Dragons to Rescuing Cats

By
EDWIN J. DELATTRE
*President
St. John's College
Annapolis, Md.*



Taken in its literal form, the story of St. George is a simple one. His task was to slay an evil dragon and to stand for what was good. His job was much easier than that of police officers today, since all he had to do was kill the dragon. He did not have to enforce the law, prevent crime, work in a chain-of-command, or deal with the public while abiding by policies and regulations. Also, he was not responsible for the maintenance of domestic and civil order. He did not have to work with the press, the media, or informants. He did not have to cooperate with or work in internal affairs, be guided by legislation, or accept the decisions of the courts. Finally, he did not have to provide a wide range of services for those in need, from evicted families to helpless alcoholics to lost children. He did not have to rescue cats, exercise discretion, make arrests, complete reports, testify in court, or look out for the safety of a partner. He had only to put on his uniform (in his case, a uniform made of metal), mount his vehicle (in his case, an armored horse), draw his weapon (in his case, a sword), find the dragon, and slay it. Police work is much more complex and demanding than the work of St. George. No matter how well a police officer does his work—even if he is commended for his performance—he will never be made a saint for it.

It must also be remembered that while people are terrified of dragons, a little tremor also runs through most of them in the presence of those who slay dragons. Police officers have witnessed this, I am sure, and have sensed many people drawing into themselves when the police are around, even if they have nothing to fear. This is, perhaps, why the social life of many police officers centers largely on the companionship of other law enforcement officers. They share in the tradition of St. George, because they, like him, have the authority to use force, including deadly force, even though for most officers the use of force is not commonplace. The police share in this tradition to the extent that people experience a tremor in the presence of authority conjoined with the visible trappings of power.

The job of St. George was much easier, less complex, and in some ways, more rewarding than that of today's police officer. For him, there was never any question about what to do or how to do it. Much more is asked and expected of the officer who works not in the company of saints, but in the company of human beings, from the best to the worst. And so, the first step is to have a look at the idea of human beings which underlies this country, the idea of human beings which has led to the U. S. Constitution, to our form of government, and in part, to the prevailing notions of what the proper functions of the police are.

James Madison is commonly described as "The Father of the Constitution." He is one of my heroes because he tried hard to be competent and qualified to do the work that he set out to do. The work in which he was interested was the design and construction of a durable country—one that would last—and a country in which there would be a willingness to conduct an experiment. The experiment he contemplated was an experiment in ordered liberty. He envisioned a country in which there would be long term survival of law, order, and freedom.

To make himself qualified for this work, Madison studied the best books on government and forms of nations. He also studied and observed human beings, including himself, to find out what could be expected of them. He realized that if he was wrong about human beings, the experiment was doomed to failure. He stated in the Federalist Papers:

"What is government itself but the greatest of all reflections on human nature? If men were angels, no government would be necessary. If angels were to govern men, neither external nor internal controls on government would be necessary. In framing a government which is to be administered by men over men, the great difficulty lies in this: you must first enable the government to control the governed, and in the next place oblige it to control itself."

Madison saw clearly that men are not angels—they are capable of vice as well as virtue. Because they are not angels, they cannot live together with any measure of freedom unless someone is vested with the authority and power to intervene if men begin to disregard the freedom of others to do whatever they please. But those who possess the authority and power are human beings, not angels. There must accordingly be limits to their right to intervene, to their authority, and to their power. These limits are imposed by the law and the Constitution. But those who make the laws are men and women as well—not angels. Because they must be limited, there is an executive branch of government to administer and enforce laws or veto legislation, if necessary. Beyond this, there must be a judicial system to review the constitutionality of the laws and to prosecute and defend those accused of violating them. But the judges are human beings, not angels, and they must not be allowed to elect themselves or choose their successors. The same principles apply to the police, internally and externally. Thus, Madison attempted to design a country where people could live together with liberty—a country built on the undeniable fact of life that no country is durable if it is designed as if men and women were angels. If men were angels, there would be no need for police. And if all men were devils, the police would never be enough, nor would martial law be enough.

Madison understood what the English historian Lord Acton put into words in a letter dated April 5, 1887, to Bishop Mandell Creighton. He said "Power tends to corrupt (he did not say it corrupts, but that is *tends* to corrupt), and absolute power corrupts absolutely." This is why tyranny—absolute power vested in someone—always ends in disaster. Nobody can handle absolute power without sooner or later being overwhelmed by it and using it abusively. America has a better idea.

The police have both authority and power, but like the rest of us, they are not angels. The challenge of police work is to live with these three factors simultaneously. The way to meet the challenge is to act as Madison did—do everything possible to become the kind of person to whom authority and power can be entrusted and the kind of police officer, patrol or command, who can exercise authority responsibly and use power in the right ways at the right times for the right reasons.

It is because this is the challenge of police work that police work must be taken seriously. To be a competent police officer is a tremendous achievement—few human accomplishments related to work are more impressive. To be an efficient officer requires technical skills, self-knowledge, a capacity for sound judgment, the ability to make rapid decisions about people and events, patience, the ability to cooperate, preparedness to draw the line on how far an incident is allowed to develop, and sensitivity to suffering. At the same time, an officer must have very thick skin, courage, respect for the law, personal restraint, concern for justice and fairness, the ability to face human depravity, hopelessness, viciousness, and deceit. He must possess the ability to face predators and victims without being destroyed by them and the self-discipline required to face hours of boredom without becoming indifferent or lax. A good police officer is like the

transmission of a fine highway tractor—10 speeds forward, 3 in reverse, with a clutch that makes it possible to move from one to another smoothly and virtually at will. Few occupations require so much or are exposed to as much scrutiny or criticism. Harry Truman had the right answer to those who complained when he said, "If you can't stand the heat, get out of the kitchen."

If you can't tolerate having colleagues who do not attempt to be good police officers, leave the profession, because they will always be there. If you haven't the patience to deal with questionable court decisions, leave the profession, because they will always be there. If you can't stand public officials, incompetent officials, an indifferent or cowardly public—persons who are afraid to get involved—leave the profession, because they will always be there. If you dislike making decisions of magnitude in a hurry—decisions on which you may be second-guessed—leave the profession, because they will always be there. If you dislike people getting away with something when you know they are guilty, leave the profession, because they will always be there. These are the burners on the stove in the kitchen, and they are always lit, emanating heat. But before you leave the profession, notice that in every walk of life, when people are entrusted with responsibility and the authority to exercise discretion, and in every occupation where one deals with the public and its agencies, the conditions are largely the same. The problems are prominent and they grind on us. But the experiment in ordered liberty looks to be a lot better than the alternatives. When you are appalled by all these sources of heat, remind yourself of your good colleagues, decent citizens, worthwhile officials, competent journalists, sound laws, and appropriate convictions for crime. Think of the good things—they are always there.

So, if this is the challenge—to exercise authority responsibly and to use power appropriately in circumstances which are far from ideal, and when none of us is an angel—how, in practice, is it to be met?

“. . . the challenge [is] to exercise authority responsibly and to use power appropriately in circumstances which are far from ideal. . . .”

The first consideration is acquiring the technical skills necessary to function effectively. These skills range from the basic study of psychology to the use of weapons—the former is intended to reduce the need for the latter. It is the responsibility of the police academy to provide instruction in these skills and the responsibility of senior officers to practice them as teachers in the presence of less experienced officers. Basic competence enhances technical skills.

The second consideration is self-knowledge. Not everyone is suitable for police work. Some lack the fortitude for it, some are physically inept, some are too emotionally vulnerable, and some cannot resist the temptations of it. The latter can be explained by the story of Richard Rich, who lived in the 16th century, and like the rest of us, was no angel. He was tremendously ambitious—not to accomplish anything worthwhile but to get ahead. He lusted for power, prestige, and wealth. When Rich was young, he asked Thomas More, "the man for all seasons," to give him a political appointment. Thomas declined, telling Rich that he could not handle the temptations of power. More told him that "a man should go where he won't be tempted," meaning that people should accept only jobs with temptations they can resist. Rich

disregarded More's advice and made his way into politics by accepting greater and greater bribes to betray trusts. Finally, Rich perjured himself. His perjury led to the execution of Thomas More at the hands of Henry VIII. Rich's corruption led him to the power, prestige, and wealth he wanted, but as a human being and a politician, he was worthless—he betrayed everything that was ever entrusted to him.

The temptations of police work are considerable. There are economic profits to be made from giving "the blessing" to illegal activities such as gambling, dealing, and prostitution, there are chances to be sadistic, there are sexual favors to be had, there are the benefits of providing selective protection to merchants, there are opportunities to break the law with impunity because of "the brotherhood," and there is bribery. Thus, opportunities to be tempted are more commonplace than in most occupations. There is also the temptation to think of the police as an isolated, maligned group who complains about the nature of people and institutions and who is self-indulgent with liquor and other depressants and stimulants off duty because the work is so demanding. The latter are the temptations of self-righteousness and self-pity. There is the temptation to be hard on one's family and friends because the tension in police work is so constant compared to that in most endeavors. Anyone who aspires to be really good at police work must learn to resist these temptations, must learn that they are invariably present, and must learn that the responsibilities of the office require that they be resisted successfully. The cop on the pad is an affront to every sacrifice ever made to build this country—from the diligence of Madison to the deaths of our soldiers in Vietnam. It is no refuge to insist that other people, even other police, yield to these temptations and get away with it. The badge and the shield are not licenses for personal gain. Rather, they should signify that the person who holds them is worthy of trust. The person who serves the law and the public should be committed to

the experiment in ordered liberty. When one puts on the badge, he is still a human being—he is still no angel. He is, however, expected to stand for the best in us.

Technical skills and self-knowledge are straightforward dimensions of the police officer worthy of the badge. Not all officers possess them, making it much worse for them, much worse for their colleagues, much worse for the rest of us, and much worse for the experiment in ordered liberty. That is the risk involved in being human and in entrusting authority to human beings.

As I have said, there is much to being excellent at police work. There are fundamental virtues of good personal character—wisdom, temperance, justice, courage, and integrity.

Integrity means wholeness and unity. It means being one person at work, at play, and in all parts of occupational, civic, personal, and social life. This is the kind of wholeness that makes people trustworthy, not only in the sense that they are honest but also in the sense that they make reliable, well-reasoned decisions and judgments. They don't act impulsively even when they have to act quickly. This kind of trustworthiness is akin to wisdom—to being able to read situations and people in order to understand what is meant by what one sees and hears. It is not just being street smart, being able to sense that someone is "hinky," or being able to sense that something is amiss. Important as these traits are, it goes much farther than these. When Bill Bradley, currently the junior Senator from New Jersey, played his last game for Princeton in the NCAA consolation finals, he concluded his time on the floor with a dazzling array of shots, all successful. He made baseline jumpers, fall-aways, and hook shots, some without ever looking at the basket. Asked later how he could do that, he explained that as a boy he had practiced every day, and at the end of his practice, he would shoot 10 different shots, 10 times in succession, until he made the 100 shots. This diligent practice gives one, he said, "a sense of where you are."

"Technical skills and self-knowledge are straightforward dimensions of the police officer worthy of the badge."

This same sentiment could be applied to wisdom—having a sense of where you are with respect to the Constitution, the laws, the public, your colleagues, and the other people in your lives. It takes practice to achieve it, just as it does to achieve other cardinal virtues. It comes from reading books and paying attention to one's experience. Temperance means self-control, not giving oneself over to impulse, rage, or fleeting desire for instant gratification. Justice consists of fair, nondiscriminatory treatment in light of relevant facts and circumstances. Courage means physical bravery—the bravery to make decisions, to stand by them when they are right, and to improve upon them when they are wrong.

These virtues—technical skills, self-knowledge, integrity, wisdom, temperance, justice, and courage—are the backbone of the ability to exercise discretion soundly in the performance of one's duties and the conduct of one's life. They are the characteristics that "separate the men from the boys." They are the achievements that distinguish mature adults from children and immature adults. People who achieve them do not have empty heads. They make mistakes, but they are able to avoid them frequently. They do not have hollow chests. They experience fear, but they do not run away. They experience temptation. Sometimes they yield to it, because they are not angels. Often, they succeed in resisting it—they do not betray their oaths.

Finally, there is respect for persons, not because they are good or noble, but simply because they are people. This kind of respect is embodied in the eighth amendment to the U.S. Constitution which prohibits cruel and unusual punishment. It does not prohibit cruel and unusual punishment only for decent people—it prohibits it for everyone. It is difficult, sometimes, in the company of dope users, rapists, or pimps to preserve this sense of limits as to what we can rightly do, but preserve the limits we must. In some police divisions citizens are referred to as "maggots." Officers will comment, "Why should I risk my life for some maggot?" The vision won't work. Every time a parent attempts to make a child behave by threatening to turn him over to a policeman, teaching him that the officer is to be feared, it becomes important for the officer to remember the limits and to preserve the capacity to treat people fairly and within the law, no matter how bad they are or what laws they have broken. This does not mean that the civil rights of the public are more important than those of the police, that the life of a "civilian" is more important than that of a police officer, or that an officer should never use force or violence. It does mean that the police are obliged, as Madison puts it, to govern themselves in the performance of their duties. They are obliged to remember that the most despicable person is still a human being.

Police officers who take these matters seriously bring a nobility to the work. This is not to romanticize them—they are worthy of the trust placed in them. They have taught me about institutions other than the police, and I have used what they taught me. They have explained what they say to people from other cities where it is common practice to give an officer money if stopped for a traffic violation or drunkenness. Their response is, "We don't do that here." Now, in the institutions I serve—in the college where I work—when something is not done as it should be, I say, "We don't do that here."

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III. BIBLIOGRAPHY

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